"To  neglect  the  care  of  food  supplies  is  to  expose  one's 
self  to  being  defeated  without  fighting." — Vegetius,  "De  Re 
Multari,"  Book  III.,  Chapter  XXV. 


THE  PROVISIONING 


OF  THE 


Modern  Army  in  the  Field 


BY 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  HENRY  G.  SHARPE, 

Commissary  General;  United  States  Army/ 


REVISED  AND  REARRANGED 
BY 

CAPTAIN  FRANK  A.  COOK, 

Commissary  U.  S.  A., 
Aisistant  to  the  Commissary  General. 


1909 

HUDSON  PUBLISHING  Co. 
Kansas  City,  Mo. 


NOTE. 


Upon  my  suggestion,  Captain  FRANK  A.  COOK,  of  the  Sub- 
sistence Department,  undertook  a  revision  of  "The  Provis- 
ioning of  the  Modern  Army  in  the  Field." 

It  was  his  idea,  in  the  revision,  that  by  additions  to  the  text 
and  rearrangement  of  the  subject-matter  he  could  bring  the 
volume  up  to  date  and  make  it  adaptable  for  use  as  a  book  of 
reference,  or  a  military  text-book  for  schools,  there  being  no 
American  work  which  included  a  summarization  of  the  varied 
and  extensive  literature  on  the  subject.  It  is  thought  he  has 
done  the  work  well,  and  deserves  full  credit  for  the  care,  in- 
telligence, and  thoroughness  which  the  revision  indicates. 

HENRY  G.  SHARPE, 
Commissary  General,  U.  S.  Army. 


INTRODUCTION. 


In  an  age  of  such  great  activities  as  the  present,  and  when 
so  many  books  are  being  published,  there  should  be  some 
justification  for  adding  to  the  number. 

The  fact  that  in  this  country  practically  no  books  have 
been  published  on  this  important  subject  would  seem  to  in- 
dicate that  the  public  and  the  service  are  both  indifferent  to 
the  matter,  except  spasmodically  when  attention  is  drawn  to 
it  by  reports  of  suffering.  Periods  of  peace  afford  no  oppor- 
tunities for  practical  experience,  and  indifference  to  a  subject 
indicates  lack  of  familiarity,  and  this  because  the  incentive  to 
study  and  preparation  has  not  been  made  imperative.  This 
study,  when  pursued,  must  include  all  wars  in  all  countries,  and 
especially  in  our  own. 

The  principal  object  of  this  small  treatise  is  to  give  some 
idea  of  the  difficulties  of  provisioning  troops  in  the  field,  and 
also  with  the  sincere  hope  that  upon  a  fuller  appreciation  of 
these  difficulties  a  greater  number  of  thoughtful  men  may  be 
induced  to  devise  measures  to  overcome  them,  and  at  the  same 
time  ameliorate,  if  they  cannot  prevent,  the  suffering  and 
horrors  of  war. 


334662 


PREFACE  TO  SECOND  EDITION. 


The  principles  underlying  the  feeding  of  fighting  armies 
have  been  absorbed  by  the  writer  during  two  years  of  duty  in 
the  Office  of  the  Commissary  General  of  the  Army.  During 
this  period  the  facilities  of  a  splendid  library,  presented  to  the 
Office  by  General  Sharpe,  and  the  privilege  of  free  intercourse 
and  discussion  with  him  on  the  subject,  have  afforded  the 
writer  exceptional  opportunity  for  acquiring  some  correct 
knowledge  of  the  particular  branch  of  the  military  service  in 
which  the  Office  is  interested. 

FRANK  A.  COOK, 

Captain,  Commissary,  U.  S.  Army, 
Assistant  to  the  Commissary  General. 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C., 

May  26,  1908. 


CONTENTS. 

Page, 
INTRODUCTION,  ......         9 

MOBILIZATION  AND  CONCENTRATION,      .  .  .  18 

PLAN  OF  OPERATIONS,  .  .  .  .  .19 

BASE  OF  OPERATIONS  AND  OF  SUPPLY,  ...  20 

PLANS  FOR  SUBSISTENCE,       .  .  .  .  .20 

CHARACTER  OF  SUBSISTENCE  SUPPLIES,  .  .  21 

INITIAL  SUPPLY  AT  THE  BASE,          .          .          .          .23 

EMERGENCY  RATIONS,      .....  24 

RESERVES  OF  OVENS  AND  COOKING  APPARATUS,    .          .      24 
LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION,          ....  25 

RATIONS  CARRIED  BY  AN  ARMY,       .  .  .  .27 

RENEWAL  OF  SUPPLIES,   .          .          .          .          .  28 

NUMBER  OF  WAGONS  REQUIRED,      .  .  .  .29 

DEPOTS  ON  THE  LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION,     .  .  29 

RAILROADS  AND  AUTOMOBILES,         .  .  .  .30 

UTILIZING  THE  LOCAL  RESOURCES,        .          .          .  31 

STATISTICAL  DATA,      ......       32 

METHODS  OF  OBTAINING  SUPPLIES  LOCALLY,    .  .  34 

PURCHASES — CONTRIBUTIONS,          .  .  .  -34 

REQUISITIONS — BILLETING,        ....  35 

FORAGING,        .......       38 

DUTIES  OF  SUBSISTENCE  OFFICERS,       •          -          .  39 

THE  MEAT  SUPPLY,     ......       41 

FRESH  BREAD,       ......  42 

ACCOUNTABILITY — PAPER  WORK,     .  .  .          .43 


INTRODUCTION. 


With  the  exception  of  Thiers,  historians  have  devoted  but 
little  attention  to  the  question  of  subsistence  of  armies  in  cam- 
paign, and  it  is  difficult  to  find  of  record  more  than  bare  state- 
ments to  the  effect  that  an  army  has  suffered  from  lack  of  food 
or  that  the  special  means  for  obtaining  it  had  provided  an 
ample  supply.  Explanation  as  to  why  the  food  supplies  failed 
to  reach  the  troops,  or  the  details  of  the  manner  in  which  they 
were  successfully  collected,  are  lacking. 

Military  writers  on  the  continent  of  Europe,  have,  how- 
ever, long  recognized  the  importance  of  the  subject.  The  work 
of  BALL  YET,*  published  in  1817,  followed  a  few  years  later  by 
the  extensive  treatises  of  Odier  and  Vauchelle,  were  practically 
the  beginnings  of  what  has  become  a  vast  literature  on  the 
subject  of  subsistence  of  armies  in  the  field.  The  French  have 
always  been  the  leaders  in  this  line  of  literature,  yet,  in  spite 
of  this  interest  in  the  subject  and  the  attention  they  had  de- 
voted to  it,  their  defeat  in  the  Franco-Prussian  War  of  1870 
and  1871  may  be  attributed  in  no  small  degree  to  the  complete 
failure  of  their  supply  service. 

This  fact  may  be  discouraging  to  the  student  of  questions 
of  supply;  it  did  not  discourage  the  French.  Realizing  their 
deficiencies,  they  made  a  determined  effort  to  correct  them, 
and,  to  aid  them  in  the  improvement  of  their  system,  they 
caused  to  be  translated  into  French  every  military  work  of 
value  published  in  foreign  countries.  From  the  best  of  their 
own  and  foreign  writings  on  the  subject  of  supply  they  have 
succeeded  in  evolving  a  system  the  equal,  if  not  the  superior, 
of  any  among  the  armies  of  Europe.  So  impressed  by  its  per- 

*  "  De  la  Constitution  de  1' Administration  Militaire  en  France," 
Paris. 


io  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

fection  was  Sir  CHARLES  DILKE,  after  witnessing  the  maneuvers 
of  the  French  Army  in  1891,  that  he  wrote,  in  the  Fortnightly 
Review  for  November  of  that  year,  an  article  on  "The  French 
Armies,"  in  which  he  stated:  "Germany  has  this  year  lost 
that  uncontested  supremacy  in  Europe  which  she  enjoyed  for 
twenty  years." 

The  maneuvers  of  1891  were  held  in  a  designated  portion 
of  the  country,  the  arrangements  being  made  in  advance  with 
great  elaborateness.  While  the  system  of  subsisting  the  troops 
in  the  field  in  those  maneuvers  was  a  great  success,  the  officers 
of  the  French  Intendance  realized  that  in  war  they  would  not 
have  the  opportunity  to  make  such  elaborate  preparations  be- 
forehand for  the  subsistence  of  troops  in  any  particular  region, 
and  in  the  maneuvers  of  1903  a  new  and  greater  problem  was 
given  the  French  supply  officers  to  solve.  The  place  of  the 
maneuvers  was  not  made  known  until  just  before  the  date  set 
for  the  concentration  of  the  troops,  which  consisted  of  two 
army  corps,  and  then  the  Intendance  was  obliged  to  subsist 
those  arrny  corps  from  the  resources  of  the  country  in  which 
they  operated.  It  was  done  in  an  entirely  successful  manner. 
With  practice  like  this  prior  to  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  in 
connection  with  the  theories  of  supply  with  which  the  French 
were  already  familiar,  it  is  doubtful  if  they  would  have  suffered 
the  humiliating  defeat  which  still  rankles  in  the  hearts  of  the 
French  people. 

The  English  have  written  comparatively  little  on  the  sub- 
ject of  subsistence  of  armies  in  the  field,  but  that  they  are  alive 
to  the  importance  of  it  is  clearly  shown  by  the  complete  success 
of  their  supply  system  in  the  South  African  War.  This  success 
may  be  attributed  largely  to  the  organization  in  the  British 
Army  in  1888  of  an  Army  Service  Corps.  "A  Digest  and 
Analysis  of  Evidence  taken  by  the  Royal  Commission  on  the 
War  in  South  Africa"  states,  page  no:  "There  are  only  two 
branches  of  the  immense  administration  concerned  in  the  work 
of  taking  the  troops  to  the  seat  of  war  and  of  maintaining  them 
there  which  came  in  for  unqualified  commendation,  both  as  to 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  n 

the  adequacy  of  their  supplies  and  the  capacity  with  which 
they  were  administered.  One  was  the  transport  by  sea,  the 
other  the  supply  of  food  on  land."  Page  249 :  "The  transport 
by  sea  to  South  Africa  from  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  Col- 
onies of  a  force  much  larger  than  any  which  had  ever  crossed 
the  seas  before  in  the  service  of  this  or  any  other  country  affords 
a  remarkable  illustration  not  only  of  the  greatness  of  British 
maritime  resources,  but  also  of  what  can  be  done  when  careful 
forethought  and  preparation  is  applied  to  the  object  of  utilizing 
rapidly  in  war  instruments  which  are  in  peace  solely  engaged 
in  the  purpose  of  civil  life.  If  the  same  forethought  had  been 
applied  throughout,  there  would  have  been  little  criticism  to 
make  with  regard  to  the  South  African  War."  Page  228: 
"The  evidence  shows  that  both  in  method  of  distribution  and 
in  quality  the  supply  of  food  was  one  of  the  most  successful 
features  in  the  South  African  War.  Lord  KITCHENER  said 
(1901) :  'I  consider  that  the  soldier  was  better  fed  than  in  any 
previous  campaign.  Complaints  were  few  and  far  between, 
and  the  majority  were  of  a  trivial  nature,  which  speaks  well  for 
the  sufficiency  of  the  ration  and  the  general  quality  of  the  food 
supplied.'  Lord  METHUEN  said  (14,312) :  'I  never  recollect  the 
food  supply  and  so  on  being  better,  or  so  good  as  it  was  in  this 
campaign,  from  the  beginning  to  the  end.  I  have  not  one  word 
to  say  against  it.'  Evidence  to  the  same  effect  was  given  by 
numerous  witnesses." 

Nothing  could  better  illustrate  the  importance  or  the  re- 
sult of  careful  study  in  time  of  peace  of  the  art  of  subsisting 
armies  in  war  than  the  contrast  afforded  by  England's  success 
in  South  Africa  and  her  miserable  failure  in  the  Crimea  half 
a  century  before. 

Sir  CHARLES  DILKE,  writing  in  the  United  Service  Magazine 
(London)  for  April,  1890,  said:  "The  last  considerable  war  in 
which  we  were  engaged  was  that  fought  out  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  Sevastopol.  It  was  a  war  which  called  less  than  usual 
for  special  cleverness  on  the  part  of  those  responsible  for  in- 
telligence and  for  movements.  There  were  no  great  marches, 


12  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

no  skillful  maneuvers  in  the  open  field  at  long  distances  from 
the  base.  Our  most  advanced  posts  in  the  Crimea  were  never  a 
full  day's  march  from  the  sea,  and  it  would  have  seemed  to  be 
a  simple  task  to  provide  for  the  army  in  the  field.  Yet  the 
whole  of  our  plan  utterly  broke  down.  The  horses  of  the  cav- 
alry and  artillery  were  destroyed  by  doing  common  transport 
work,  for  which  they  should  never  have  been  used;  and  the 
army  of  the  richest  nation  in  the  world,  commanding  the  seas, 
starved  almost  within  sight  of  its  own  ships  for  want  of  proper 
arrangement  as  to  food — rotted  for  lack  of  sanitary  provision — 
and,  from  the  absence  of  that  care  which  is  the  business  of  a 
general  staff,  became  a  wreck  of  itself.  Before  and  since,  the 
character  and  endurance  of  officers  and  men  kept  the  fragments 
together,  and  whatever  pride  we  now  take  in  remembering  the 
struggles  of  the  campaign  is  a  pride  in  the  endurance  of  the 
race  when  suffering  the  most  unmerited  and  unnecessary  hard- 
ships from  want  of  brain  direction.  Carelessness  at  home  in 
time  of  peace  had  to  be  atoned  for  by  magnificent  courage  and 
dogged  determination  on  the  part  of  the  soldier,  at  the  cost  of 
many  lives.  The  miserable  inquiry  as  to  the  conduct  of  the 
Crimean  War  brought  into  the  national  mind  in  a  dim  way  the 
necessity  for  some  sort  of  staff  training,  and  caused  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  Staff  College,  which  has,  on  the  whole,  done 
much  good." 

The  Civil  War  in  the  United  States  was  fought  from  1861 
to  1865  with  a  larger  number  of  troops  engaged  than  had  ever 
before  been  in  the  field.  We  find  the  following  remarks  made 
by  Hon.  E.  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War,  in  his  annual  report 
for  1865,  in  speaking  of  the  Subsistence  Department  and  of 
the  manner  in  which  the  troops  were  subsisted  in  the  field: 
"During  the  war  this  branch  of  the  Service  never  failed.  It 
answers  to  the  demand  and  is  ever  ready  to  meet  the  national 
call." 

President  LINCOLN,  during  a  visit  to  Richmond  early  in 
1865,  is  reported  to  have  said  to  an  officer  of  the  Subsistence 
Department:  "Your  Department  we  scarcely  hear  of.  It  is 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  13 

like  a  well-regulated  stomach :  works  so  smoothly  that  we  are 
not  conscious  of  having  it." 

General  DE  CHANAL,  of  the  French  Army,  who  visited  the 
United  States  in  1864,  being  sent  by  the  French  Government 
to  observe  the  operations  in  the  Civil  War,  says,  in  his  book 
entitled  "The  American  Army  in  the  War  of  Secession,"  page 
200,  in  speaking  of  the  Subsistence  Department:  "It  would 
be  difficult  for  a  commissariat  service  to  work  more  smoothly 
and  certainly  than  does  that  of  the  American  Army,  especially 
as  that  army  is  unable  to  live  upon  the  country  and  must 
carry  all  its  supplies." 

BARATIER,  writing  on  the  same  subject,  says:  "If,  from 
the  military  point  of  view,  we  cannot  always  admire  the  con- 
duct of  operations,  we  are  nevertheless  struck  with  the  vigor 
and  breadth  of  the  views  which  directed  the  organization  and 
maintenance  of  numerous  armies,  always  supplied  with  im- 
mense means  of  action;  we  are  likewise  forced  to  praise  the 
persistence  displayed  in  the  use  of  certain  methods,  especially 
pertaining  to  the  matter  of  supplies."* 

The  voluminous  reports  published  by  the  Government  in 
what  are  known  as  the  "Rebellion  Records"  contain  nearly 
all  the  military  correspondence  on  file  in  the  War  Department 
concerning  the  Civil  War  in  the  United  States;  and  it  is  a  sig- 
nificant fact  that  hardly  any  reference  is  made  to  the  operations 
of  the  Subsistence  Department. 

The  vast  mass  of  literature  that  has  been  published  rela- 
tive to  this  war  since  its  close  has  been  concerned  mostly  with 
descriptions  of  battles,  and,  with  the  exception  of  General 
Sherman,  no  American  military  writers  have  made  any  ex- 
tended reference  to  the  workings  of  the  Subsistence  Depart- 
ment during  that  war;  nor  has  any  systematic  treatise  on  the 
provisioning  of  armies  in  the  field  ever  been  published  in  the 

*A.  BARATIER,  Sous-Intendant  Militaire,  "I/ Art  de  Ravitailler  les 
Grandes  Armees,"  p.  47.  Cf.  "Puissance  Militaire  des  Etats-Unis  d' 
Amerique  d'apres  la  Guerre  de  la  Secession,  1861-1865,"  Par  F-  p-  Vigo- 
Roussillon,  Ancien  Eleve  de  1'Ecole  Polytechnique,  etc.,  Paris,  J.  Dumaine, 
1866,  p.  65. 


14  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

United  States,  except  one  elementary  book  on  ''The  Art  of 
Subsisting  Armies  in  War,"  published  in  1893,  and  the  book 
of  which  this  is  a  revision.  The  explanation  of  this  would 
seem  to  be  that  the  operations  of  the  Subsistence  Department 
during  the  Civil  War  were  conducted  so  smoothly,  as  pointed 
out  by  President  Lincoln  and  Secretary  Stanton,  that  the  im- 
portance of  the  matter  has  been  entirely  overlooked. 

Following  the  Civil  War  frequent  operations  on  the  plains 
against  hostile  Indians  led  to  erroneous  notions  as  to  the  ease 
of  subsisting  armies.  American  officers  in  those  operations 
obtained  most  excellent  training  in  the  duties  of  a  cavalry 
screen  of  an  advance  guard  of  a  modern  army,  but  nothing 
more.  Such  officers,  when  drawing  lessons  from  their  personal 
experiences,  may  be  disposed  to  think  that  all  wars  can  be 
made  somewhat  after  the  fashion  in  which  the  operations  were 
conducted  against  the  Indians,  when  very  small  bodies  of 
troops,  rarely  numbering  over  a  few  hundred,  had  to  be  sup- 
plied; and  when  of  necessity,  as  the  operations  took  place  in  a 
country  devoid  of  provisions,  all  supplies  had  to  be  taken  with 
the  command.  This  fact  must  account  for  the  impossible  or- 
ders relating  to  transportation  and  rations  published  during 
the  American  War  with  Spain  and  their  dissimilarity  to  those 
published  at  the  close  of  the  Civil  War  after  the  armies  had 
been  for  four  years  in  the  field.  The  lack  of  Civil  War  litera- 
ture, or  other  American  literature  relating  to  subsistence,  and 
the  erroneous  lessons  drawn  from  the  personal  experiences  of 
officers  on  the  plains,  combined  to  produce  practically  a  failure 
of  the  supply  departments  of  the  American  Army  in  the  War 
with  Spain,  which  failure,  had  the  war  been  of  greater  mag- 
nitude, might  have  resulted  in  a  national  disaster.  After  the 
formation  of  a  General  Staff  and  the  establishment  of  a  War 
College,  the  subject  of  supplies  in  war  began  to  receive  in  the 
United  States  the  consideration  it  demands. 

Many  of  the  famous  captains  of  the  past  have  recorded  in 
their  writings  the  great  importance  which  they  consider  should 
be  given  to  the  subject  of  the  subsistence  of  troops  in  the  field . 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  15 

Frederick  the  Great  even  made  the  assertion  that  the  art  of 
conquering  is  lost  without  the  art  of  subsistence.  In  his 
" Memoirs  and  Instructions"  he  often  goes  into  considerable 
detail,  showing  the  care  that  should  be  exercised  by  a  com- 
mander to  insure  the  subsistence  of  his  troops  in  the  field. 
He  has  likewise  incorporated  this  same  subject  in  his  poem  on 
"The  Art  of  War." 

During  the  Peninsular  War  the  Duke  of  Wellington  was 
necessarily  so  much  occupied  with  the  question  of  food  and 
supply  that  he  humorously  used  to  say  that  he  did  not  know 
that  he  was  much  of  a  general,  but  that  he  prided  himself  up- 
on being  a  first-class  commissariat  officer.  (MAURICE,  "War," 

P-  25.) 

Military  writers  on  the  continent  of  Europe  have  pointed 
out  that  the  failure  of  provisions  is  the  greatest  deprivation 
that  can  occur  to  an  army;  that  it  destroys  discipline  when  it 
is  most  necessary,  and  that  it  can  ruin  the  very  best  army  in 
a  short  time.  This  is  clearly  shown  in  "Memoirs  of  Baron  de 
Marbot,"  page  439.  During  the  campaign  in  Portugal,  a 
French  sergeant,  wearied  of  the  misery  in  which  the  army  was 
living  through  lack  of  provisions,  persuaded  about  a  hundred 
men  to  desert  and  become  marauders.  The  sergeant  gained 
the  expressive,  if  contemptuous,  name  of  "Marshal  Stockpot," 
and  his  band  became  so  bold  and  impudent  that  the  French 
commanders  were  compelled  to  detach  a  force  to  storm  their 
stronghold  and  exterminate  them. 

A  few  quotations  from  great  commanders  and  famous 
military  writers  will  serve  to  close  this  Introduction,  which  is 
written  in  an  attempt  to  impress  upon  the  reader  the  importance 
of  the  subject  that  is  treated  by  this  book : 

"The  art  of  conquering  is  lost  without  the  art  of  subsistence." — 
Frederick  the  Great. 

"The  art  of  subsisting  a  body  of  men  in  the  field  is  among  the  most 
difficult." — Jomini.  Quoted  by  Lewal  in  " Etudes  de  Guerre,"  p.  4. 

"It  is  frequently  a  more  difficult  task  than  to  direct  certain  opera- 
tions."— General  Foy,  in  "Etudes  de  Guerre,"  p.  4. 


1 6  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

"Famine  is  more  cruel  than  steel,  and  starvation  has  ruined  more 
armies  than  have  battles." — MontecucuH,  in  "Etudes  de  Guerre''  p.  5. 

"The  misfortune  of  lacking  food  and  forage  is  the  greatest  that  can 
befall  an  army,  for  it  destroys  discipline  at  a  time  when  it  is  most  nec- 
essary, and  it  may  in  a  short  time  ruin  an  army." — Guvion  Saint-Cyr,  in 
"Etudes  de  Guerre,"  p.  6. 

"  A  commander-in-chief  expends,  in  our  day,  more  thought  in  assuring 
subsistence  to  his  troops  than  for  any  other  purpose,  and  his  best-laid 
plans  are  constantly  being  opposed  and  their  effect  lost  through  the  lack 
of  timely  issues." — Marmont,  "Esprit  des  Institutions  Militaires,"  Chapter 
V.,  p.  105. 

"Without  regular  issues  of  supplies  nothing  is  possible.  Their  im- 
portance equals  and  even  surpasses  that  of  the  plans  of  battle  themselves. 
Before  marching  comes  existence,  and  this  requires  food.  Before  fighting, 
supplies  must  be  provided.  After  the  battle  the  wounded  require  our  care. 
The  renewal  of  subsistence  constitutes  one  of  the  gravest  preoccupations 
of  the  military  commander.  It  is  a  vital  and  decisive  question,  which  he 
must  not  for  a  moment  neglect,  for  success  depends  upon  its  observance." 
— Lewal,  "Etudes  de  Guerre,"  p.  5. 

"The  difficulty  of  finding  food  for  an  army  is  one  of  the  greatest 
difficulties  of  war.  How  is  it  that  the  most  distinguished  generals,  who 
have  seen  their  combinations  fail  in  consequence  of  it,  have  not  found  its 
solution?" — Marmont,  "Esprit  des  Institutions  Militaires." 

"In  an  army  the  commander  is  either  all  or  nothing;  unless  he  can 
control  the  auxiliary  services,  he  will  certainly  be  controlled  by  them. 
He  must  be  either  master  or  servant.  There  can  be  no  other  alternative." 
— Lewal,  "Etudes  de  Guerre,"  p.  18. 

"Nothing,  in  fact,  that  may  contribute  to  the  success  of  operations 
can  be  considered  as  beneath  the  rank  or  genius  of  the  commanders." — 
Thiers,  "Consulat,"  Hi).  4. 

"Mobility  and  power  of  action  in  an  army  depend  upon  a  proper 
balance  between  its  numerical  strength  and  the  available  resources  of  the 
seat  of  war.  Beyond  a  certain  number,  the  strength  of  the  army  is  but  a 
load  that  crushes  it.  The  want  of  food  and  forage  strikes  at  discipline 
and  hampers  military  operations.  It  must  in  a  brief  period  weaken  an 
army,  particularly  when  it  is  engaged  in  making  a  long  retreat." — "Me- 
moires  Militaires  du  Lieutenant-General  Comte  Roguet"  Tome  IV.,  p.  641. 

"Men  brought  together  in  large  numbers  have  wants;  the  talent  to 
satisfy  those  with  order,  economy,  and  intelligence  forms  the  science  of 
administration." — "Esprit  des  Institutions  Militaires,"  by  Marechal  Mar- 
t, Chapter  IV.,  p.  122. 

"Companion  and  sister  of  tactics,  administration  often  anticipates 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  17 

and  always  aids,  but  never  hinders  it." — Odier,  "Cours  d' Etudes  sur  I' Ad- 
ministration Militaire"  Vol.  IV.,  p.  298. 

"The  great  strategical  movements  of  armies  have  depended  always 
upon  their  means  of  obtaining  food  and  warlike  supplies." — Colonel  Mau- 
rice, "War,"  p.  13. 

"An  army  is  a  city  flung  down  suddenly  in  the  country,  each  day 
moving,  each  day  requiring  fresh  alterations  in  the  arrangement  by  which 
food  is  conveyed  from  the  producer  to  the  consumer.  Yet  this  portion  of 
the  Art  of  War — one  of  the  most  important,  if  not  the  most  important — re- 
ceives but  scant  notice.  'War  is  the  art  of  being  the  strongest  at  any 
given  place,'  and  that  portion  of  the  Art  of  War  that  keeps  the  greatest 
number  of  bayonets  in  the  ranks  is  surely  not  to  be  despised." — Home, 
"Precis  of  Modern  Tactics"  p.  186. 

"An  army  must  be  fed,  and  many  people  rarely  consider  the  mag- 
nitude of  the  operation.  The  action  of  an^army  in  the  field,  its  marches 
and  its  battles,  the  lists  of  killed  and  wounded,  are  what  chiefly  strike  the 
eye  of  the  looker-on;  when  a  man  is  killed  or  wounded,  or  even  when  he 
is  taken  prisoner,  his  loss  is  chronicled;  but  the  man  is  just  as  much  lost 
if  he  dies  or  is  invalided  from  want  of  food  or  medical  aid.  We  read  of 
so  many  guns  and  standards  captured;  but^who  notices  the  losses  from 
privations  and  hardships?  Yet  the  losses^from  the  latter  causes  far  out- 
weigh those  from  the  former." — Home,  "Precis  of  Modern  Tactics"  p.  186. 

"The  feeding  of  an  army  is  a  matter  .of  the  most  vital  importance, 
and  demands  the  earliest  attention  of  f the"  general  entrusted  with  the 
campaign." — General  Sherman,  "Memoirs"  Vol.  II.,  p.  389. 


THE  SUBSISTENCE  OF  MODERN  ARMIES 
IN  WAR. 


MOBILIZATION  AND  CONCENTRATION. 

Before  an  army  takes  the  field  two  distinct  operations  have 
to  be  effected — namely,  the  mobilization  and  the  concentra- 
tion. Mobilization  is  the  act  of  putting  troops  in  a  state  of 
readiness  for  active  service  in  war.  Concentration  is  the  act  of 
bringing  together  the  mobilized  troops  at  threatened  points  or 
at  convenient  points  for  taking  the  offensive. 

The  important  advantages  of  assuming  the  initiative  in  a 
campaign  have  been  so  often  illustrated  in  history  that  most 
of  the  great  nations  of  the  earth  now  have  definite  detailed 
plans  for  the  mobilization  of  their  armies. 

"In  1859  it  took  thirty-seven  days  for  France  to  collect 
on  the  River  Po  a  force  of  104,000  men,  with  12,000  more  in 
Italy.  In  1866  the  Prussian  armies  (220,000  in  number)  were 
placed  on  the  frontiers  of  Saxony  and  Silesia  in  a  fortnight ; 
and  in  1870  Germany  was  able  to  mobilize  her  forces  in  nine 
days,  and  to  send  in  eight  days  more,  to  the  French  frontier, 
an  army  of  400,000  soldiers  and  1,200  guns."* 

"The  system  of  mobilization  of  the  German  Army,  the 
most  complete  there  is,  is  no  new  operation;  it  dates  from  the 
3d  of  April,  1809,  and  ever  since  then,  when  any  change  has 
been  effected  in  the  organization,  a  corresponding  modification 
in  the  mobilization  has  been  introduced.  Notwithstanding 
that  in  1870  some  corps  had  completed  their  mobilization  in 
seven  days,  and  were  able  to  commence  moving  toward  the 
frontier  on  the  eighth  day,  the  German  Staff  is  striving  to  re- 

*VoYLE,  "A  Military  Dictionary,"  third  edition,  p.  260. 

18 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  19 

duce  this  interval  of  time,  small  indeed  as  it  is,  by  one  or  two 
days."* 

The  construction  of  elevated  roads  in  Berlin  necessitated 
a  complete  change  in  the  German  plan  of  mobilization  so  as 
to  gain  a  few  hours  in  the  execution  of  that  operation. 

Proper  plans  for  mobilization  include  the  storage  at  con- 
venient points  of  a  reserve  of  supplies  and  necessary  arrange- 
ments for  increasing  the  personnel  of  the  supply  departments, 
in  order  that  the  greater  demands  of  the  mobilized  army  may 
be  promptly  met.  The  methods  of  subsistence  during  the  pre- 
paratory period  of  mobilization  and  concentration  will  not 
differ  materially  from  those  used  in  time  of  peace,  but  such 
changes  as  may  be  necessary  in  the  application  of  those  meth- 
ods to  meet  the  new  conditions  should  be  elaborately  planned 
as  a  part  of  the  scheme  of  mobilization.  It  is  only  when  the 
period  of  active  operations  has  been  entered  upon  that  the 
serious  problems  of  subsistence  begin. 

PLAN  OF  OPERATIONS. 

As  stated  by  YONDER  Goorz  ("The  Conduct  of  War,  "page 
97),  "A  complete  plan  for  enterprises  in  the  field  is  impossible, 
because  we  have  to  reckon  with  the  independent  will  of  the 
opponent."  It  is,  however,  highly  important  that  definite 
ideas  be  formed  as  to  the  object  of  a  campaign,  a  fixed  purpose, 
to  the  consummation  of  which  the  energies  of  the  commander 
must  be  persistently  directed.  It  is  stated  that  Napoleon  I. 
has  made  the  assertion  that  he  never  had  a  plan,  yet  we  see 
that  all  his  undertakings  were  directed  from  the  beginning  at 
some  large  and  definite  object.  A  plan  of  operations  can  state 
what  we  desire  to  do  and,  with  the  means  available,  hope  to 
accomplish,  but  the  separate  movements  and  enterprises  to  be 
undertaken  to  accomplish  the  object  cannot  be  arranged  in 
advance.  The  farthest  range  of  a  detailed  plan  can  generally 

*FuRSE,  "Mobilization  and  Embarkation  of  an  Army  Corps,"  p.  2. 
See  also  Bronsard  von  Schellendorf,  "The  Duties  of  the  General  Staff," 
Vol.  II.,  p.  109. 


20  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

not  extend  beyond  the  concentration.  Thereafter  much  must 
depend  upon  the  result  of  the  first  serious  encounter  with  the 
enemy.  But  always  the  great  general  purpose  must  be  kept 
in  mind. 

BASE  OF  OPERATIONS  AND  OF  SUPPLY. 

Consideration  of  a  general  plan  of  operations  involves  the 
selection  of  a  base.  Colonel  MACDOUGAL,  in  his  "Theory  of 
War,"  explains  that  the  base  of  operations  is  "the  point,  line, 
or  district  from  which  an  army  starts  and  from  which  all  its 
reinforcements  and  supplies  proceed  when  it  is  committed  in  a 
campaign.  It  may  be  a  single  town;  it  may  be  a  frontier  line 
of  any  length,  or  a  line  of  sea-coast,  if  the  army  possesses  the 
command  of  the  sea;  or  it  may  be  a  district  or  a  county,  having 
breadth  as  well  as  length.  Whatever  be  its  nature,  it  must  be 
such  that  the  army  retreating  upon  it,  in  case  of  disaster,  shall, 
on  reaching  it,  find  succor  and  safety." 

JOMINI,  in  his  "Precis  de  1'Art  de  la  Guerre,"  published  in 
1839,  says:  "The  base  of  operations  is  most  generally  that  of 
supply, — though  not  necessarily  so,  at  least  as  far  as  food  is 
concerned, — as,  for  instance,  a  French  army  upon  the  Elbe 
might  be  subsisted  from  Westphalia  or  Franconia,  but  its  real 
base  would  certainly  be  upon  the  Rhine."  However,  at  the 
beginning  of  a  campaign  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  conditions 
which  would  result  in  the  establishment  of  one  base  from  which 
the  army  is  to  proceed  and  another  base  from  which  supplies 
are  to  be  forwarded  to  it. 

Assuming,  then,  that  the  bases  of  operations  and  supply 
are  coincident,  it  is  evident  that  the  base  must  be  selected  not 
only  with  reference  to  the  military  operations  that  are  to  pro- 
ceed therefrom,  but  also  so  that  it,  as  well  as  the  army  beyond 
it,  can  be  sustained  by  all  the  resources  of  the  country. 

PLANS  FOR  SUBSISTENCE. 

The  general  plan  of  operation  and  the  base  having  been 
decided  upon,  it  becomes  the  duty  of  the  Subsistence  Depart- 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  21 

ment  to  sketch  out  a  plan  of  the  measures  which  will  have  to 
be  taken  to  insure  the  regular  provisioning  of  the  army.  It 
must  be  shown  how  subsistence  affairs  are  to  be  administered, 
the  personnel  required,  the  amount  and  character  of  the  stores 
to  be  accumulated  at  the  base,  and  the  preparations  that  must 
be  set  going  to  furnish  them  and  to  renew  the  supply.  Beyond 
the  base,  the  plan  of  supply,  like  the  plan  of  operations,  cannot 
be  arranged  in  detail.  Much  will  depend  upon  the  course  of 
events  and  upon  the  resources  of  the  theater  of  war.  We 
should  in  peace  tabulate  and  keep  up  to  date  the  resources  of 
all  countries  that  are  likely  to  become  theaters  of  war,  but  it  is 
wrong  in  principle  to  place  any  reliance,  in  the  preliminary  ar- 
rangements, upon  our  tabulated  data.  If,  upon  penetrating 
the  enemy's  country,  it  is  found  that  its  resources  can  be 
utilized,  then  the  flow  of  supplies  from  the  rear  can  be  stopped; 
but  the  supplies  must  nevertheless  be  at  the  base,  lest  the 
resources  upon  which  we  have  counted  fail. 

During  the  preparatory  period,  then,  supplies  must  be  ac- 
cumulated and  stored  at  various  depots  at  the  base,  the  amount 
to  be  stored  depending  upon  the  strength  of  the  command  and 
being  independent  of  the  probable  resources  in  the  theater  of 
operations.  This  is  practically  all  that  can  be  done  by  the 
supply  departments  prior  to  the  opening  of  a  campaign,  except 
that  in  time  of  peace,  whether  or  not  war  is  in  sight,  elaborate 
plans  should  be  perfected  for  the  organization  of  the  service  at 
the  base  and  along  the  lines  of  communications,  statistical 
data  should  be  collected,  and  general  regulations  should  be 
promulgated  and  mastered  relative  to  the  utilization  of  the 
local  resources. 

CHARACTER  OF  SUBSISTENCE  SUPPLIES. 

A  ration  is  the  daily  allowance  of  food  for  one  man.  The 
subsistence  supplies  to  be  stored  at  the  base  will  consist  largely 
of  the  articles  composing  the  national  ration.  The  composition 
of  the  ration  is  governed  by  the  national  dietary,  and  varies  in 
most  countries  according  to  the  nature  of  the  service  to  be  per- 


22  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

formed.  It  is  a  principle  of  dietetics  that  the  greater  the 
amount  of  muscular  exertion  the  more  nutritive  must  be  the 
food  consumed.  So  that  the  soldier  in  war  should,  theoreti- 
cally, have  a  better  ration  than  when  in  garrison;  but  with 
large  modern  armies  this  principle  has  to  be  ignored,  for  the 
problem  of  the  subsistence  of  such  armies  is  practically  a  trans- 
portation problem  only.  The  larger  the  ration  the  greater  the 
amount  of  transportation  required,  and  the  greater  the  trans- 
portation the  less  the  mobility  and  consequently  the  efficiency 
of  the  troops,  for  rapidity  of  movement  is  one  of  the  essentials 
of  success  in  war.  Accordingly,  we  find  that  nations  hava 
adopted  as  the  ration  for  campaigns  one  consisting  of  the  most 
essential  components  of  the  peace  ration,  selected  with  refer- 
ence to  their  portability,  keeping  qualities,  and  nutritive  value. 
The  less  essential  components  are  omitted  entirely,  and  the 
quantities  of  the  components  used  are  reduced  to  the  minimum 
consistent  with  affording  a  fair  amount  of  nourishment.  While 
the  campaign  ration  is  the  one  intended  to  be  issued  habitually 
in  active  service,  it  is  recognized  that  opportunities'  will  not  be 
infrequent  for  increasing  the  issue  to  the  full  peace  ration  or 
even  to  a  greater  extent  by  means  of  supplies  procured  in  the 
theater  of  operations  or  by  shipments  from  the  rear  when  the 
army  is  stationary. 

There  should,  then,  be  stored  at  the  base  not  only  a  liberal 
supply  of  campaign  rations,  but  also  an  assortment  of  other 
stores  ready  for  shipment  forward  to  the  fighting  army  when- 
ever opportunity  occurs,  and  for  issue  to  the  sick  and  at  sta- 
tions occupied  by  inactive  forces.  Upon  the  chief  commissary 
at  the  base  devolves  the  important  duty  of  making  a  wise  se- 
lection of  these  extra  stores  and  an  approximate  estimate  of 
the  amounts  required.  Their  issue  to  the  fighting  forces  during 
any  lull  in  the  operations  when  transportation  is  available 
should  be  made  with  liberality,  without  strict  adherence  to  the 
letter  of  the  law.  The  commissary  officer  who  hesitates  to  as- 
sume responsibility  will  surely  be  a  failure. 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  23 

INITIAL  SUPPLY  AT  THE  BASE. 

The  amount  of  supplies  to  be  stored  at  the  base  will  depend 
upon  the  number  of  troops  and  camp-followers  to  be  supplied, 
but  it  would  be  an  inexcusable  lack  of  foresight  to  limit  the 
amount  by  the  actual  requirements  as  computed.  The  com- 
plete uncertainty  of  war  forbids  it.  The  possible  necessity  for 
the  prompt  sending  forward  of  heavy  reinforcements  before 
supplies  can  be  collected  for  them,  the  loss  of  a  supply  train, 
the  deterioration  of  stores,  the  capture,  perhaps,  of  thousands 
of  prisoners  who  must  be  fed,  and  other  contingencies  impossible 
to  foresee,  render  it  imperative  that  the  depots  at  the  base  be 
stocked  with  a  most  liberal  reserve  of  stores. 

VON  DER  GOLTZ,  in  "The  Nation  in  Arms,"  page  373,  says: 

"He  who,  according  to  directions,  calculates  the  needs  of 
an  army  in  the  field  in  pounds  and  provides  for  it  according  to 
the  most  careful  dispositions,  certainly  will  scarcely  ever  run 
the  risk  of  a  portion  of  the  supplies  he  has  furnished  being 
spoiled.  But  the  army  will  suffer  by  this  arrangement.  Two 
and  three  times  as  much  as  an  army  needs'must  be  supplied, 
if  it  is  to  be  kept  from  want;  double  and  treble  in  respect  to 
the  good  quality  of  the  provisions,  double  and  treble  of  the 
quantity." 

And  in  the  same  book,  page  374,  CLAUSEWITZ  is  quoted  as 
follows : 

"The  strength  to  endure  privation  is  one  of  the  noblest 
virtues  in  a  soldier,  *  *  *  but  this  privation  must  be 
merely  temporary,  caused  by  the  force  of  circumstances,  and 
not  the  result  of  *  *  *  a  parsimonious  abstract  calcula- 
tion of  absolute  necessity." 

From  May  i  until  August  12,  1864,  the  daily  average 
number  of  rations  forwarded  from  Chattanooga  to  Sherman's 
Army,  which  numbered  105,000  effective  men  and  30,000  civil 
employees,  was  412,000  rations — more  than  three  rations  for 
every  man  that  left  Chattanooga  on  that  campaign.  (Sv- 
MONDS,  "The  Report  of  a  Commissary  of  Subsistence,"  pages 
130  and  158.) 


24  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

EMERGENCY  RATIONS. 

An  emergency  ration,  as  its  name  implies,  is  a  ration  in- 
tended to  be  used  only  on  emergent  occasions.  It  is  a  reserve 
ration,  carried  habitually  by  the  soldier,  who  is  not  permitted 
to  open  it  except  by  order  of  an  officer  or  in  extremity.  The 
emergency  ration  has  been  referred  to  as  "a  substitute  for 
nothing."  Its  greatest  usefulness  is  on  the  firing-line,  when, 
separated  from  their  supplies,  and  with  their  regular  rations 
consumed,  the  troops  can,  by  using  it,  prolong  the  battle  for 
twenty-four  to  thirty-six  hours.  The  principal  requirements  of 
such  a  ration  are  that  it  be  light  in  weight,  of  small  volume, 
put  up  in  a  package  of  suitable  shape  for  carrying  in  the  haver- 
sack, capable  of  being  eaten  without  any  preparation  requiring 
the  use  of  fire,  and  readily  procurable  in  large  quantities  in 
time  of  war;  and  it  must  provide  sufficient  nourishment  to 
maintain  the  strength  and  vigor  of  a  man  for  one  day. 

It  is  the  duty  of  commanding  officers  to  see  that  every 
man  has  an  emergency  ration  when  starting  on  a  campaign. 
The  Subsistence  Department  must  store  and  maintain  a  reserve 
of  these  rations  at  the  base  and  push  forward  a  supply  of  them 
to  depots  within  reach  of  the  troops,  with  a  view  to  the  prompt 
issue  of  another  ration  when  one  has  been  consumed. 

RESERVES  OF  OVENS  AND  COOKING  APPARATUS. 

Field  bakeries  are  provided  for  in  most  of  the  large  armies 
of  the  world,  and  for  such  armies  it  is  important  that  a  reserve 
supply  of  ovens  and  apparatus  pertaining  thereto  be  stored  at 
the  base,  available  for  replacing  those  worn  out  or  lost  in  the 
service. 

Likewise  a  reserve  of  apparatus  for  cooking  should  be 
stored  at  the  base,  although  individual  cooking  must  generally 
be  resorted  to  during  the  progress  of  a  campaign.  However, 
at  the  base,  at  depots  along  the  line  of  communications,  at 
hospitals,  at  permanent  stations  occupied  by  portions  of  the 
field  army,  and  even  at  the  front  during  inactive  periods,  such 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  25 

cooking  apparatus  comes  in  play.  Cooking  by  organizations 
permits  the  employment  of  trained  cooks  and  the  preparation 
of  more  elaborate  and  palatable  meals  than  is  possible  when 
each  man  cooks  for  himself.  Moreover,  it  conduces  to  the  con- 
tentment of  the  men  and  gives  them  more  time  for  rest.  Cook- 
ing by  organizations  rather  than  by  individuals  has  always 
been  the  rule  in  the  United  States  Army,  but  the  reverse  is  true 
in  most  European  armies.  This  probably  accounts  for  the 
present  enthusiasm  of  the  German  Army  over  their  recently 
adopted  rolling  kitchen. 

On  account  of  the  necessity  of  reducing  the  transportation 
of  modern  armies  to  the  minimum,  it  will  seldom  be  practicable 
or  wise  to  carry  cooking  apparatus,  even  rolling  kitchens,  along 
with  an  army  as  a  part  of  its  authorized  impedimenta.  But  a 
supply  of  cooking  outfits  should  nevertheless  be  stored  at  the 
base,  ready  for  shipment  from  there  to  such  portions  of  the 
army  as  can  use  them. 

LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION. 

The  supplies  carried  by  armies  are  renewed  either  from 
the  country  invaded  or  by  shipments  from  the  base.  The  latter 
is  the  principal  source  of  supply,  and  a  commander  is  com- 
pelled, therefore,  to  maintain,  at  all  periods  of  the  operations, 
an  uninterrupted  connection  with  it.  This  connection  is  nec- 
essary, not  only  to  enable  him  to  draw  his  reinforcements  and 
supplies  therefrom,  but  also  that  he  may  return  to  it  from  the 
army  everything  which  is  likely  to  impair  its  mobility.  The 
routes  by  which  this  connection  is  kept  up,  be  they  rail,  water, 
or  road,  are  termed  the  "lines  of  communications."* 

*Cf.  Clarke,  "Lectures  on  Staff  Duties."  p.  52. 

Wolseley,  "The  Soldier's  Pocket-book  for  Field  Service,"  fifth  edition, 
p.  150. 

Pierron,  "Strategic  et  Grande  Tactique,"  Tome  I.,  p.  323;  also  see 
"Ordinance  of  the  King  of  Prussia,"  dated  July  20,  1872,  given  in  the 
same  volume,  p.  333. 

Von  Schellendorff,  "The  Duties  of  the  General  Staff,"  Vol.  II.,  p. 
237,  et  seq. 

Von  der  Goltz,  "The  Nation  in  Arms,"  p.  377. 


26  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

Along  the  lines  of  communication  there  will  alway  s  be 
two  streams  flowing  in  opposite  directions :  one  of  supplies  and 
reinforcements  from  the  base  to  the  army;  the  other  of  the 
sick,  the  wounded,  prisoners,  captured  arms,  trophies,  un- 
serviceable supplies,  etc.,  from  the  army  to  the  rear.  To  feed 
and  provide  transport  and  accommodations  for  the  detachments 
of  men  and  animals  passing  along  the  line,  without  interfering 
with  the  transit  of  supplies  to  the  army,  is  no  easy  matter. 

The  multifarious  requirements  cannot  evidently  be  looked 
after  by  the  commanding  general  of  the  troops  in  the  field,  but 
must  be  committed  to  the  charge  of  an  experienced  officer, 
subordinate  to  the  commanding  general,  with  a  sufficient  staff 
of  officers  and  clerks  to  assist  him.  This  officer  is  usually  des- 
ignated as  the  "general, of  communications."  His  charge  ex- 
tends from  the  base  of  operations  to  the  most  advanced  depot 
of  supplies,  inclusive. 

The  functions  of  the  subsistence  officer  on  his  staff  are  to 
keep  the  base  depots  stocked  with  food,  to  furnish  it  to  troops 
or  others  entitled  to  it  moving  or  stationed  along  the  line  of 
communication,  and  to  push  it  forward  to  within  reach  of  the 
army  in  the  field.  His  duties,  it  is  seen,  can  be  stated  in  a 
simple  manner,  but  the  performance  of  them  requires  adminis- 
trative ability  of  a  high  order. 

Baratier,  "L/Art  de  Ravitailler  les  Grandes  Armees,"  p.  156,  et  seq- 

Goodrich,  "Report  of  the  British  Naval  and  Military  Operations  in 
Egypt  in  1882,"  p.  208. 

Home,  "Precis  of  Modern  Tactics/'  pp.  193  and  194. 

Furse,  "The  Organization  and  Administration  of  the  Lines  of  Com- 
munications in  War,'  the  entire  book. 

"Etudes  sur  le  Service  des  Etapes,  d'apres  les  Renseignments  Per- 
sonnels Recueillis  pendant  la  Guerre  de  1870-1871,"  par  un  officier  de 
1'Inspection  Generate  Bavaroise  des  Etapes. 

NAPOLEON  to  his  brother  Joseph  (Kaiserslautern,  September  24, 
1808) :  "According  to  the  laws  of  war,  every  general  wrho  loses  his  line  of 
communication  deserves  death.  By  'line  of  communication'  I  understand 
that  line  on  which  are  the  hospitals  and  hospital  supplies,  munitions  of 
war,  food  supplies;  where  the  army  may  be  reorganized  and  regain,  after 
two  days'  rest,  its  morale,  which  it  may  have  lost  through  an  unforeseen 
accident." — Pierron,  "Strategic  et  Grand  Tactiqtie,"  Vol  I.,  p.  20. 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  27 

RATIONS  CARRIED  BY  AN  ARMY. 

An  army  starting  from  the  base  takes  along  with  it  several 
days'  supplies  of  rations,  the  number  depending  somewhat 
upon  the  nature  of  the  service  to  be  performed.  Most  nations 
fix  the  minimum  number  of  rations  to  be  carried  by  their  arm- 
ies, and  allot  to  various  units  the  necessary  number  of  wagons 
or  other  transportation  required  to  carry  this  minimum  number, 
relying  upon  the  theater  of  operations  to  furnish  additional 
transportation  if  circumstances  render  it  necessary  to  carry 
more  rations. 

The  rations  with  which  an  army  starts  from  its  base  are 
distributed : 

1.  On  the  man  or  horse; 

2.  In  wagons  or  other  transportation  attached  to 

small  units; 

3.  In  wagons  following  each  division,  far  to  the  rear. 

It  is  apparent  that  soldiers  themselves  should  habitually 
carry  at  least  the  current  day's  rations;  they  should  be  to  this 
extent  independent  of  transportation,  so  that  in  the  event  of 
an  unexpected  encounter  or  a  day's  continuous  march  there 
need  be  no  delay  caused  by  the  necessity  of  bringing  up  wagons 
and  making  issues.  This  principle  is  universally  recognized, 
though  the  number  of  rations  prescribed  in  various  armies  to 
be  carried  by  the  soldier  varies.  Another  important  considera- 
tion is  the  reduction  of  transportation  effected  by  the  soldiers 
carrying  rations  themselves.  Consider  two  opposing  armies  of 
1,000,000  men  each,  one  of  which  requires  the  men  to  carry  two 
days'  rations,  while  the  other  seeks  to  relieve  them  of  this 
burden  and  provides  wagon  transportation  for  all  of  its  rations. 
The  latter  will  require  no  less  than  2,500  more  wagons  drawn  by 
10,000  mules.  The  problem  of  transportation  for  immense 
armies  is  a  serious  one,  and  nothing  can  be  neglected  that  will 
reduce  the  amount  required. 

When  combat  is  probable,  the  rations  in  the  wagons  at- 


28  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

tached  to  the  units  should  be  emptied  into  the  men's  haver- 
sacks and  be  refilled  from  the  trains  far  in  rear  before  the  army 
proceeds  to  the  encounter,  for  it  is  a  serious  thing  to  expose  a 
supply  train  to  capture  by  the  enemy  or  to  bring  it  up  to  the 
vicinity  of  troops  in  action.  Their  movements  would  be  ham- 
pered, and  great  confusion  would  result  in  the  event  of  a  reverse 
and  necessary  retreat. 

The  wagons  following  in  the  immediate  rear  of  different 
small  units  are  variously  designated  and  will  here  be  referred 
to  as  "troop  trains,"  suggesting  their  proximity  to  the  troops. 
Those  following  far  in  rear  of  the  divisions  will  be  called  the 
"supply  columns." 

RENEWAL  OF  SUPPLIES. 

The  continuity  of  the  supply  is  habitually  assured  by  the 
following  method  of  procedure,  which,  of  course,  must  be 
varied  by  circumstances :  At  the  close  of  each  day  rations  are 
issued  from  the  troop  trains  to  the  men  to  replace  those  con- 
sumed during  the  day.  The  emptied  wagons  renew  their  sup- 
plies locally,  or  return  half  a  day's  march  to  the  rear  to  meet 
a  section  of  the  supply  train  with  rations,  or  await  the  arrival 
of  the  section,  according  to  circumstances.  If  the  rations  are 
obtained  from  the  section  of  the  supply  train,  the  emptied 
wagons  of  that  section  renew  their  supplies  locally  or  return  to 
the  rear  to  refill.  Because  of  the  vast  amount  of  transporta- 
tion required  for  a  modern  army  to  carry  even  its  minimum  of 
supplies,  it  is  now  generally  admitted  by  the  best  authorities 
that  operations  cannot,  as  a  rule,  be  safely  or  successfully  con- 
ducted at  a  greater  distance  than  two  days'  march  from  the 
source  of  supply — that  is,  the  supply  trains  should  never  be 
required  to  move  more  than  a  two-days'  march  away  from  the 
troops  to  renew  their  supplies.  Also,  since  the  wagons  of  the 
troop  trains  should  be  with  their  units,  always  available  to 
participate  in  a  movement,  however  unexpected,  they  should 
never  be  separated  from  the  troops  by  more  than  half  a  day's 
march. 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  29 

NUMBER  OF  WAGONS  REQUIRED. 

The  number  of  wagons  required  to  supply  an  army  from 
the  rear  increases  rapidly  as  the  distance  from  the  source  of 
supply  increases.  The  COMTE  DE  PARIS  has  furnished  a  re- 
markable calculation  on  this  subject;  he  has  shown  that  an 
army  of  100,000  men  with  16,000  animals,  to  move  ten  days' 
march  from  its  base,  would  require  10,975  wagons  of  2,000 
pounds  capacity  each,  drawn  by  65,850  mules.  He  points  out 
the  impossibility  of  dealing  with  this  number  of  wagons,  and 
states  that  even  if  the  distances  be  kept,  the  train  would  cover 
no  less  than  108  miles,  which  would  be  more  than  the  whole 
length  of  the  ten  days'  march.* 

A  calculation  by  a  different  method  to  show  the  number 
of  wagons  required  by  an  infantry  division  consisting  of  21,178 
men  and  7,785  animals,  moving  five  days'  march  from  its  base 
and  operating  there,  appears  in  the  May- June  (1909)  number 
of  the  Journal  of  the  Military  Service  Institution,  in  an  article 
entitled,  "Subsisting  Our  Field  Army  in  Case  of  War  with  a 
First-Class  Power."  The  conclusion  reached  is  that  the  train 
must  consist  of  654  four-mule  wagons,  each  of  2,500  pounds 
capacity.f 

DEPOTS  ON  THE  LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION. 

If  the  army  has  advanced  more  than  a  two-days'  march 
from  the  base,  requisitioned  wagons  must  be  sent  forward  from 
there  to  within  two  days'  march  of  the  troops  with  a  day's 
supply  for  the  emptied  section  of  the  supply  train.  On  ac- 
count of  the  difficulty  that  will  generally  be  experienced  in 
supplementing  the  regular  supply-wagons  of  an  army  by  the 
necessary  number  of  local  wagons  to  carry  forward  each  day  a 
day's  supply,  it  will  ordinarily  be  found  necessary  to  halt  the 
army  after  it  has  proceeded  two  days'  march  from  the  base,  or 

*See  Home's  "  Precis  of  Modern  Tactics,"  pages  187  and  188. 
fSee  Appendix. 


3°  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

at  most  three,  until  a  depot  of  supplies  can  be  established 
farther  to  the  front. 

Accordingly,  we  shall  find,  after  an  army  has  proceeded  a 
distance  from  the  base,  a  series  of  depots  established  along  the 
lines  of  communications,  about  two  days'  march  apart,  the 
one  farthest  to  the  front  being  known  as  the  "advance  depot," 
and  those  between  that  and  the  base  depots  as  "intermedi- 
ate depots."  The  advance  depot  should  be  within  two  days' 
march  of  the  army. 

RAILROADS  AND  AUTOMOBILES. 

Evidently  the  same  difficulties  of  transportation  will  be  ex- 
perienced in  moving  supplies  from  the  base  to  the  advance 
depot,  thence  to  the  army,  as  in  moving  them  directly  from  the 
base  to  within  reach  of  the  supply  trains  of  the  army;  and  the 
best  authorities  have  therefore  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
lines  of  communication  of  large  modern  armies  must  be  rail- 
road lines,  or  occasionally  navigable  waterways,  along  which 
depots  must  be  pushed  as  the  army  advances,  and  operations 
at  any  great  distance  from  such  lines  of  supplies  will  be  im- 
practicable on  account  of  the  difficulty  of  providing  supplies 
by  any  other  means. 

The  automobile  may  be  developed  into  a  most  useful 
means  of  transportation  for  the  supplies  of  an  army,  but  au- 
tomobiles can  never  replace  railroads,  and  it  seems  probable 
that  as  the  art  of  war  and  the  art  of  subsisting  armies  continue 
to  progress  a  corps  of  trained  railroad  constructors  and  oper- 
ators must  constitute  an  important  part  of  the  supply  depart- 
ments of  modern  armies. 

"In  a  country  with  numerous  lines  of  railway  and  vast 
quantities  of  rolling  stock  ready  at  hand  there  are  immense 
possibilities  of  attack  and  defense,  provided  it  possesses  com- 
petent military  force.  Great  bodies  of  men  and  material  can 
be  moved  over  extreme  distances  at  very  brief  notice  by  a  vig- 
orous government,  directed  by  the  necessary  skill  and  ability." 
— Holabird,  "Transportation  of  Troops  and  Supplies." 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  31 

"It  is  thus  evident  that  railways  have  become  the  true 
military  roads  of  an  army  and  that  their  location  in  the  future 
will  have  a  determining  influence  on  the  plans  of  campaign 
adopted." — Michie,  "American  Military  Roads  and  Bridges." 

"All  countries  have  not  adopted  modern  improvements, 
and  in  many  railways  either  do  not  exist  or  are  too  few  in 
number;  but  even  in  the  most  advantageous  case,  where  these 
improved  means  of  transportation  are  plentiful,  an  army  re- 
quires also  other  means  of  transport  on  account  of  the  constant 
shifting  of  direction  of  military  operations,  the  destruction  of 
railway  lines  by  a  retreating  enemy,  and  the  necessity  to  dis- 
tribute the  stores  which  the  railways  only  carry  in  bulk." — 
Furse,  "Military  Transport,"  p.  2. 

UTILIZING  THE  LOCAL  RESOURCES. 

In  the  petty  wars  of  a  great  nation,  occurring  as  they  often 
may  in  a  barbarous  or  barren  country,  dependence  must  be 
placed  almost  entirely  upon  supplies  from  the  base;  conse- 
quently such  wars  are  oftotj  prolonged  simply  because  the  dif- 
ficulties of  supply  render  rapid  movements  impossible,  but  the 
modern  wars  of  two  great  nations  will  seldom,  if  ever,  take 
place  in  regions  devoid  of  resources,  and  that  army  which,  re- 
lying upon  its  base  for  supplies,  fails  to  make  use  of  those  re- 
sources will  infallibly  be  beaten  by  the  one  that  uses  them. 
On  the  other  hand,  to  place  exclusive  reliance  upon  what  can 
be  obtained  in  the  theater  of  operations  would  ordinarily  be 
fatal,  for  the  supplies  of  no  country  are  limitless,  and  two  of 
our  immense  modern  armies  operating  in  zones  of  limited  area 
would  soon  exhaust  the  country  round  about  and  must  then 
of  necessity  draw  supplies  from  the  rear.  Armies  continually 
on  the  move,  tapping  fresh  supplies,  might  live'on  a  productive 
country,  but  concentrate  them  for  action  and  in  a  few  days  the 
available  local  supplies  are  exhausted. 

It  is  therefore  necessary  at  all  times,  even  in  rich  countries, 
to  continue  to  push  the  advance  depot  along,  regardless  of  the 
amount  of  supplies  that  the  army  is  obtaining  from  the  inhab- 
itants. The  best  plan  of  supply,  then,  is  to  live  on  the  country 
if  practicable,  keeping,  however,  the  advance  depot  stocked  and 


3  2  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

conforming  it  to  the  movements  of  the  army.  French  regula- 
tions, published  in  an  order  dated  January  n,  1893,  state  the 
principle  as  follows : 

"The  country  will  be  drawn  upon  as  if  nothing  can  be 
forwarded  from  the  rear,  but  at  the  same  time  the  trains  and 
supplies  will  be  organized  at  the  rear  as  if  nothing  can  be  ob- 
tained from  the  country  by  the  army." 

In  practice,  the  local  resources  will  furnish  most  of  the 
supplies  when  an  army  is  spread  out  or  moving;  but  when 
concentrated  or  stationary,  the  supplies  must  come  from  the 
rear. 

STATISTICAL  DATA. 

In  order  to  be  able  to  take  full  advantage  of  the  resources 
of  a  country,  we  should,  in  time  of  peace,  make  a  careful  study 
of  the  local  wealth  of  such  countries  as  may  become  theaters 
of  war.  Statistical  tables  should  be  prepared  and  kept  up  to 
date.  As  relating  to  subsistence,  the  data  compiled  should 
show  the  principal  productions  of  the  country,  the  distribu- 
tion of  the  available  resources,  the  importance  of  the  last 
harvest,  the  kind  and  number  of  cattle  and  sheep  in  the  country, 
the  number,  capacity,  and  location  of  flour-mills  and  bakeries, 
the  means  of  transportation,  railways,  steamboats,  and  or- 
dinary roads,  the  number  of  inhabitants,  the  character  of  the 
imports  and  exports.  The  necessity  of  considering  the  ex- 
ports from  a  country  in  connection  with  the  resources  is  well 
illustrated  by  the  invasion  of  Lombard  y  in  1859  by  the  French 
Army.  As  large  quantities  of  wheat  were  grown  in  that 
country,  it  was  thought  the  local  resources  would  largely 
suffice  to  provide  subsistence  for  the  troops;  but  it  was  found 
that  the  wheat  had  been  almost  entirely  exported,  wheat  bread 
not  entering  into  the  ordinary  diet  of  the  people,  and  in  con- 
sequence the  French  Army  suffered  greatly  from  lack  of  food. 
To  supplement  the  statistical  tables  of  a  country  we  should 
note  the  most  convenient  foreign  markets  in  the  vicinity  of 
each  country  from  which  we  might  make  shipments  to  better 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  33 

advantage  than  from  the  home  country.  It  must  be  remem- 
bered, however,  that  food  supplies  intended  for  the  army  are 
contraband  of  war. 

The  plan  of  campaign  may  often  be  influenced  by  consid- 
erations of  the  resources  of  the  country,  for  the  line  of  opera- 
tions should,  when  practicable,  lead  through  populous  and  fer- 
tile districts.  The  line  of  operations  having  been  selected, 
supply  officers  moving  along  that  line  can  often  be  materially 
assisted  in  making  their  requisitions,  if  supplied  with  detailed 
information  regarding  the  resources.  A  knowledge  of  the  re- 
sources will  also  effect  shipments  to  the  base.  A  hundred  years 
ago  NAPOLEON  reprimanded  his  Chief  of  Staff,  as  follows: 

"I  think  it  ridiculous  to  send  flour  from  Metz  and  Nancy 
to  Donauwerth ;  by  this  means  we  shall  end  by  getting  nothing 
at  all;  the  country  will  be  overrun  with  transport,  and  enor- 
mous expense  will  be  incurred.  I  will  have  none  of  these 
measures.  It  would  have  been  far  simpler,  in  so  rich  a  country 
as  Germany,  to  get  what  was  wanted  by  purchase.  In  twenty- 
four  hours  you  might  have  collected  as  much  flour  and  wheat 
as  you  could  have  wished.  I  beg  of  you,  Daru  [the  Commissary 
General],  to  make  it  clearly  understood  that  it  is  my  intention 
to  bring  nothing  from  France  that  can  be  procured  in  Ger- 
many."- -"The  Line  of  Communications ,"  Furse,  p.  91. 

Prior  to  the  Franco-Prussian  War  of  1870-1871,  Germany 
seems  to  have  been  the  only  nation  to  have  devoted  any  con- 
siderable attention  to  the  important  subject  of  statistics;  and 
it  may  be  assumed  that  during  that  war  that  nation  made  full 
use  of  her  knowledge  of  the  resources  of  France,  for  it  is  stated 
that  one-third  of  her  supplies  of  food  and  forage  were  obtained 
in  that  country.  While  no  attention  had  been  paid  to  this 
subject  in  the  United  States  until  the  present  decade,  SHERMAN 
states,  in  his  "Memoirs,"  that  he  had  in  his  possession,  prior  to 
his  starting  on  the  expedition  that  made  him  famous,  detailed 
information  as  to  the  resources  of  the  various  counties  of 
Georgia.  It  is  well  to  reflect  upon  this  bare  statement  of  his. 
The  French  are  now  fully  alive  to  the  importance  of  this  sub- 
ject. Their  statistical  data  relates  to  all  matters  affecting  sup- 

—3 


34  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

plies  and  is 'systematically  kept  up  to  date  and  in  great  detail, 
and  applied  practically  at  her  maneuvers. 

METHODS  OF  OBTAINING  SUPPLIES  LOCALLY. 

Supplies  may  be  procured  locally  in  three  ways: 

1.  By  purchase; 

2.  By  requisitions; 

3.  By  foraging. 

PURCHASES — CONTRIBUTIONS. 

The  first  is  the  preferable  method,  for  the  main  thing  is  to 
obtain  the  supplies.  By  offering  highly  remunerative  prices, 
the  cupidity  of  producers  and  dealers  will  cause  them  to  bring 
forward  all  their  reserves.  Expense  is  of  secondary  considera- 
tion when  the  destiny  of  a  nation  is  at  stake.  We  can  compel 
inhabitants  to  disgorge,  but  the  proceeding  is  unpleasant;  we 
incur  the  hostility  of  the  people;  delays  will  occur;  and  hidden 
stores  may  not  be  discovered.  Moreover,  if  demands  are  made 
and  the  local  authorities  or  the  inhabitants  refuse  to  comply 
with  them,  considerable  embarrassment  might  result.  We 
can,  of  course,  arrest  and  punish  the  offenders;  we  can  destroy 
public  property,  and  seize  what  supplies  we  need  if  we  can 
find  them;  but  we  can  ordinarily  get  more  supplies  with  less 
delay  by  the  commercial  transaction  of  peace-times — simple 
purchase.  Cash  payments  facilitate  the  supply,  and  if  available 
cash  is  not  at  hand,  contributions  of  money  with  which  to 
make  purchases  may  be  exacted  from  the  local  authorities. 
Demands  for  money  will  generally  be  found  more  satisfactory 
than  requisitions  for  supplies  in  kind,  for  the  collection  is  less 
difficult  and  the  hostility  of  the  inhabitants  is  not  so  apt  to  be 
incurred ;  also  they  bear  upon  the  people  in  proportion  to  their 
financial  means.  Contributions  of  money,  moreover,  are  now 
recognized  as  one  of  the  justifiable  means  of  causing  an  enemy's 
country  to  feel  more  keenly  the  rigors  of  war,  and  may  be 
levied  on  a  town  or  community  as  a  punishment.  Contribu- 
tions are  not  refunded. 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  35 

REQUISITIONS — BILLETING. 

Requisitions  are  demands  for  necessary  supplies  or  services 
made  on  the  inhabitants,  through  their  civil  authorities.  When 
money  is  demanded,  requisitions  are  called  ''contributions." 
Requisitions  differ  from  purchases  in  that  the  buyer  fixes  the 
price.  They  were  first  employed  by  Washington  and  so  named 
by  him  in  the  War  for  Independence,  and  have  since  been  uni- 
versally recognized  as  a  legitimate  and  useful  method  of  ob- 
taining supplies.  Indeed,  HOME,  in  his  "Precis  of  Modern 
Tactics,"  page  182,  says:  "War  cannot  be  maintained  without 
requisitions  on  the  people."  And  on  the  same  page  he  quotes 
CLAUSEWITZ  as  saying :  "  Regular  requisitions  are  undoubtedly 
the  simplest  and  best  method  of  feeding  an  army  and  are  the 
only  system  that  can  serve  as  the  basis  of  modern  war."  It  is 
thought  that  Home  and  Clausewitz  both  intended  to  convey 
by  these  statements  only  the  fact  that  subsistence  from  depots 
alone  is  impracticable  in  modern  war;  that  supplies  must  be 
obtained  also  from  the  inhabitants.  They  appear  to  have  used 
the  word  "requisitions"  in  a  broad  sense,  overlooking  the  dis- 
tinction that  should  be  made  between  purchases,  requisitions, 
and  foraging. 

Requisitions  should  be  made  on  printed  forms  and,  if 
practicable,  in  the  language  of  the  country;  and  if  supplies  are 
received  on  requisitions  and  not  paid  for  upon  delivery,  a 
printed  receipt  should  be  given  to  the  civil  authority  to  whom 
the  requisition  is  presented. 

Requisitions  may  be  made  for  cooked  meals,  in  which  case 
the  civil  authorities  may  assign  soldiers  to  the  various  house- 
holds in  proportion  to  the  numbers  composing  the  families  of 
the  same.  If  the  soldiers  are  also  quartered  in  the  same  houses, 
they  are  then  said  to  be  "billeted"  upon  the  inhabitants.  In 
the  enemy's  country  billeting  upon  the  inhabitants  may  fre- 
quently be  resorted  to  to  advantage,  especially  by  the  inde- 
pendent cavalry,  which,  if  dependent  upon  trains,  would  lose 
their  mobility,  and  which  must,  to  be  efficient,  live  almost 


36  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

wholly  upon  the  resources  of  the  country.  The  advantages  of 
billeting  are  that  it  gives  the  men  a  good  opportunity  to  rest; 
they  are  provided  with  a  varied  meal;  the  food  supplies  of  all 
kinds  in  the  country  are  more  completely  utilized,  and  it  is  an 
economical  method  of  supply.  The  disadvantages  are  that  it 
causes  great  dispersion  and  separation  of  the  different  units 
composing  the  army,  and,  except  in  thickly  settled  countries, 
obliges  a  command  to  spread  out  over  too  large  a  portion  of 
the  country  to  obtain  subsistence.  The  men,  moreover,  live 
in  the  kitchen,  and  are  apt  to  demand,  either  by  force  or  in 
other  ways,  more  supplies  than  they  are  entitled  to.  Further- 
more, many  indignities  are  likely  to  be  shown  the  female  por- 
tion of  the  inhabitants  of  the  country,  as  their  natural  pro- 
tectors are,  in  many  instances,  enrolled  in  the  ranks  of  the 
enemy's  army.  In  addition,  this  method  may  lead  to  oppres- 
sion on  the  part  of  the  troops  if  they  are  not  treated  as  liberally 
as  they  consider  they  should  be,  and  it  will  provoke  frequent 
disputes  if  more  is  demanded  from  the  inhabitants  than  they 
should  justly  be  expected  to  furnish.  The  dispersion  of  the 
troops  prevents  the  officers  enforcing  strict  compliance  with 
orders,  and  is  subversive  of  discipline. 

Requisitions  may  often  be  necessary  in  the  home  country 
in  a  defensive  war,  though  straight  purchases  can  generally  be 
made  and  are  greatly  to  be  preferred.  The  same  holds  true  in 
the  country  of  an  ally.  To  enforce  requisitions  in  such  a 
country  is  a  delicate  operation,  requiring  the  exercise  of  tact, 
judgment,  and  diplomacy.  The  whole  subject  should  be  a 
matter  of  mutual  understanding  between  the  two  governments. 
Even  in  an  enemy's  country,  requisitions  should  never  be  im- 
posed in  too  arbitrary  a  manner.  Before  making  any  exactions, 
an  estimate  should  be  formed  of  all  the  resources  which  the  in- 
habitants can  be  made  to  surrender  without  subjecting  them 
to  serious  want. 

' '  These  demands  should  be  imposed  and  apportioned  with 
judgment  and  moderation,  taking  into  consideration  the  popu- 
lation, the  geographical  situation,  the  nature  of  the  products, 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  37 

the  richness  of  the  country,  and  also,  when  possible,  propor- 
tioning the  extent  of  the  demands  to  the  grievances  of  the  con- 
querors. To  ravage  a  country,  you  reduce  the  inhabitants  to 
misery,  to  despair,  flight,  and  then  you  not  only  deprive  your- 
self of  their  favorable  cooperation,  but,  on  the  day  of  reverse, 
you  will  find  these  same  men  implacable  and  cruel  enemies." — 
Vauchelle,  "Cours  d' Administration  Militaire,"  Vol.  III.,  p.  9. 

Private  property  and  the  person  of  the  peaceable  inhab- 
itants who  are  citizens  of  the  occupied  territory  should  be  re- 
spected, as  war  is  waged  against  a  state,  and  not  against 
individuals. 

The  same  rule  applies  to  neutrals  who  reside  in  the  country, 
but  this  does  not  exempt  them  from  the  burden  of  the  requisi- 
tions or  contributions.  The  occupying  army  can  hardly  be  ex- 
pected to  stop  to  inquire  whether  certain  stores  are  owned  by 
a  citizen  of  the  enemy's  country  or  by  a  foreigner,  a  neutral, 
resident  there ;  such  neutral  by  residing  in  the  enemy's  country 
has  received  a  certain  amount  of  security  and  protection  from 
its  government,  and  should  therefore  bear  his  full  share  of  the 
burden  imposed  upon  it  by  the  war. 

Some  English  subjects  residing  in  France  in  1870—1871 
maintained  that  they  were  exempt  from  the  requisitions  im- 
posed by  the  Germans.  The  English  courts  decided  that  they 
could  not  claim  special  protection  for  their  property  or  exemp- 
tion from  the  military  requisitions  and  contributions  to  which 
they  would  be  subject  together  with  the  inhabitants  of  the 
place  where  they  resided  or  where  their  properties  were  located. 
(FERRAND,  "Des  Requisitions  Militaires,"  p.  27.) 

The  method  of  subsistence  at  the  front  will  always  be  de- 
termined by  the  commanding  general,  according  to  circum- 
stances. If  local  resources  are  to  be  utilized,  it  will  ordinarily 
be  found  best  to  conduct  negotiations  through  the  civil  au- 
thorities if  they  can  be  found,  regardless  of  whether  purchases 
or  requisitions  are  to  be  made,  and  the  best  plan  is  to  tell  those 
authorities  what  the  army  requires,  requesting  them  to  inform 
the  merchants  of  the  requirements,  that  liberal  cash  payments 
will  be  made,  and  that  the  supplies  should  be  at  some  desig- 


38  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

nated  central  place  at  a  stated  time,  when  the  purchase  will  be 
consummated.  In  the  event  of  a  disposition  on  the  part  of 
the  authorities  not  to  cooperate  with  the  army  in  the  trans- 
action, then  the  formal  requisition  should  be  served  upon  them , 
and  such  force  as  may  be  necessary  should  be  used  to  compel 
compliance  with  the  demand. 

FORAGING. 

Foraging  is  the  collection  of  supplies  from  the  inhabitants 
by  impressment,  without  the  assistance  of  the  local  ciml  authori- 
ties. Foraging  is  resorted  to  when  there  is  not  time  or  oppor- 
tunity to  address  the  civil  authorities,  or  when  they  show  a  dis- 
position not  to  assist  in  the  procuring  of  supplies  by  requisition 
or  purchase,  or  when  the  inhabitants  are  distinctly  hostile  or 
obstructive — in  short,  when,  in  the  opinion  of  the  commanding 
general,  this  arbitrary  method  would  be  productive  of  better 
results  than  any  other.  SHERMAN  states,  in  his  "Memoirs," 
Volume  II.,  page  183,  that  his  system  of  foraging  was  indis- 
pensable to  his  success  in  his  march  through  Georgia;  that  the 
country  was  sparsely  settled,  with  no  magistrates  or  civil  au- 
thorities who  could  respond  to  requisitions.  And  yet  Sher- 
man's method,  successful  though  it  was  and  in  line  with  the 
methods  of  the  Confederacy  and  with  the  practice  of  nations 
up  to  that  time,  could  not  be  applied  in  its  entirety  in  a  future 
war.  Under  Article  52,  Hague  Convention,  July  29,  1899,  re- 
specting laws  and  customs  of  war  on  land,  supplies  in  kind 
procured  from  the  inhabitants  must  be,  as  far  as  possible,  paid 
for  in  ready  money;  if  not,  their  receipt  must  be  acknowledged. 
Sherman  forbade  the  giving  of  receipts,  although  he  authorized 
officers  in  charge  of  foraging  expeditions,  if  they  thought 
proper,  to  give  written  certificates  of  the  facts.  See  Special 
Field  Orders,  No.  120,  November  9,  1864,  quoted  in  Sherman's 
"Memoirs,"  Volume  II.,  page  176. 

In  his  "Memoirs,"  Volume  II.,  page  182,  SHERMAN  de- 
scribed his  method  of  foraging  as  follows: 

"Each  brigade  commander  had  authority  to  detail  a  com- 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  39 

pany  of  foragers,  usually  about  fifty  men,  with  one  or  two 
commissioned  officers,  selected  for  their  boldness  and  enter- 
prise. This  party  would  be  dispatched  before  daylight  with  a 
full  knowledge  of  the  intended  day's  march  and  camp;  would 
proceed  on  foot  five  or  six  miles  from  the  route  travelled  by 
their  brigade,  and  then  visit  every  plantation  and  farm  within 
range.  They  would  easily  procure  a  wagon  or  family  carriage, 
load  it  with  bacon,  corn-meal,  turkeys,  chickens,  ducks,  and 
everything  that  could  be  used  as  food  or  forage,  and  then  re- 
gain the  main  road,  usually  in  advance  of  their  train.  When 
this  came  up,  they  would  deliver  to  the  brigade  commissary 
the  supplies  thus  gathered  by  the  way." 

The  difference  between  requisitioning  and  foraging  is 
clearly  indicated  in  the  following  extract  from  General  SHER- 
MAN'S letter  of  February  24,  1865,  to  General  Wade  Hampton: 

"Of  course,  you  cannot  question  my  right  to  'forage  on 
the  country.'  It  is  a  war  right,  as  old  as  history.  The  manner 
of  exercising  it  varies  with  circumstances,  and  if  the  civil  au- 
thorities will  supply  my  requisitions,  I  will  forbid  all  foraging. 
But  I  find  no  civil  authorities  who  can  respond  to  calls  for 
forage  and  provisions,  therefore  must  collect  directly  of  the 
people." — "Supplemental  Report  of  the  Joint  Committee  in  the 
Conduct  of  the  War,"  1866,  Vol.  /.,  pp.  331  and  332. 

DUTIES  OF  SUBSISTENCE  OFFICERS. 

To  properly  supply  subsistence  for  an  army  in  the  field  re- 
quires a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  different  methods  that  can 
be  used  and  an  ability  to  select  the  best  methods  to  meet  the 
conditions  prevailing.  Upon  the  chief  commissary  of  an  army 
devolves  the  important  duty  of  keeping  his  commander  in- 
formed of  the  state  of  subsistence  supplies,  and  making  per- 
tinent suggestions  for  the  improvement  of  the  service.  His 
duties  are  wholly  administrative.  He  should  not  be  accounta- 
ble for  funds  or  stores,  but  should  devote  his  whole  time  to  the 
large  questions  of  supply,  leaving  the  details  to  his  subordin- 
ates. Under  instructions  of  the  commanding  general,  he  di- 
rects when,  in  what  manner,  and  to  what  extent  the  country 
invaded  shall  be  exploited  to  collect  supplies,  designating  the 


40  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

zones  of  supply  for  each  division.  His  duties  keep  him  with 
his  commander,  but  he  must  exercise,  by  means  of  reports 
from  subordinate  commissaries  and  such  inspections  as  he  can 
make,  such  supervision  over  subsistence  affairs  as  may  be 
necessary  to  secure  efficiency. 

The  duties  of  the  chief  commissary  of  a  division  are  like- 
wise largely  administrative.  He  should  have  money  accounta- 
bility and  should  be  liberally  supplied  with  cash,  but  should 
not  be  burdened  with  accountability  for  stores.  He  is  re- 
sponsible for  the  continued  supply  of  the  number  of  days'  ra- 
tions designated  to  be  kept  in  trains  and  on  the  persons  of  the 
troops.  He  has  immediate  charge  of  the  levying  of  subsistence 
supplies  in  the  theater  of  operations,  assigning  to  brigades 
their  zones  of  supply,  and  transmitting  to  brigade  commissaries 
the  instructions  of  his  commander  concerning  the  collection  of 
supplies  and  paying  and  accounting  for  them.  He  will  or- 
dinarily make  payments  himself  for  supplies  purchased  or 
requisitioned  in  the  enemy's  country,  but  may,  if  circum- 
stances render  it  desirable,  furnish  necessary  funds  to  brigade 
commissaries  to  enable  -them  more  readily,  by  payments  of 
cash  on  delivery,  to  obtain  needed  supplies.  In  such  case,  if 
requisitions  are  to  be  made,  he  should  generally  furnish  brigade 
commissaries  with  uniform  schedules  of  prices. 

Supply  trains  of  divisions  are,  so  far  as  subsistence  sup- 
plies are  concerned,  under  the  supervision  and  control  of  di- 
vision chief  commissaries;  but  as  these  officers  must  of  neces- 
sity be  near  their  commanders  in  order  to  properly  administer 
subsistence  affairs,  they  should  be  allowed  the  necessary  as- 
sistants for  duty  with  the  train. 

Cavalry  operating  far  in  advance  of  the  army  or  independ- 
ently on  the  flanks  will  seldom  be  able  to  connect  with  the 
supply-trains  of  the  army.  Such  supplies  as  they  must  take 
with  them  should  be  carried  on  pack-mules.  A  most  active 
and  intelligent  commissary  should  be  assigned  to  such  cavalry 
with  ample  authority  and  cash  to  procure  supplies.  The  com- 
missary with  the  advance  cavalry  will  often  be  able  not  only 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  41 

to  procure  supplies  for  immediate  use  of  the  cavalry,  but  also 
to  make  requisitions  for  or  purchases  of  larger  quantities  to  be 
ready  for  the  army  upon  its  arrival. 

THE  MEAT  SUPPLY. 

If  beef  cattle  can  be  procured  locally,  full  advantage  should 
be  taken  of  the  opportunity;  but  to  drive  beef  cattle  on  the 
hoof  after  an  army,  as  the  source  of  its  meat  supply,  is  an  obso- 
lete, objectionable,  and  now  unnecessary  expedient.  The  ob- 
jections are  many  and  are  set  forth  in  French,  German,  and 
Swiss  official  reports  and  by  numerous  celebrated  military  au- 
thorities in  Europe.  The  "  Dienstanweisung  fur  den  Schlacht- 
ereibetrieb  und  den  Viehtransport "  ("Regulations  for  the 
Slaughtering  and  Transport  of  Animals"),  states  that  pigs, 
calves,  and  cattle,  ready  for  killing,  cannot  undertake  long 
marches,  and  that  they  can  only  be  moved  long  distances  over- 
land by  means  of  box- wagons.  The  "Regulations"  lay  down 
the  distance  that  oxen  can  march  in  a  day  as  20  kilometers 
on  the  average,  provided  that  there  are  two  rest-days  in  each 
week  and  that  the  animals  are  well  fed  and  looked  after. 
Oxen  and  pigs  will  therefore  have  to  be  left  behind  when  troops 
are  continually  advancing,  and  cannot,  as  a  rule,  be  used  in 
such  circumstances  for  supply  purposes.  Any  attempts  to 
make  the  animals  march  farther  might  easily  lead  to  the  out- 
break of  all  sorts  of  diseases.  These  animals  have  but  little 
stamina;  when  they  have  to  endure  much  physical  exertion 
and  are  badly  looked  after  and  are  insufficiently  fed,  they  die 
and  their  carcasses  poison  the  air.  The  conditions  under  which 
sheep  can  be  forwarded  are  much  more  favorable.  "The  Reg- 
ulations for  the  Slaughtering  and  Transport  of  Animals"  gauge 
their  average  marching  powers  at  30  kilometers  per  diem.  Ac- 
cording to  this,  their  rate  of  movement  is  approximately  the 
same  as  that  of  the  troops.  Flocks  of  sheep  could  therefore  be 
driven  along  and  made  use  of  for  feeding  purposes. 

General  SHERMAN  states,  as  a  result  of  his  experiences  in 
the  Civil  War  in  the  United  States:     "In  my  opinion,  there  is 


4 2  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

no  better  food  for  man  than  beef  cattle  driven  on  the  hoof, 
issued  liberally,  with  salt,  bacon,  and  bread."  Military  stu- 
dents cannot  afford  to  ignore  any  conclusions  of  General  Sher- 
man's, but  they  must  bear  in  mind  that  the  Civil  War  was 
fought  over  forty  years  ago,  during  which  period  frozen  meats 
and  canned  meats  have  made  their  appearance  in  the  com- 
mercial world,  and  their  preparation  has  been  perfected  to 
such  an  extent  that  in  future  wars  they  will  surely  be  used  to 
the  exclusion  of  cattle  on  the  hoof. 

FRESH  BREAD. 

The  supply  of  fresh  bread  to  troops  in  the  field  is  an  im- 
portant matter  that  has  received  full  consideration  by  Eu- 
ropean armies,  most  of  which  have  a  field  bakery  column  at- 
tached to  their  supply  trains.  The  local  resources  will  seldom 
be  able  to  supply  more  than  a  limited  quantity  of  bread  to  an 
occupying  army,  so  that  if  soft  bread  is  to  be  furnished,  it  must 
be  obtained  from  large  bakeries  established  at  the  base,  or  from 
bakeries  accompanying  the  supply  column.  To  ship  bread 
from  the  base  will  soon  become  impracticable  as  the  army  ad- 
vances, and  the  bakery  column  thus  becomes  a  necessary  ad- 
junct of  an  army  in  campaign.  Even  with  a  bakery  column,  it 
will  often  be  necessary  to  issue  hard  bread  to  the  troops;  but 
hard  bread,  on  account  of  its  indigestibility,  will,  if  used  as  a 
steady  diet,  soon  ruin  the  best  of  stomachs,  so  that  advantage 
should  be  taken  of  every  possible  means  of  supplying  fresh 
bread  to  troops  in  campaign. 

The  bakeries  are  usually  established  in  rear  of  the  supply 
train,  near  the  advance  depot.  They  should  never  be  located 
nor  the  column  moved  so  far  to  the  front  as  to  interfere  with 
the  mobility  of  the  army;  this  is  in  accordance  with  the  prac- 
tice in  European  armies.  Habitually,  all  the  ovens  of  a  fighting 
division  work  together,  or  if  a  division  marches  in  several  col- 
umns, the  division  bakery  column  should  be  similarly  divided, 

NOTE. — See  Appendix  for  a  discussion  of  the  disadvantages  in  the 
use  of  cattle  on  the  hoof. 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  43 

and  when  organizations  are  detached  for  any  purpose  from 
their  divisions,  their  share  of  bakery  wagons  should  go  with 
them. 

If  provision  is  made  for  a  field  bakery  column,  the  details 
of  its  operation  can,  in  practice,  be  worked  out  by  the  sub- 
sistence officers  in  charge.  Detailed  regulations  should  not  be 
adopted,  for  the  reason  that  the  conditions  of  service  will  so 
vary — depending  upon  the  local  supply  of  bread,  flour,  or 
wheat,  the  length  of  the  line  of  communications,  the  means  of 
transportation  available,  the  rapidity  of  the  movements  of 
the  troops,  the  propinquity  of  the  enemy,  and  other  considera- 
tions— that  much  must  always  depend  upon  the  judgment  of 
the  commanding  generals  and  their  subsistence  officers. 

ACCOUNTABILITY — PAPER  WORK. 

In  time  of  peace  a  well-organized  supply  department  has 
no  occasion  for  rush,  and  the  tendency  of  thoughtless  officials 
is  to  prescribe  a  system  of  accounting  so  rigid  and  exacting  as 
to  impair  the  efficiency  of  the  army  if  continued  during  war. 
To  expect  officers,  when  war  comes,  to  burst  suddenly  all  this 
red  tape  of  accountability  and  assume  the  responsibility  of 
prompt  action,  is  not  a  logical  sequence  of  such  a  system  of 
training. 

The  aim  should  be,  then,  during  peace  to  develop  a  simple 
plan  of  accounting  susceptible  during  war  of  still  greater  sim- 
plification, and  officers  should  be  trained  by  theoretical  and 
practical  study  in  adapting  the  peace  system  to  the  conditions 
apt  to  obtain  in  war.  Armies  are  maintained  for  the  double 
purpose  of  discouraging  war  and  undertaking  it,  and  as  the 
maintenance  of  large  armies  in  peace,  as  well  as  in  war,  is  an 
expensive  proposition,  it  is  undoubtedly  justifiable  and  nec- 
essary to  keep  careful  watch  of  public  funds  and  property; 
but  in  war  the  red  tape  must  be  freely  cut,  else  the  supply 
officers  must  neglect  their  main  duty,  which  is  to  feed  the 
troops,  in  order  to  devote  their  time  to  the  preparation  of 
elaborate  accounts. 


44  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

England's  regulations  contemplate  that  accountability 
shall  cease  at  the  advance  depot,  and  the  supply  officers  with 
the  army  are  thus  enabled  to  devote  their  time  to  their  real 
business.  Supplies  proceeding  from  the  advance  depot  are 
dropped  as  issued,  and  those  collected  locally  and  turned  over 
to  the  troops  or  trains  are  reported  to  the  advance  depot  for 
the  necessary  accounting. 


APPENDIX. 


1.  EXPEDITIONS  BEYOND  THE  SEA,  .  .     46 

2.  EMBARKATION  AND  DISEMBARKATION  FOR  WAR,    .  52 

3.  THE  NUMBER  OF  WAGONS  REQUIRED  IN  FRONT  OF 

ADVANCE  DEPOT,  .  .  .  .  -59 

4.  DISADVANTAGES  IN  THE  USE  OF  CATTLE  ON  THE  HOOF,    80 

5.  BIBLIOGRAPHY,  .  .  .  .  93 


EXPEDITIONS  BEYOND  THE  SEA. 


"Expeditions  beyond  the  seas  are  all  those  enterprises  in  which  large 
bodies  of  troops  are  conveyed  in  ships  to  a  distant  country,  there  to  be 
landed  to  undertake  military  operations." — Furse,  "Military  Expeditions 
Beyond  the  Seas,"  Vol.  I.,  p.  2. 

"An  expedition  across  the  sea  differs  from  other  military  operations, 
inasmuch  as  an  army  does  not  step  over  a  frontier  or  advance  from  a  se- 
lected base  of  operations,  but  is  thrown  into  a  hostile  country,  and  all  the 
combatants,  materials,  and  stores  have  to  be  conveyed  thereto  from  a 
distance  in  ships.  Operations  of  this  nature  demand  very  thorough 
preparations,  for,  unless  everything  which  relates  to  the  number  of  troops, 
to  the  amount  and  assortment  of  war  materials  and  stores,  and  to  the 
quantity  of  provisions  is  carefully  calculated,  there  is  a  risk  of  finding  the 
means  inadequate  for  the  accomplishment  of  the  object  we  have  in  view." 
— Idem,  p.  84. 

In  former  times  skill  in  handling  and  directing  considerable 
bodies  of  men  was  thought  to  be  possessed  only  by  those  who 
were  connected  with  the  profession  of  arms,  and  the  French 
philosopher  Helvetius  was  then  probably  justified  in  asserting 
that  "Discipline  is  the  art  of  inspiring  soldiers  with  more  fear 
for  their  own  officers  than  they  have  for  the  enemy."  In  the 
commercial  and  manufacturing  activities  of  modern  times  vast 
numbers  of  men  are  employed,  and  to  direct  them  successfully 
a  knowledge  of  how  to  handle,  discipline,  and  control  men  is 
necessary.  Modern  business  enterprises  comprise  every  pos- 
sible sphere  of  human  activity,  from  the  manufacture  of  the 
most  delicate  tissue  for  an  infant's  wear  to  the  construction  of 
the  most  stupendous  works  of  engineering  and  the  most  for- 
midable weapons  of  destruction. 

War  also  is  a  business — that  of  fighting — and  requires  the 
application  of  business  methods  and  principles,  just  as  any 
other  business  does. 

The  supplies  necessary  for  an  expedition  and  the  troops 
comprising  the  same  may  be  represented  by  a  large  department 
store  and  its  customers.  A  business  man  first  constructs  his 
store,  next  organizes  his  force  of  employees,  procures  and  ar- 
ranges his  stock,  and  then  announces  his  readiness  to  receive 
customers.  The  business  of  conducting  a  military  expedition 
beyond  the  sea  can  and  should  be  executed  in  like  manner. 

46 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  47 

This  discussion  presumes  that  the  command  of  the  sea  has  been 
either  temporarily  or  permanently  gained  by  the  Navy.  It  is 
not  to  be  supposed  that  an  expedition  will  be  dispatched  to 
make  a  landing  at  a  place  where  the  enemy  has  previously  ar- 
ranged defenses  and  concentrated  a  force  to  prevent  the 
landing. 

The  command  of  the  sea  being  assured,  if  a  landing  cannot 
be  effected  at  one  point,  it  can  be  at  some  other,  and  therefore 
business  methods  can  be  closely  followed. 

The  preparation  in  peace  for  an  expedition  beyond  the 
sea  will  include  a  profound  study  of  the  local  resources  of  the 
country  to  be  invaded,  of  the  character  of  the  harbors  of  same, 
the  depth  of  water  therein,  whether  adequate  wharves  are  in 
existence  or  sufficient  lighters  are  available,  whether  railroads 
run  to  the  port,  and  the  local  means  of  transportation;  and  in 
particular  this  preparation  should  include  compilation  of  full 
data  of  the  size  and  number  of  vessels  which  can  be  utilized 
to  transport  the  troops  and  stores,  and  the  number  of  men, 
horses,  wagons,  guns,  and  stores  that  can  be  carried  on  each. 
The  port  of  embarkation  should  be  arranged  beforehand,  and 
an  adequate  depot  with  proper  number  of  clerks  and  laborers 
established  there. 

The  Japano-Russian  War  shows  that  the  preparation  for 
war  should  turn  to  advantage  all  the  ordinary  devices  of 
modern  social  and  commercial  life.* 

In  all  cases  of  expeditions  beyond  the  sea  there  are  four 
distinct  phases — viz.,  i°,  the  embarkation;  2°,  the  voyage;  3°, 
the  disembarkation;  and  4°,  the  subsequent  operations. 

*M.  C.  SULLIVAN,  writing  in  The  Electrical  Review  (New  York,  July  i, 
1905),  says: 

"One  of  the  most  remarkable  events  that  has  occurred  in  the  world's 
history  is  the  battle  of  Mukden — remarkable  because  it  was  the  mightiest 
land  battle  ever  fought,  and  startling  because  no  victory  was  ever  won  by 
such  scientific  methods.  Feats  were  accomplished  by  the  Japanese  never 
before  contemplated  in  war,  and  which  had  been  previously  declared  by 
military  experts  to  be  impossible.  The  success  of  the  victorious  forces 
was  almost  entirely  due  to  the  skillful  use  of  what  is  to-day  considered  to 
be  one  of  the  most  ordinary  and  commonplace  among  electrical  instru- 
ments— -the  telephone. 

' '  From  the  sub-divisions  of  each  portion  of  the  army  telephone  lines 
were  run  to  a  portable  switchboard,  and  from  the  various  switchboards 
trunk-lines  were  run  to  headquarters  several  miles  to  the  rear.  Thus. the 
parts  of  each  portion  of  the  army  were  made  to  correspond  with  the  sub- 
scribers of  a  telephone  sub-station  in  a  large  city,  the  headquarters  being 
analogous  to  the  central  station,  to  which  all  of  the  subsidiary  stations 
are  connected  bv  trunk-lines." 


48  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

A  transport,  in  a  military  sense,  is  a  vessel  capable  of  con- 
veying a  military  unit  fully  equipped  in  all  particulars  and 
ready  to  take  the  field  and  engage  in  active  campaign  when 
disembarked. 

To  ship  troops  to  invade  a  country  in  any  other  manner  is 
as  absurd  as  it  would  be  to  dispatch  a  naval  fleet  without  guns 
or  ammunition,  with  the  expectation  that  these  latter  would  be 
brought  by  other  vessels  and  mounted  on  the  war-ships  when 
the  enemy's  fleet  cleared  for  action. 

In  the  British  Army  the  amount  of  tonnage  required  to 
embark  each  unit  of  an  army  corps  is  carefully  computed  and 
published  for  the  guidance  of  officers.  The  estimate  is  given 
in  PURSE'S  "Military  Expeditions,"  Volume  I.,  pages  210  to 
215,  inclusive.  Such  data  should  be  computed  and  published 
for  each  of  the  military  units  of  the  country,  the  calculation 
being  based  upon  the  rule  that  each  unit  is  to  be  embarked  fully 
equipped  with  horses,  wagons,  etc.,  to  take  the  field.  Secrecy 
in  such  matters  is  only  harmful  and  results  in  some  officers  not 
being  informed  fully  of  the  duty  required  of  them.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  would  be  unwise  to  announce  openly  what  vessels 
were  available  and  the  number  of  men,  horses,  wagons,  and 
horse-boats  each  could  carry.* 

The  vessels  selected  as  transports  are  assembled  at  the 
port  of  embarkation  and  there  equipped  to  receive  the  men, 
horses,  and  wagons.  Facilities  for  providing  suitable  hot  meals 
for  the  men  while  on  the  voyage  must  be  provided.  An  athletic 
trainer  will  not  permit  his  squad  to  get  out  of  condition  when 
travelling  to  participate  in  a  contest,  and  the  condition  of  men 
who  are  to  engage  in  a  contest  for  the  supremacy  of  their 
country  should  be  as  carefully  guarded.  Each  vessel  must  be 
provided  with  supplies  for  the  troops  assigned  thereon  sufficient 
to  last  for  at  least  ten  days  after  landing,  and  with  horse-boats 
and  launches  for  landing  the  horses  and  stores. 


*"In  assigning  the  troops  to  the  different  transports,  it  is  an  ad- 
mitted principle  that,  if  possible,  each  transport  should  carry  a  complete 
unit  with  its  regimental  transport  and  baggage,  or,  if  this  cannot  be  done, 
that,  at  any  rate,  the  portion  of  the  unit  carried  should  be  complete  with 
baggage,  ammunition,  equipment,  stores,  and  regimental  transport,  so 
that  it  may  be  ready  to  land  and  act  without  reference  to  the  remainder 
of  the  regiment  or  battery." — Clarke,  "Staff  Duties,"  p.  177;  cf.  Furse, 
"Military  Expeditions,"  Vol.  I.,  p.  277;  cf.  Furse,  "Mobilization  and  Em- 
barkation," p.  195;  and  Furse,  "Military  Transport"  p.  157. 

"Testimony  shows  that  the  vessels  were  not  loaded  systematically. 
A  battery  with  its  guns  and  horses  would  be  placed  on  one  vessel  and  its 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  49 

Materials,  stores,  and  provisions,  other  than  those  em- 
barked with  the  troops,  must  be  shipped  in  the  order  in  which 
they  will  be  needed  at  the  point  of  debarkation.  It  is  a  gen- 
eral principle  that  those  things  which  are  required  first  on 
landing  should  be  loaded  last. 

The  transports  having  been  fitted  and  the  stores  shipped, 
the  troops  are  brought  to  the  port  and  each  command  placed 
aboard  the  transport  to  which  it  has  previously  been  assigned. 

The  British  Admiralty  has  ascertained  that  the  maximum 
force  which  could  be  moved  by  sea  at  one  time,  without  seri- 
ously interfering  with  trade  or  injuriously  affecting  the  question 
of  food-supply  for  England,  is  one  army  corps,  a  cavalry  di- 
vision, and  the  line  of  communication  troops — in  all  53,000 
men,  20,000  horses,  and  2,600  vehicles.  (RoTHWELL,  "  Convey- 
ance of  Troops  by  Sea.  ") 

"  Taking  the  ships  which  happened  to  be  available  at  a  given  date, 
and  appropriating  them  by  name  to  the  troops  of  the  ist  Army  Corps, 
the  cavalry  division,  and  the  line  of  communication  troops,  the  transport 
authorities  at  the  Admiralty  obtained  the  following  results:  134  ships, 
with  a  gross  tonnage  of  457,112  tons,  would  be  required." — Clarke,  "Staff 
Duties,"  p.  169. 

This  represents  the  maximum  effort  which  the  greatest 
maritime  power  in  the  world  is  capable  of  making.  Consider- 
ing the  limited  mercantile  marine  of  other  nations,  the  diffi- 
culties of  transporting  large  armies  across  the  sea  will  be 
apparent. 

ammunition  on  another.  The  Second,  Seventh,  and  Seventeenth  Regular 
Infantry  were  each  divided  up  and  portions  in  each  case  sent  on  three 
different  vessels." — Report  of  the  Commission  to  investigate  the  conduct  of 
the  War  Department  in  the  War  of  the  United  States  with  Spain,  Vol.  I.,  p. 
135- 

"The  First  and  Third  Squadrons  of  the  Sixth  United  States  Cavalry 
were  assembled  at  San  Francisco  the  latter  part  of  June,  1900,  with  orders 
to  sail  on  the  Grant  July  ist  to  Nagasaki,  there  to  receive  orders  for  the 
Philippines  or  for  China.  About  250  horses  had  been  sent  to  Vancouver 
to  go  on  a  horse-boat  from  there;  the  remaining  horses  left  San  Francisco 
July  ist  on  two  horse-boats." 

«#  *  *  #  Twenty-five  sets  of  the  horse  equipments  of  my  troop 
had  gone  with  that  number  of  men  to  Vancouver  with  the  horses  of  my 
troop  and  were  to  go  on  the  horse-boat  from  there.  When  the  order  was 
received  to  place  the  remainder  of  my  horse  equipments  on  one  of  the 
horse-boats  sailing  from  San  Francisco  with  the  horses  of  the  other  troops, 
I  endeavored  to  get  it  changed.  *  *  *  For  some  reason  this  change 
was  not  allowed,  and  I  sailed  with  my  horses  on  one  boat  with  part  of  the 
horse  equipments,  the  rest  of  the  equipments  on  another,  and  seventy- five 
of  my  men  on  a  third." — "Troop  'M,'  Sixth  Cavalry,  in  the  Chinese  Relief 
Expedition  of  1900,"  Journal  U.  S.  Cavalry  Association,  July,  1904. 


50  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

Debarkations  of  a  large  force  in  a  foreign  country  are  of 
rare  occurrence,  and  few  officers  study  the  complicated  meas- 
ures connected  with  the  undertaking.  Of  recent  years  the 
British  Government  has  endeavored  to  give  officers  and  men 
some  practical  experience  in  this  matter  during  peace.  In  the 
British  maneuvers  of  1904,  the  fleet  consisting  of  ten  vessels, 
gross  tonnage  of  about  71,000  tons,  moved  from  Southampton 
and  disembarked  the  troops  at  Clacton.  Ten  transports  car- 
ried 559  officers,  11,139  men,  2,701  horses,  61  guns,  315  ve- 
hicles, 4  motors,  108  bicycles,  and  54  horse-boats,  and  the  ma- 
neuver demonstrated  that  this  fighting  force  could,  under  fa- 
vorable conditions,  be  disembarked  in  10  hours,  and  in  24 
hours  sufficient  transports  could  be  landed  to  keep  it  in  the 
field  for  about  three  days.  In  this  movement  the  allowance 
was  about  3  tons  per  man  and  a  little  over  n  tons  per  horse.* 

As  it  will  be  necessary  to  establish  a  depot  at  the  sea-base, 
it  is  advisable  to  assign  one  or  more  vessels  for  the  purpose  of 
transporting  the  stores.  On  this  vessel  should  be  sent  the 
officers  who  are  to  be  in  charge  of  the  depots,  together  with 
their  clerks  and  laborers,  and  necessary  mechanics  and  ma- 
terials to  construct  landing-places  and  temporary  depots. 
Agreements  should  be  made  with  a  competent  railroad  con- 
structor to  build  a  narrow-gauge  railway  at  the  base,  and  a 
vessel  should  be  assigned  to  transport  his  men  and  material. 
A  narrow-gauge  railway  known  as  the  Decauville  Patent  Port- 
able Railway  is  suitable  for  this  purpose.! 

The  vessels  having  been  loaded  and  the  necessary  horse- 
boats,  lighters,  and  steam  launches  provided  to  accompany 
each,  the  convoy  sails,  escorted  by  the  navy.  Upon  arrival  at 

*The  following  is  now  accepted  as  the  allowance  of  tonnage,  based 
on  most  recent  experiences  in  war,  of  which  any  data  is  now  available. 

For  voyages  over  seven  days  in  duration  and  carrying  three  months' 
supplies  for  the  command : 
Per  man,  2f  tons; 
Per  horse,  8  tons. 

For  voyages  not  over  seven  days  and  carrying  one  month's  supplies: 
Per  man,  2^  tons; 
Per  horse,  6}  tons. 

The  above,  of  course,  is  based  upon  the  infallible  rule  that  units 
must  be  embarked  complete  in  all  particulars,  including  transport,  horses, 
etc.,  and  fully  equipped  for  active  service. 

fThe  advantages  obtained  by  the  use  of  such  a  railway  are  well  de- 
scribed by  A.  Perot,  Sous-Intendant  Militaire  de  2e  classe,  in  his  work  en- 
titled "Emploi  du  Chemin  de  Fer  a  voie  de  Om.  60  pour  le  Ravitaillement 
des  Troupes." 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  51 

place  of  debarkation,  the  officer  appointed  to  command  the 
base  should  land  first,  together  with  his  staff  and  the  guard  as- 
signed to  the  base.  Arrangements  to  provide  suitable  landing- 
places  should  be  constructed,  and  when  all  is  in  readiness,  the 
landing  officer  indicates  what  troops  are  to  be  landed,  and  as 
they  reach  the  shore  each  unit  is  at  once  marched  to  the  place 
assigned  for  its  bivouac,  which  must  be  removed  from  the  base. 
No  troops  are  permitted  to  loiter  at  the  base  and  none  allowed 
to  enter  the  limits  of  same  without  authority.  Before  disem- 
barkation the  troops  are  provided  with  field  rations  for  several 
days  and  with  one  or  more  emergency  rations.  If  several 
landing-places  are  available,  the  troops  and  stores  can  be  dis- 
charged at  the  same  time.  Markers  are  established  to  indicate 
where  each  variety  of  stores  is  to  be  placed,  and  the  stores  are 
received  and  properly  arranged  by  the  clerks  and  laborers  of 
each  department.  It  is  now  known  that  practically  the  first 
articles  unloaded  by  the  Japanese  at  Chemulpo,  in  1904,  were 
small  railway  trucks,  which  were  at  once  made  use  of  in  moving 
the  stores  from  the  landing-places.  After  the  stores,  troops, 
guns,  horses,  and  wagons  have  been  unloaded  in  this  systematic 
manner,  the  command  will  be  prepared  to  enter  upon  active 
campaign  fully  equipped  with  everything  essential  and  with 
strong  morale,  induced  by  the  knowledge  that  everything 
needed  for  their  comfort  and  efficiency  has  been  amply  pro- 
vided and  systematically  arranged  at  the  base.  That  the  fore- 
going is  not  an  ideal,  but  a  perfectly  feasible,  manner  of  ef- 
fecting a  debarkation  is  evidenced  by  the  accomplishment 
of  the  Japanese  at  Chemulpo,  in  1904,  and  represents  an  or- 
derly, systematic,  and  business-like  manner  of  conducting  war, 
made  possible  by  elaborate  preparation  of  all  the  detail  s  in 
time  of  peace. 


EMBARKATION  AND  DISEMBARKATION 
FOR  WAR.* 


"EXPEDITION   OF   UNITED   STATES  TROOPS    FROM 
TAMPA  TO   DAIQUIRI,  IN  CUBA,  JUNE,  1898. 

"(Compiled  from  'The  War  with  Spain,'  by  H.  C.  LODGE,  and  'Main 
Features  of  the  Spanish- American  War/  by  Rear- Admiral  PLUDDERMANN, 
Imperial  German  Navy.) 

"In  the  spring  of  1898  it  was  determined  that  a  force 
of  15,000  should  be  despatched  from  Tampa,  under  General 
Shafter,  to  take  part  in  the  operations  against  Santiago.  On 
the  yth  of  June  orders  were  issued  for  an  immediate  embarka- 
tion, and,  to  use  the  words  of  an  historian  of  the  war,  'Then  was 
displayed  a  scene  of  vast  confusion.  The  railway  tracks  were 
blocked  for  miles  with  cars  filled  with  supplies  tightly  shut  up 
with  red  tape,  at  which  men,  unused  to  responsibility  and  to 
the  need  of  quick  action,  gazed  helplessly.  The  cars  not  only 
kept  the  supplies  from  the  Army,  but  they  stopped  movement 
on  the  line,  and  hours  were  consumed  where  minutes  should 
have  sufficed  in  transporting  troops  from  Tampa  to  the  port. 
Once  arrived,  more  confusion  and  widening  of  the  area  of  chaos. 
No  proper  arrangement  of  transport — no  allotment  at  all  in 
some  cases,  and  in  others  the  same  ship  given  to  two  or  three 
regiments.  Thereupon  much  scrambling,  disorder,  and  com- 
plication, surmounted  at  last  in  some  rough-and-ready  fashion, 
and  the  troops  were  finally  embarked.' — PL  C.  Lodge,  'The  War 
with  Spain.' 

"On  the  i4th  of  June,  after  several  false  alarms  of  attack 
by  Spanish  torpedo-boats,  the  United  States  fleet  got  under 
way  and  crept  towards  its  destination  at  about  eight  knots  an 
hour — the  limit  of  speed  of  many  of  the  old  steamers  which  had 
been  chartered  as  transports.  On  arrival  at  Daiquiri,  which 

*From  a  gold  medal  prize  essay  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  E.  D. 
TELFER-SMOUvETT,  3d  Bn.  South  Staffordshire  Regiment;  published  in  the 
Journal  of  the  Royal  United  Service  Institution  (London),  April,  1905. 

52 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  53 

had  been  selected  as  a  landing-place,  it  was  discovered  that  the 
transports  were  provided  with  one  lighter  only  for  the  dis- 
embarkation of  horses  and  guns,  and  no  launches.  The  one 
available  landing-stage  was  but  partially  floored,  and  there 
were  no  materials  or  tools  available  for  its  repair  or  for  the 
construction  of  other  stages. 

"Every  boat  and  launch,  even  from  the  iron-clads  block- 
ading Santiago  Harbor,  was  requisitioned  for  the  service,  and 
by  the  splendid  efforts  of  the  American  blue-jackets,  greatly 
aided  by  a  spell  of  exceptionally  fine  weather,  the  infantry  were 
got  on  shore  during  the  first  day  of  the  disembarkation;  two 
men,  however,  being  drowned.  In  the  absence  of  lighters  or 
flats,  horses  and  mules  had  to  swim  to  shore,  being  simply 
hoisted  out  of  the  transports  and  lowered  into  the  ocean; 
moreover,  as  there  were  no  ordinary  boats  available  to  guide 
them  to  land,  some  fifty  animals  swam  out  to  sea  in  the  con- 
fusion and  were  drowned.  Under  the  circumstances,  it  is  not 
remarkable  that  the  disembarkation  of  horses,  guns,  and  stores 
was  not  completed  for  many  days.  The  number  of  animals 
was  very  limited,  as,  owing  to  the  omission  to  fit  up  a  sufficient 
number  of  vessels  for  their  transport,  most  of  the  cavalry  horses 
had  to  be  left  behind  at  Tampa.  The  landing  of  provisions  was 
effected  with  such  slowness  that  the  troops  from  the  outset 
had  to  be  placed  on  reduced  rations;  and  throughout  the  dis- 
embarkation there  was  great  confusion  on  the  landing-place, 
which  was  congested  with  the  men  and  stores,  as  no  officer 
had  been  detailed  to  assume  control  there,  or  to  act  as  base 
commandant. 

"The  disembarkation  was  practically  unopposed,  as  the 
few  Spaniards  in  the  neighborhood  of  Daiquiri  appear  to  have 
fled  as  soon  as  the  American  men-of-war  opened  fire.  German 
authorities,  however,  are  of  the  opinion  that  as  the  rocks 
reached  close  to  the  sea,  and  afforded  many  places  screened 
from  the  fire  of  the  war-ships,  300  determined  men,  although 
they  might  not  have  been  able  to  frustrate  the  landing  entirely, 
could  certainly  have  inflicted  very  severe  loss  on  the  invaders. 
Great  friction  appears  to  have  arisen  between  the  military  au- 
thorities and  the  officers  of  the  transport  steamers.  'The 
latter  had  only  their  own  advantage  and  that  of  the  ships' 
owners  in  view,  and  did  not  pay  the  least  attention  to  the 
wishes  and  plans  of  the  officers  of  the  troops.  The  greater  part 
of  the  time  they  kept  at  a  distance  of  from  three  to  twenty 
miles  from  the  shore,  *  *  *  and  if  at  times  they  did  assist 


54  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

in  unloading  their  cargoes,  they  would  return  to  sea  as  fast  as 
possible  as  soon  as  fire  was  opened  ashore!'  (Rear-  Admiral 
PivUDDERMANN.)  Even  when  the  landing  had  at  last  been  com- 
pleted, the  Army  was  wranting  in  mobility  through  the  defi- 
ciency of  land  transport. 

"Bearing  in  mind  that  the  force  engaged  had  been  sent 
forth  by  one  of  the  most  powerful  and  most  enlightened  nations 
in  the  world,  and  that  the  descent  took  place  at  the  close  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  it  would  certainly  appear  that  the  landing 
at  Daiquiri  is  a  unique  illustration  of  the  fact  that  even  the 
most  splendid  resources  cannot  compensate  for  the  absence  of 
a  well-established  organization  carefully  prepared  and  tested 
in  time  of  peace. 

"The  miscalculations  and  errors,  which  resulted  not  from 
individual  incapacity  —  for  all  accounts  bear  testimony  to 
the  zeal  and  enthusiasm  of  American  sailors  and  soldiers  —  but 
from  an  entire  lack  of  pre-existing  and  established  system, 
would  have  brought  disaster  to  the  very  gates  of  the  great 
Republic  if  its  forces  had  been  pitted  against  an  enterprising 
foe.  The  forces  of  the  United  States  have  been  without  the 
schooling  of  war  for  thirty  four  years;  but  it  is  not  too  much  to 
say  that  the  state  of  affairs  depicted  could  not  possibly  have 
arisen  if  the  theory  and  practice  of  the  combined  action  of 
fleets  and  armies  had  been  established  before  the  encounter 
with  Spain  as  a  recognized  branch  of  naval  and  military  arts." 


"WAR  BETWEEN  JAPAN  AND  RUSSIA,  1904. 

"(Compiled  from  the  official  dispatches  and  from  the  letters  of  the 
newspaper  war  correspondents.) 

"One  of  the  most  detailed  descriptions  which  has  been 
published,  on  the  authority  of  eye-witnesses  of  reliability,  is 
that  of  the  first  disembarkation  of  the  war,  carried  out  at  Chem- 
ulpo by  a  Japanese  army  consisting  of  20,000  men,  with  2,500 
horses,  several  batteries  of  field-guns,  together  with  an  enor- 
mous mass  of  stores,  estimated  at  100,000  tons. 

"On  the  night  of  the  8th  February  an  advanced  guard  of 
2,500  infantry  was  disembarked  at  a  small  existing  jetty.  On 
the  1  3th  February,  the  Russian  war-  vessels  Variaq  and  Korietz 
having  been  destroyed  at  Chemulpo  by  Admiral  Uriu's  squad- 
ron in  the  intervening  time,  two  Japanese  transports  arrived, 
carrying  no  troops,  but  filled  with  supplies  and  having  Army 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  55 

Medical  Corps  details  and  about  1,000  coolies  for  the  land  trans- 
port service.  With  the  coolies  came  a  carpenter  corps  of  100 
men,  each  carrying  his  box  of  tools,  and  also  an  equal  number  of 
Army  blacksmiths.  These  were  detailed  to  put  up  a  blacksmith 
shop  close  to  the  head  of  the  landing  jetty,  and  some  of  the 
carpenters  proceeded  to  lay  a  cleated  wooden  roadway  up  the 
rough  stone  landing,  to  facilitate  the  disembarkation  of  horses 
and  artillery. 

"The  Medical  Corps  of  300  hundred  men  came  ashore  in 
charge  of  the  supplies  for  their  own  department :  small  trunks, 
weighing  about  100  pounds  each,  containing  necessaries  for 
'first  aid'  to  the  wounded,  etc.  The  coolies  were  engaged  in 
landing  a  vast  bulk  of  military  material,  and  nothing  seems  to 
have  been  forgotten.  The  Army  authorities  appear  to  have 
trusted  in  no  way  to  local  supplies.  The  advanced  transports 
also  brought  4  steam  launches,  100  flat-bottomed  boats,  and  6 
tank  water-boats  rigged  with  hand -pumps.  During  the  next 
few  days,  under  the  direction  of  the  Japanese  military  engineers, 
temporary  landing-piers  were  erected,  adjoining  the  permanent 
stone  jetty. 

"Wooden  floats,  which  had  arrived  in  sections  in  the  trans- 
ports, were  put  together,  and  cleated  gangways  were  placed 
across  and  between  them,  forming  a  continuous  floor  with  rail- 
ings from  the  channel  to  land.  Korean  junks  were  also  to  some 
extent  utilized  in  a  similar  manner.  Whilst  these  stages  were 
in  progress  supplies  were  coming  ashore  continuously.  Some  of 
the  difficulties  attending  the  landing  at  Chemulpo  can  be  appre- 
ciated when  it  is  understood  that  the  mean  rise  and  fall  of  the 
tide  is  thirty  feet,  and  that  for  a  considerable  portion  of  each 
twenty-four  hours  mud  flats,  in  many  cases  miles  in  extent,  lie 
on  either  side  of  the  narrow  channel  available  for  lighters  and 
launches.  The  currents  run  like  a  mill-race.  (All  that  can  be 
said  in  favor  of  Chemulpo  Harbor  is,  that  it  was  better  as  a 
landing-place  than  the  neighboring  coasts.)  On  the  i6th  Feb- 
ruary seven  transports  anchored  in  the  harbor  and  immediately 
proceeded  to  land  men  and  horses.  The  flat-bottomed  boats 
were  taken  alongside,  the  horses  raised  in  slings,  and  lowered 
into  them,  each  boat  carrying  five  animals  and  bearing  a  trans- 
port departmental  flag,  giving  its  number  and  the  number  of 
the  landing-float  to  which  it  was  to  go.  On  arrival  at  the  float, 
each  horse-boat  was  brought  up  broadside  on;  the  troopers, 
holding  the  horses'  heads,  leaped  up  onto  the  floats,  and  the 
horses  made  the  three-feet  or  four-feet  jump  from  the  bottom 


56  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

of  the  boat  to  the  floor  of  the  temporary  landing-stage  without 
hesitation  or  accident.  A  correspondent  counted  twenty  ani- 
mals landed  in  ten  minutes,  and  one  a  minute  would  be  a  fair 
average,  which  was  kept  up  for  hours  without  cessation.  Rice 
mats  were  thrown  down  to  deaden  the  noise.  At  the  same 
time  two  streams  of  men,  fully  accoutred,  were  pouring  over 
two  other  temporary  landing-piers,  and  the  disembarkation  of 
supplies  was  steadily  maintained  at  the  permanent  stone  jetty. 
Men  and  horses  were  rapidly  marched  to  the  adjacent  railway 
station,  where  long  lines  of  cars  were  in  readiness  to  take  them 
to  Seoul.  In  spite  of  all  difficulties,  the  whole  force,  together 
with  an  immense  mass  of  stores,  was  thrown  on  shore  in  a 
space  of  barely  a  week  without  confusion  or  accident.  At  no 
time  were  the  approaches  to  the  landing-stages  in  the  slightest 
degree  congested,  and  all  eye-witnesses  affirm  that  men,  horses, 
guns,  and,  above  all,  the  immense  bulk  of  100,000  tons  of  bag- 
gage, were  cleared  away  as  if  by  magic. 

"  I  have  dwelt  somewhat  at  length  on  the  foregoing,  be- 
cause the  details  set  forth  give  an  almost  ideal  illustration  of 
the  perfection  in  the  execution  of  naval -military  operations 
which  results  on  active  service  from  methodical  peace- training. 

"The  descent  was  completed  within  a  few  days  of  the  out- 
break of  hostilities,  and  hence  owed  none  of  its  success  to  the 
costly  teaching  of  immediately  preceding  failures  in  the  same 
campaign. 

"In  the  years  preceding  the  struggle  the  Japanese  had,  as  a 
part  of  their  unostentatious  preparations,  carefully  organized 
and  practiced  a  thoroughly  efficient  system  of  disembarkation, 
and  when  the  day  of  trial  at  last  arrived,  this  difficult  and  com- 
plicated operation  was  carried  out  with  the  absolute  precision 
which  is  usually  associated  with  the  carefully  rehearsed  pa- 
geants of  the  Military  Tournament  at  Islington. 

"Everything  was  in  its  place,  and  every  man  knew  what 
was  required  of  him. 

"Ample  appliances  and  labor  were  at  hand  for  the  con- 
struction of  new  stages  and  the  repair  of  those  in  existence,  and 
it  was  thus  possible  to  mitigate  confusion  by  appropriating 
special  and  separate  landing-places  for  the  disembarkation  of 
men,  horses,  and  stores,  respectively.  A  sufficient  supply  of 
boats  was  also  available;  and  although  the  resources  of  even 
Japanese  ingenuity  have  not  as  yet  apparently  been  able  to 
hit  upon  any  more  expeditious  method  of  getting  horses  out  of 
transports  than  by  slinging  them,  yet  the  precision  and  method 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  57 

which  have  prevailed  have  rendered  it  possible  for  this  and  the 
subsequent  debarkations,  which  have  been  a  feature  of  the  war, 
to  be  effected  with  a  speed  and  freedom  from  untoward  events 

hitherto  unsurpassed.     *     *     * 

******** 

"It  is  possible  that  the  prosperity  which  has  attended  the 
combined  efforts  of  the  fleets  and  armies  of  the  Mikado  may 
blind  the  general  public  in  this  country  to  the  careful  prepara- 
tion and  sustained  effort  to  which  the  remarkable  success 
achieved  has  been  entirely  due;  and  may  lead  to  the  impres- 
sion that  operations  which  have  been  carried  through  with  such 
apparent  ease  cannot  be  difficult  in  themselves,  that  time  and 
money  need  not,  therefore,  be  devoted  to  the  peace-rehearsal 
of  such  feats  by  our  own  forces,  and  that  in  the  future,  as  in  the 
past,  we  should  fall  back  in  such  matters  on  the  antiquated, 
dangerous,  and  costly  policy  of  trusting  to  luck  when  an  emer- 
gency arises.  Now,  there  is  no  point  which  has  made  itself 
more  clearly  apparent  than  this:  that  up  to  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities  the  diplomacy  of  Russia  had  been  very  much  in  ad- 
vance of  her  warlike  preparations;  whilst  as  regards  Japan  the 
state  of  affairs  was  exactly  opposite,  her  rulers  having  been  wise 
enough  to  let  the  work  of  preparation  keep  pace  with  the  words 
of  diplomacy.  The  whole  campaign,  therefore,  has  been  a 
splendid  example  of  the  triumph  in  combined  naval  and  mili- 
tary operations  of  method  and  peace  organization  over  illim- 
itable resources. 

"-But  the  lesson  can  be  given  in  an  even  more  concrete 
form  than  is  afforded  by  the  events  of  the  present  war  standing 
by  itself.  If  any  man  is  inclined  to  doubt  the  correctness  of 
the  inferences  drawn,  let  him  carefully  study  the  details  of  the 
Japanese  disembarkation  at  Chemulpo,  in  February,  1904,  and 
compare  its  features,  one  by  one,  with  the  similar  operation 
which  was  carried  through  by  the  forces  of  the  United  States 
at  Daiquiri,  in  June,  1898.  The  former  episode  was  purposely 
selected  for  quotation  in  t  he  first  part  of  this  essay,  because  it  is 
an  example  of  a  descent  executed  with  admirable  precision, 
within  a  few  days  of  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  and  conse- 
quently too  soon  for  it  to  have  been  possible  for  any  lessons 
learned  during  the  existing  war  to  have  been  applied.  The 
disembarkation  at  Chemulpo,  therefore,  was  a  product  of  peace- 
preparation,  and  of  peace-preparation  alone. 

"To  fully  realize  the  tremendous  influence  which  national 
foresight  may  exercise  as  compared  with  numbers  and  wealth, 


58  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  forces  employed  at  Daiquiri 
were  engaged  in  executing  the  mandate  of  a  great  State,  whose 
resources  exceed  those  of  Japan  by  many  millions,  alike  in  popu- 
lation and  money.  Yet,  as  we  have  seen,  whilst  the  most  es- 
sential appliances,  such  as  horse-boats,  were  denied  to  the  brave 
men  of  the  United  States  forces  at  Daiquiri,  at  Chemulpo,  in 
spite  of  the  comparative  slenderness  of  the  national  resources, 
every  detail,  down  to  signboards  for  the  Japanese  troop-boats 
and  landing-stages,  and  rice  mats  for  the  horses'  feet,  were  at 
hand  and  constantly  available.  The  disposition  of  the  British 
nation,  like  that  of  the  Americans  before  1898,  and  of  the  Rus- 
sians up  to  1904,  has  ever  erred  on  the  side  of  procrastination, 
where  expenditure  and  preparation  for  national  safety  are  con- 
cerned, and  as  a  result,  in  almost  every  campaign,  from  the 
expedition  to  Carthagena  in  1741  down  to  the  present  day, 
British  sailors  and  soldiers,  wrhen  called  upon  to  uphold  the 
national  honor,  have  been  placed  more  or  less  at  a  disadvantage, 
owing  to  the  lack  of  previous  peace-preparation.  Luck,  sheer 
fighting  power,  the  like  unpreparedness  of  our  opponents,  have 
hitherto  averted  a  catastrophe;  but  as  years  roll  by  the  appli- 
ances for  war  become  more  complicated,  and  success  is  gradu- 
ally tending  to  depend  rather  on  scientific  and  systematic  train- 
ing than  on  personal  courage.  The  immunity  from  disaster, 
therefore,  which  has  hitherto  attended  our  arms  may,  and 
probably  will,  fail  us  at  a  critical  moment,  if  the  object-lesson 
of  Japanese  foresight  and  Russian  supineness  be  not  taken  to 
heart." 


THE   NUMBER  OF  WAGONS   REQUIRED   IN 
FRONT  OF  ADVANCE  DEPOT.* 


The  present  Field  Service  Regulations  state  that  the  num- 
ber of  rations  carried  by  a  command  will  vary  greatly,  but  that 
the  following  may  be  assumed  as  the  minimum : 

1.  On  the  man  or  horse,  one  emergency  ration  and 

one  field  ration; 

2.  In  the  regimental  trains,  two  field  rations; 

3.  In  the  supply  columns,  three  field  rations. 

As  to  forage,  each  cavalry  horse  is  required  to  carry  a 
small  reserve  of  oats — about  six  pounds.  Forage  for  artillery 
horses,  for  quick  supply,  is  apparently  not  provided  for.  The 
regimental  trains  carry  two  days'  oats,  twelve  pounds  per  day 
for  horses  and  nine  pounds  for  mules;  and  the  supply  columns 
three  days'  supply  of  oats. 

A  proposed  revision  of  the  Field  Service  Regulations 
changes  somewhat  the  above  requirements  and  prescribes  as 
the  "normal"  amounts  to  be  carried: 

1.  By  each  man,  one  emergency  ration,  and  in  addi- 

tion, when  combat  is  probable  or  the  troops  are 
liable  to  be  separated  from  their  baggage  trains, 
each  man  starts  with  two  haversack  rations; 

2.  In  the  baggage  trains,  at  least  two  field  rations; 

3.  In  the  supply  train,  three  field  rations. 

On  each  cavalry  horse,  about  six  pounds  of  grain,  and 
on  each  artillery  carriage  a  small  quantity.  On  the  baggage 
trains,  grain  for  two  days;  and  on  the  supply  train,  grain  for 
three  days. 

As  a  compromise,  the  following  is  proposed  as  the  mini- 
mum to  be  carried  in  campaign  by  every  division  of  the  army : 

RATIONS. — By  each  man,  one  emergency  ration  and  one 

*  Extract  from  an  article  entitled  "Subsisting  Our  Field  Army  in 
Case  of  War  with  a  First-Class  Power,"  published  in  Journal  of  the  Mili- 
tary Service  Institution  of  the  United  States,  May- June,  1909. 

59 


60  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

haversack  ration;  in  the  troop  trains,  two  haversack  rations; 
in  the  supply  train,  three  haversack  rations.  Total,  six  haver- 
sack rations  and  one  emergency  ration. 

FORAGE. — By  each  animal  or  artillery  carriage,  one  day's 
supply  of  oats  (nine  pounds  per  animal) ;  in  the  troop  trains, 
two  days'  supply;  in  the  supply  train,  three  days'  supply. 
Total,  six  days'  supply  of  oats. 

It  is  assumed  that  when  the  command  is  forced  to  use  the 
emergency  ration,  the  animals  must  subsist  that  day  by  grazing. 
Thus  an  army  supplied  as  above  can  subsist  seven  days  on  the 
supplies  accompanying  it. 

It  will  be  noted  that  it  is  proposed  to  substitute  the  new 
haversack  ration  for  the  field  ration  as  the  ration  for  campaigns. 
The  desirability  or  necessity  of  the  substitution  will  be  demon- 
strated at  the  very  outset  of  any  campaign  when  one  begins  to 
figure  on  the  amount  of  transportation  required.  The  Field 
Service  Regulations  allot  81  wagons  to  the  supply  column  of  a 
division,  prescribing  that  three  days1  field  rations  and  three 
days'  forage  shall  be  carried  therein.  This  number  of  wagons 
seems  to  have  been  adopted  for  no  other  reason  than  that  the 
Germans  have  that  number.  It  will  be  shown  later  that  to 
carry  even  three  haversack  rations  and  three  days'  reduced 
supply  of  forage  (nine  pounds  of  oats  per  animal  per  day), 
more  than  twice  that  number  of  wagons  will  be  necessary.  As 
the  field  ration  is  half  as  heavy  again  as  the  haversack  ration, 
it  is  estimated  that  250  wagons  instead  of  81  would  be  required 
to  a  division  if  an  attempt  were  made  to  carry  along  three  days' 
field  rations  and  three  days'  full  allowance  of  grain.  The  num- 
ber of  wagons  required  at  the  advance  depot  and  along  the  line 
of  communication  would  be  correspondingly  great,  and  there  is 
no  doubt  that  any  army  commander  would  see  at  once  the  ne- 
cessity of  leaving  behind  such  field  luxuries  as  potatoes  and 
onions,  beans,  jam,  milk,  etc.,  and  settling  down  to  the  still 
difficult  task  of  supplying  even  the  practical  haversack  ration. 
It  will  be  assumed,  therefore,  in  the  following  discussion,  that 
the  haversack  ration,  and  not  the  field,  is  to  be  carried  by  the 
men,  by  the  troop  trains,  and  by  the  supply  train. 

Of  course,  when  an  army  becomes  stationary,  it  will  often 
be  practicable  to  supply  it  with  more  than  the  bare  necessities, 
but  it  is  folly  to  attempt  habitually  to  do  so. 

The  proposed  Field  Service  Regulations  state  that  the  men 
are  required  to  carry  rations  (other  than  the  emergency  ration) 
only  when  necessary.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  always  neces- 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  61 

sary  for  them  to  carry  rations.  Home,  in  his  "  Precis  of  Mod- 
ern Tactics,"  page  178,  in  describing  a  movement  of  the  Crown 
Prince's  army  during  the  Franco-German  War,  says: 

«*  *  *  When  each  column  halted  for  the  night  at  the  places  in- 
dicated in  the  orders,  the  head  of  the  column  did  not  halt  there,  with  all 
the  tail  spread  out  along  the  road  it  had  marched  on,  but  each  corps  drew 
its  tail  up  after  it,  and  more  or  less  formed  a  line  of  battle.  Thus  the 
roads  were  cleared,  and  it  then  became  possible  for  the  trains  to  advance 
with  food.  But  it  is  manifest  that  if  the  soldier,  having  to  march  twelve  to 
fifteen  miles,  and  starting  at  4  A.  M.,  and  probably  not  getting  settled 
into  his  bivouac  until  3  or  4  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  had  to  wait  for  his 
food  until  the  train  arrived,  he  would  be  simply  starved.  Therefore,  it 
follows  that  if  troops  are  to  be  fed  in  the  field,  they  must  carry  rations 
with  them,  and  the  rations  consumed  during  the  day  must  be  replaced  by 
the  train  during  the  night,  so  that  the  men  shall  move  off  the  following 
day  with  the  same  number  of  rations  as  previously.  Soldiers,  if  they  are 
not  to  starve,  must  carry  rations.  No  one  who  has  considered  this  subject 
will  question  the  truth  of  these  words.  *  *  *" 

It  will  be  assumed,  therefore,  that  each  soldier  carries  a 
minimum  of  one  emergency  ration  and  one  haversack  ration. 

The  trains  accompanying  the  troops,  following  immedi- 
ately after  various  units,  are  designated  by  various  names  in 
foreign  countries,  and  have  had  numerous  designations  in  our 
own,  as,  for  instance,  regimental  trains,  baggage  trains,  field 
trains.  As  being  more  descriptive  than  any  of  these,  the  desig- 
nation "  troop  trains  "  is  suggested  and  is  used  in  this  discussion. 

We  will  now  proceed  to  determine  by  a  series  of  diagrams 
just  what  can  be  accomplished  in  the  way  of  supplying  a  divi- 
sion at  different  distances  in  front  of  the  advance  depot  with 
food  and  forage,  assuming  that  each  man  carries  an  emergency 
ration  and  a  haversack  ration,  each  horse  or  artillery  carriage  a 
day's  supply  of  oats,  each  troop  train  two  days'  supply  of 
haversack  rations  and  oats,  and  the  supply  train  three  days' 
supply. 

We  will  assume  first  that  a  division  is  moved  one  day's 
march,  say  fifteen  miles,  from  the  advance  depot,  and  that  it  is 
to  operate  there.  Chart  I.  illustrates  the  method  of  its  supply. 
The  upper  horizontal  line  represents  the  advance  depot,  the 
lower  line  is  a  day's  march  away.  On  the  first  of  the  month  the 
army  advances.  During  the  first  day's  march,  or  after  its  com- 
pletion, the  men  consume  the  one  day's  rations  which  they  car- 
ried in  their  haversacks.  The  troop  trains  arrive  later  and 
issue  a  day's  rations  to  the  men  for  use  the  next  day.  Late  at 
night  one  section  of  the  supply  column  arrives  and  issues  a 
day's  rations  to  the  troop  trains.  The  other  two  sections  of  the 


62 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 


supply  column  remain  at  the  depot.  On  the  second  the  empty 
section  returns  to  the  advance  depot  and  the  second  section 
starts  from  there,  arriving  in  the  evening  and  issuing  its  rations 
to  replace  those  consumed  during  the  day.  This  movement  is 
continued  from  day  to  day.  The  troops  will  therefore  have 
three  days'  haversack  rations  with  them  at  the  beginning  of 
each  day,  and  the  emergency  ration.  Two  sections  of  the 
supply  train  pass  each  other  every  day,  one  going  loaded,  the 

Chart  I-  5to»ln<J  *«/!W  afsuffly  of<lJ)>'<"'tt'o!,  t>y  ifs  Q*»  Tram  wh<n  oat  cfay't  morcA  from  J!d«m '<.(.  Jvtf, 


other  returning  empty.  The  remaining  section  with  a  day's 
rations  is  at  the  advance  depot.  Every  returning  section  has  a 
day's  rest  before  starting  again,  transportation  is  ample,  and 
there  is  no  difficulty  in  supplying  the  army.  But  transporta- 
tion should  not  be  idle — that  is,  a  day's  work  should  be  done 
every  day.  Forced  marches  are  to  be  avoided,  and  continuous 
work  without  rest;  but  to  rest  thirty-six  hours  instead  of  twelve 
is  inexcusable,  unless  it  be  to  recuperate  after  a  long  spell  of 
hard  work.  In  the  case  under  consideration,  the  three  sections 
of  the  supply  column  should  be  made  into  two,  and  should 
carry  full  field  rations  to  the  troops,  if  practicable,  instead  of 
haversack  rations,  and  should  at  least  carry  fresh  bread  and 
frozen  beef  if  available.  Advantage  should  be  taken  of  the 
stationary  position  of  the  army  to  push  forward  supplies,  in- 
cluding emergency  rations,  along  the  line  of  communications 
to  the  advance  depot  and  to  gather  into  that  depot  supplies 
procured  from  the  country.  The  amount  of  supplies  to  be 
accumulated  at  the  depot  will  depend  entirely  upon  what  are 
to  be  the  future  movements  of  the  army.  The  field  bakeries 
should  be  established  near  the  advance  depot,  turning  out  a 
day's  supply  of  fresh  bread  to  be  forwarded  to  the  troops  each 
day.  The  troop  trains  can  be  utilized,  if  necessary,  to  assist 
the  supply  train,  moving  out  each  day,  meeting  the  supply 
train  half-way  and  returning  the  same  day;  but  the  troop  trains 
should  never  move  more  than  half  a  day's  march  away,  lest  an 
unexpected  move  of  the  army  become  necessary  during  their 
absence. 


I 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  65 

It  is  evident  that  no  trouble  will  be  experienced  in  supply- 
ing with  its  own  wagons  an  army  operating  one  day's  march 
from  the  advance  depot,  provided  the  depot  itself  is  continu- 
ously supplied. 

We  will  now  consider  a  division  operating  two  days'  march 
from  the  advance  depot.  Plate  II.  illustrates  the  method  of 
supply.  Two  days'  rations  are  consumed  during  the  march, 
therefore  two  sections  of  the  supply  column  move  out  in  rear 
of  the  army  to  re-supply  the  troop  trains.  The  first  section  re- 
turns the  second  day  and  the  second  section  the  third  day.  At 
the  beginning  of  the  third  day  three  days'  rations  are  with  the 
troops,  and  not  counting  the  emergency  ration.  The  supply  is 
renewed  the  next  two  days  by  the  arrival  of  the  third  sec- 
tion and  the  first  section,  the  latter  having  returned  to  the 
depot  and  refilled,  as  shown  on  the  chart.  But  on  the  fourth 
day  no  section  is  available  to  leave  the  depot,  and  consequently 
two  days  later  no  rations  will  arrive  at  the  front  and  the  supply 
is  reduced  to  two  days.  Similarly,  four  days  later  (at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  tenth  day)  the  number  of  rations  is  reduced  to 
one,  and  on  the  fourteenth  nothing  but  the  emergency  ration 
remains.  Consuming  that  on  the  fourteenth,  the  situation  is 
relieved  by  the  arrival  on  each  of  the  next  three  days  of  a  sec- 
tion with  a  day's  rations.  But  on  the  eighteenth  no  rations 
are  forthcoming  and  the  troops  are  without  food.  Similarly, 
every  fourth  day  thereafter  no  rations  are  available.  By  living 
on  three-fourths  of  a  ration  from  the  time  of  their  arrival,  the 
supply  of  three  days'  rations  in  the  hands  of  the  troops  will  not 
be  reduced.  It  could  be  maintained  also  by  requiring  the 
supply  sections  to  make  forced  marches,  travelling  twenty  miles 
a  day  instead  of  fifteen,  thus  saving  a  day  on  the  round  trip. 

The  continuity  of  the  supply  when  two  days  from  the  depot 
can,  however,  best  be  secured  by  utilizing  the  troop  trains,  as 
shown  by  Chart  III.  On  the  day  of  arrival  at  the  station,  one 
section  of  the  supply  column  moves  up  to  the  troops  and  re- 
supplies  the  troop  trains.  On  subsequent  days  the  supply  sec- 
tions are  met  by  the  troop  wagons  half  a  day's  march  from  the 
station,  thus  saving  a  full  day's  march  for  the  supply  sections, 
as  clearly  shown  on  the  chart,  and  providing  for  a  continuous 
supply  of  rations. 

Thus  at  a  distance  of  two  days'  march  from  the  depot  the 
question  of  supply  with  the  prescribed  number  of  wagons  is 
comparatively  simple. 

Consider  now  a  division  moving  three  days  from  the  depot 

5— 


66  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

and  operating  there.  Chart  IV.  shows  the  state  of  affairs. 
Supply  sections  arrive  only  on  alternate  days,  and  unless  the 
troops  are  put  on  half  rations,  a  continuous  supply  cannot  be 
provided.  It  will  be  seen  that  on  the  ninth  day  the  emergency 
ration  must  be  used  and  on  the  eleventh  day  the  troops  will  be 
without  food. 

If  the  troop  wagons  are  used,  rations  can  be  obtained  only 
for  one  day  more,  as  shown  by  Chart  V.  If  the  trains  make 
forced  marches,  rations  will  be  forthcoming  for  a  few  days 
longer,  but  the  transportation  will  soon  wear  out  and  the  con- 
tinuity of  the  supply  cannot  be  assured. 

It  may  therefore  be  concluded  that  more  than  the  usual 
transportation  will  be  required  if  troops  are  to  operate  three 
days  from  the  advance  depot.  In  the  absence  of  additional 
transportation,  arrangements  should  be  perfected,  before  the 
departure  of  the  army,  for  transferring  the  advance  depot  and 
the  bakery  column  one  day  farther  to  the  front;  and  the  general 
principle  may  be  stated  that  the  advance  depot  should  be  within 
two  days'  march  of  the  operating  army,  say  within  thirty  miles. 

As  the  distance  of  an  army  from  the  depot  increases,  so  does 
the  difficulty  of  its  supply.  It  may  often  be  impracticable  to 
push  the  advance  depot  forward  to  within  thirty  miles  of  the 
active  army,  and  in  such  case  it  becomes  necessary  to  figure  on 
the  number  of  wagons  required  to  supply  it.  This,  in  itself, 
is  a  complicated  problem.  Off-hand,  one  would  say:  Take  the 
number  of  pounds  of  rations  and  forage  required  by  an  army 
each  day,  divide  that  by  2,500,  the  capacity  of  one  wagon,  arid 
we  have  the  number  of  wagons  required  to  leave  the  advance 
depot  each  day.  But,  in  order  to  carry  forage  for  the  mules 
that  draw  these  supplies  and  rations  for  the  drivers,  more 
wagons  w^ould  be  required,  and  again  more  for  the  mules  and 
drivers  of  these  extra  wagons;  moreover,  the  returning  mules 
and  drivers  must  be  provided  for  en  route,  and  as  the  wagons 
return  they  again  become  available  to  send  forward;  so  that  we 
shall  find  great  complications 'in  the  calculations  and  difficulty 
in  arriving  at  just  the  number  of  wagons  it  is  necessary  to  have 
at  the  depot  in  order  to  supply  the  army  continuously. 

The  best  way  to  solve  all  such  problems  is  to  begin  at  the 
end  and  work  backwards.  A  complete  solution  of  a  transpor- 
tation problem  is  illustrated  by  Chart  VI.,  which  will  now  be 
explained. 

PROBLEM. — An  infantry  division  is  ordered  to  move 
seventy-five  miles  from  the  advance  depot  and  to  operate  there. 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Arm.y.  71 

How  many  four-mule  wagons  must  be  available  at  the  advance 
depot  to  carry  rations  and  forage  for  the  division  en  route  and 
to  continue  the  supply  after  arrival?  How  many  wagons  must 
start  each  day,  and  how  shall  they  be  loaded  ? 

Every  night  the  supply  train  must  issue  a  day's  rations  and 
forage  to  the  troop  trains  to  replace  those  issued  by  the  latter 
earlier  in  the  evening.  Therefore,  as  the  division  is  to  march 
for  five  consecutive  days,  five  days'  rations  and  forage  for  the 
division  must  be  carried  by  the  supply  train.  Also  forage  and 
rations  for  the  mules  and  drivers  of  the  supply  train.  As  each 
day's  march  is  completed,  the  wagons  that  are  emptied  can  re- 
turn the  next  day  toward  the  advance  depot  to  bring  up  more 
supplies.  Forage  and  rations  for  consumption  during  the  first 
day  of  the  return  trip  of  these  emptied  wagons  must  also  be 
carried  along.  To  provide  against  accident,  a  percentage  of 
spare  wagons  should  be  added.  It  will  be  assumed  that  10  per 
cent  spare  wagons  accompany  the  column.  Some  of  these 
spare  wagons  can  be  utilized  to  carry  extras,  but  all  of  them 
cannot  be  filled ;  otherwise  when  they  were  needed  they  would 
not  be  available.  How  best  to  utilize  them,  and  what  propor- 
tion of  them  should  be  loaded,  will  be  explained  later  on. 

To  get  at  the  total  number  of  wagons  required  to  accom- 
pany the  division  as  a  supply  column,  we  will  start  with  the  last 
day  of  the  march  and  work  backward  to  the  first.  On  the  last 
day  there  must  be  wagons  enough  to  carry  one  day's  supply  for 
the  division  and  one  day's  supply  for  their  own  mules  and 
drivers,  also  a  second  day's  supply  for  these  mules  and  drivers 
for  consumption  during  the  first  day  of  their  return. 

The  strength  of  an  infantry  division,  exclusive  of  its  sup- 
ply column,  as  recently  given  by  the  General  Staff,  is  21,178 
persons  and  7.. 78 .5  animals.  A  haversack  ration  weighs  3 
pounds  gross.  Multiplying  this  by  21,178,  we  get  63,534 
pounds  as  the  weight  of  a  day's  rations  for  the  division;  and 
multiplying  7,785  by  9,  we  get  70,065  pounds  as  the  weight  of 
the  forage;  a  total  of  133,599  pounds  required  for  use  on  the 
day  of  arrival,  for  which  transport  must  be  provided. 

The  capacity  of  a  four-mule  wagon  is  2,500  pounds;  but 
not  all  of  this  is  available  during  this  last  day's  march  for  car- 
rying the  supplies  for  the  division.  Each  wagon  must  carry  72 
pounds  of  oats  and  6  pounds  of  rations,  two  days'  supply  for  its 
own  mules  and  drivers.  We  must  add  10  per  cent  to  this  for 
the  requirements  of  mules  and  drivers  of  spare  wagons  travel- 
ing unloaded,  which  gives  85.8  pounds.  Deducting  this  from 


72  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

2,500  pounds  gives  2,414.2  pounds  as  the  available  carrying 
power  of  every  wagon.  Dividing  one  day's  requirements  of  a 
division,  133,599  pounds,  by  24,14.2  gives  55.34  wagons;  add 
10  per  cent  and  we  have  60.87  or  61  wagons  as  the  number 
needed,  plus  10  per  cent,  for  the  last  day  of  the  march,  to  carry 
rations  and  forage  for  the  division  for  one  day  arid  rations  and 
forage  for  two  days  for  the  drivers  and  mules. 

We  can  verify  this  number  of  wagons  before  proceeding 
further. 

Each  wagon  must  carry  78  pounds  for  its  driver  and  mules ; 
multiply  this  by  61  gives  4,758  pounds,  the  requirements  of  the 
wagons;  add  this  to  133,599  pounds,  the  requirements  of  the 
division,  and  we  get  138,357  pounds,  the  total  weight  to  be 
carried;  drvide  this  by  2,500,  a  wagon  load,  gives  55.34  wagons 
needed  to  carry  these  supplies.  Adding  10  per  cent  space  gives 
60.87  or  6 1  wagons,  as  before. 

For  convenience  of  reference  we  will  divide  the  total 
amount  to  be  carried  this  last  day  into  rations  and  forage,  arid 
similarly  for  other  loads  as  they  are  determined,  and  record  the 
results,  so  that  by  reference  to  the  chart  we  can  see  at  a  glance 
just  how  many  haversack  rations  and  how  much  forage  are 
with  the  supply  trains  at  the  various  stations  and  as  they  start 
from  the  advance  depot.  The  138,357  pounds  is  found  to  con- 
sist of  21,300  haversack  rations  (63,900  pounds)  and  74,457 
pounds  of  forage.  These  numbers  we  record  with  the  total, 
opposite  Station  IV.  and  under  the  proper  date,  and  we  also 
enter  61  on  the  diagonal  lines  as  indicating  the  number  of 
wagons  carrying  these  supplies  fiom  Station  TV.  to  V.  and 
returning  empty  to  Station  IV. 

We  can  now  ascertain  the  number  of  supply  wagons  re- 
quired to  accompany  the  division  from  the  third  to  the  fourth 
station.  Evidently  we  must  add  to  the  138,357  pounds  re- 
quired for  the  last  day  three  separate  amounts,  viz.:  another 
day's  supply  for  the  division,  a  day's  supply  for  the  wagons 
travelling  from  the  third  to  the  fourth  station,  and  another 
day's  supply  for  those  wagons  which  are  to  return  empty  the 
next  day  from  Station  IV.  It  will  greatly  facilitate  the  com- 
putation if  from  the  138,357  pounds  we  deduct  the  requirements 
of  the  6 1  wagons  for  the  last  day  of  the  march  and  include  these 
requirements  in  the  present  calculation;  for  then  we  must  pro- 
vide exactly  two  days'  supply  for  all  the  wagons  moving  from 
Station  III.  to  IV.,  one  day  for  the  march  from  III.  to  IV.,  and 
a  second  day  for  those  that  proceed  on  as  well  as  for  those  that 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  73 

return.  The  61  wagons  require  for  one  day  61  X  39  pounds, 
equals  2,379  pounds,  which,  deducted  from  138,357  pounds, 
leaves  135,978  pounds.  We  can  now  get  at  the  requirements 
at  Station  III.  by  adding  to  135,978  pounds  a  day's  supply  for 
the  division  and  two  days'  supply  for  the  wagons  which  are 
to  leave  Station  III. 

Add  to  135,978  pounds  133,599  pounds,  a  day's  supply  for 
the  division,  and  we  have  269,577  pounds;  divide  tlds  by 
2,414.2,  the  available  capacity  of  a  wagon  carrying  two  days' 
supply  for  its  mules  and  drivers,  and  we  get  m.66  wagons; 
adding  10  per  cent  gives  123  wagons  required  at  Station  III. 
Two  days'  supplies  for  these  wagons  amounts  to  9,594  pounds, 
which,  added  to  269,577  pounds,  gives  279,171  pounds  to  be 
carried  by  the  123  wagons.  Of  these  wagons,  61  proceed  and 
62  return.  The  total  weight  is  divisible  into  151,182  pounds  of 
oats  and  127,989  pounds  of  rations.  The  results  are  recorded 
on  the  chart. 

In  making  the  above  calculations  it  is  desirable  to  keep 
the  forage  and  rations  separated,  but  the  total  amounts  are  re- 
ferred to  above  in  order  not  to  complicate  the  explanation 
unnecessarily. 

In  the  same  way  the  weight  to  be  carried  forward  from 
Station  II.  and  the  number  of  wagons  required  can  be  com- 
puted. Deducting  from  279,171  pounds  the  requirements  of 
123  wagons  for  one  day  and  adding  a  day's  supply  for  the  di- 
vision, we  get  407,973  pounds.  Dividing  by  2,414.2  and  ad- 
ding 10  per  cent  gives  186  wagons,  the  requirements  at  Station 
II.  Multiply  1 86  by  72  to  get  the  forage  required  by  these 
wagons  for  two  days,  and  by  6  to  get  the  weight  of  the  rations 
for  the  drivers,  and  add  the  sum  of  these  to  407,973,  and  we 
have  the  total  load  at  Station  II.,  422,481  pounds,  of  which 
230,211  pounds  are  oats  and  192,270  pounds  are  rations.  Of 
the  1 86  wagons,  63  return  toward  the  depot  the  next  day  and. 
123  go  forward. 

Similarly  the  requirements  at  Station  I.  arid  at  the  advance 
depot  are  computed.  The  results  are  shown  on  the  chart.  It 
will  be  seen  that  if  it  is  intended  to  move  a  division  five  days' 
march  from  the  advance  depot  and  to  continue  its  supply  at 
that  point  from  the  depot,  the  division  should  be  followed  by  a 
supply  train  of  315  wagons  (10  per  cent  more  than  the  actual 
number  required),  carrying  321,420  pounds  of  rations  (107,140 
haversack  rations)  and  395,325  pounds  of  oats.  Moreover,  at 
intervals  of  twenty-four  hours,  other  trains  carrying  a  day's 


74  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

supply  for  the  division  must  start  from  the  advance  depot  so 
that  the  amounts  daily  consumed  by  the  division  after  their 
arrival  shall  be  continually  renewed.  But  before  proceeding 
to  find  out  the  strength  of  these  daily  trains  it  will  be  well  to 
verify  the  calculations  up  to  the  present  time. 

The  requirements  of  the  division  during  the  five  days' 
march  amount  to  5  X  133,599  pounds,  equals  667,995  pounds. 
Reference  to  the  chart  shows  that  a  day's  supply  must  be  car- 
ried along  for  the  following  number  of  wagons:  315  -f  65  -f- 
250  -f  64  -f-  186  -f-  63  -f  123  +  62  +  61  -f  61  =  1,250.  Each 
wagon  requires  39  pounds  of  forage  and  rations  per  day.  Mul- 
tiplying 1,250  by  39,  we  get  48,750  pounds,  the  requirements  of 
the  wagons;  add  this  to  667,995  pounds,  the  requirements  of 
the  division  during  the  march,  and  we  get  716,745  pounds,  as 
on  the  chart. 

Again,  the  315  wagons  which  leave  the  advance  depot  in- 
clude 10  per  cent  spare.  Therefore  315  is  no  per  cent  of  the 
number  of  loaded  wagons;  hence  286  wagons  are  loaded.  Di- 
viding 716,745  by  2,500,  a  wagon  load,  we  get  286  as  the  num- 
ber of  wagons  required  to  carry  this  load.  Q.  B.  D. 

We  are  now  ready  to  figure  on  the  number  of  wagons  and 
the  load  required  to  start  from  the  advance  depot  on  the  second 
day  in  order  to  renew  the  supply  at  the  front  consumed  by  the 
division  on  the  day  following  its  arrival.  As  before,  we  begin 
at  the  end.  The  number  of  wagons  of  this  new  column  and  the 
load  required  to  go  forward  from  Station  IV.  to  V.  are  the  same 
as  before,  61  wagons  carrying  138,357  pounds.  The  only  ad- 
ditional wagons  required  from  the  third  to  the  fourth  station 
are  those  necessary  to  carry  supplies  for  themselves  during  that 
stage  and  for  such  emptied  wagons  as  must  return  the  next  day. 
Evidently  the  number  of  wagons  that  will  be  emptied  will  be 
small,  and  for  the  present  we  will  ignore  that  number  in  order 
to  discover  better  the  available  capacity  of  a  wagon  under  the 
present  conditions.  From  Station  III.  to  IV.  each  wagon  must 
carry  supplies  for  itself  for  one  day — that  is,  39  pounds;  plus 
10  per  cent,  42.9  pounds,  which  reduces  the  carrying  capacity 
of  a  wagon  to  2,500  minus  42.9,  equals  2,457.1  pounds.  Di- 
viding the  requirements  of  the  last  day,  138,357  pounds,  by 
2,457.1  and  adding  10  per  cent,  we  get  62  as  the  number  of 
wagons  required  between  the  third  arid  fourth  stations.  Of 
these,  6 1  go  on  and  only  i  returns  empty.  This  one  returning 
empty  must  carry  supplies  for  itself  for  one  day,  39  pounds; 
but  this  small  additional  weight  does  not  affect  the  number  of 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  75 

wagons  required,  although  the  load  of  the  62  wagons  must  be 
increased  by  it.  The  62  wagons  consume  62  X  39  pounds  of 
forage  and  rations,  which,  plus  the  39  pounds  for  the  return- 
ing wagon,  equals  2,457  pounds;  adding  this  to  138,357  gives 
140,814  pounds  as  the  weight  of  supplies  to  be  carried  forward 
from  Station  III.;  dividing  this  into  forage  and  rations,  the 
results  obtained  and  the  number  of  wagons  going  and  return- 
ing are  recorded  on  the  chart. 

Starting  now  with  140,814  pounds  as  the  initial  weight  to 
be  carried  forward  from  Station  II.,  we  can,  by  precisely  the 
same  method  of  calculation,  arrive  at  the  total  load  at  Station 
II.  and  the  number  of  wagons  required.  These  are  as  recorded 
on  the  chart.  Similarly,  we  work  back  to  the  advance  depot, 
and  find  that  65  wagons  must  leave  there  on  the  second  day, 
loaded  as  indicated. 

The  computations  in  the  case  of  the  wagons  leaving  the  ad- 
vance depot  on  the  third  day  are  somewhat  complicated,  due  to 
the  fact  that  returning  wagons  are  met  by  this  column,  which 
must  be  supplied  with  one  day's  forage  and  rations  for  the  next 
day  of  their  return.  But  we  shall  find  that  approximately  the 
same  number  of  wagons  arrive  at  and  return  from  each  of  the 
stations,  and  by  assuming  that  the  numbers  are  exactly  the 
same  and  making  the  necessary  corrections  afterwards,  we  shall 
have  no  difficulty. 

The  requirements  at  Station  IV.  are  the  same  as  before, 
and  from  this  point  on  they  are  provided  for  by  the  wagons 
returning  from  the  front  the  day  before.  That  is,  61  wagons 
arrive  at  Station  IV.  from  the  front  each  day  and  the  same 
number  are  required  to  carry  supplies  forward  the  next  day. 
All  of  the  wagons  that  leave  Station  III.  on  the  third  day  may 
therefore  return  the  next  day  toward  the  depot.  The  available 
capacity  of  a  wagon  is  therefore  reduced  by  its  own  require- 
ments for  two  days,  making  it  2,414.2  pounds.  Dividing  the 
initial  weight  at  Station  III.,  138,357  pounds,  by  2,414.2,  and 
adding  10  per  cent,  we  get  64  wagons  as  the  number  required 
at  Station  III.  All  of  these,  after  completing  the  day's  march, 
return  unloaded  the  next  day.  Two  days'  supplies  for  them 
amount  to  378  pounds  of  rations  and  4,536  pounds  of  forage, 
which,  added  to  the  initial  weights,  give  64,278  pounds  of  ra- 
tions and  78,993  pounds  of  forage,  a  total  of  143,271  pounds, 
to  be  carried  forward  from  Station  III.  The  same  require- 
ments for  Station  III.  will  be  found  to  exist  on  succeeding  days, 
and  the  chart  for  that  day  may  therefore  now  be  completed. 


76  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

Taking  now  143,271  as  the  initial  weight  at  Station  II., 
dividing  it  by  2,414.2  and  adding  10  per  cent,  we  get  65  wagons 
required  at  that  station.  Of  these,  63  go  forward  beyond  Sta- 
tion III.  the  next  day  and  2  return;  but  62  other  returning 
wagons  arrive  at  Station  III.  at  the  same  time,  so  that  the  next 
day  64  wagons  all  together  will  return  from  Station  III.  and 
must  be  provided  with  a  day's  supplies.  When  we  used  2,414.2 
as  a  divisor  above,  we  assumed  that  all  the  wagons  to  be  used 
would  require  two  days'  supplies.  It  now  develops  that  while 
65  wagons  go  forward  from  Station  II.  only  64  return  the  next 
day — that  is,  in  getting  at  the  number  of  wagons  we  have  over- 
estimated the  requirements  by  the  weight  of  the  supplies  re- 
quired by  one  wagon  for  one  day;  this  is  39  pounds,  which  will 
not  affect  the  number  of  wagons  required.  We  must  now  add 
to  the  initial  weight  at  Station  II.  the  weight  of  the  supplies 
required  by  65  wagons  for  one  day  and  64  wagons  for  one  day— 
that  is,  129  X  39  pounds  equals  5,031,  which  makes  the  total 
load  at  Station  II.  148,302  pounds,  of  which  83,637  are  forage 
and  64,665  are  rations.  Similarly,  we  work  back  to  the  advance 
depot  and  find  that  70  wagons  must  leave  there  on  the  morning 
of  the  third  day.  As  65  wagons  returned  to  the  depot  the 
evening  before,  only  5  additional  wagons  are  required. 

The  columns  of  wagons  which  must  leave  the  advance 
depot  on  the  fourth  and  subsequent  dates  can  be  calculated  in 
exactly  the  same  manner.  On  the  tenth  we  find  70  wagons 
leaving  the  advance  depot  and  the  same  number  returning  in 
the  evening;  and  we  also  find  that  between  any  other  two  sta- 
tions on  that  day  the  number  of  returning  wagons  is  the  same  as 
the  number  that  leave.  These  numbers  remain  constant  so  long 
as  conditions  are  the  same.  We  have  then  70  +  68  +  65  +  63 
+  6 1  =  327  wagons  leaving  the  respective  stations  loaded  each 
day;  and  the  same  number  returning,  or  a  total  of  654  wagons 
required  to  supply  continuously  a  division  75  miles  away;  this 
number  is,  of  course,  exactly  the  same  as  the  number  that  have 
left  the  advance  depot  up  to  and  including  the  tenth  day,  minus 
those  that  have  returned  to  it;  and,  in  general,  on  any  day  we 
can  find  the  number  of  wagons  working  along  the  line  by  ad- 
ding those  that  have  left  the  advance  depot  and  subtracting 
from  the  result  those  that  have  returned.  Thus,  during  the 
fourth  day  315  +  65  +  70  +  66  —  65  —  1  =  450  wagons  are 
wrorking  along  the  line.  On  the  tenth  and  afterwards  the  num- 
ber is  constant,  amounting,  as  already  shown,  to  654  wagons. 
By  means  of  the  completed  chart,  the  necessary  orders  for  the 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  77 

movements  of  the  various  trains  can  be  prepared  in  detail. 
The  calculations  have  been  explained  at  perhaps  too  great  a 
length,  but  the  importance  of  a  correct  understanding  of  the 
method  used  should  be  appreciated,  for  by  this  method  alone 
can  the  amount  of  transportation  required  for  a  particular  pur- 
pose be  obtained  with  accuracy.  The  method  is  adaptable  to 
all  classes  of  transportation  problems,  and  however  many  com- 
plications may  arise  in  their  solution,  they  can  always  be  pro- 
vided for  if  we  bear  in  mind  the  point  that  we  must  always 
begin  at  the  end  and  work  backward.  In  the  problem  just 
solved  it  will  be  noted  that  no  transport  lies  idle  at  any  station, 
and  none  except  the  10  per  cent  spare  go  forward  empty. 

It  has  been  shown  in  the  first  part  of  this  paper  that  a  divi- 
sion cannot  continuously  supply  itself  from  the  advance  depot 
with  its  own  wagons  if  it  is  operating  more  than  two  days' 
march  from  that  depot.  In  such  case,  the  usual  method  is  to 
send  other  wagons  from  the  advance  depot  each  day  with  a 
day's  supply  to  within  thirty  miles  of  the  troops,  where  they  are 
met  by  sections  of  the  regular  supply  train  of  the  division.  The 
same  result  may  be  accomplished  as  in  the  problem  solved  by 
increasing  the  supply  train  of  the  division  by  the  necessary 
number  of  wagons.  It  can  readily  be  seen  that  the  number  of 
wagons  constituting  the  troop  trains  of  a  division  may  readily 
be  fixed  at  such  a  definite  number  as  may  be  necessary  to  carry 
two  days'  supply  of  oats  and  rations  and  such  other  impedi- 
menta as  may  be  authorized ;  but  the  number  of  wagons  needed 
for  the  supply  train  cannot  be  fixed,  for  it  must  necessarily  vary 
greatly,  depending  upon  many  conditions,  as,  for  instance,  the 
resources  of  the  country,  the  nature  and  length  of  the  com- 
munications, the  distance  of  the  enemy,  and  so  forth.  We  can, 
however,  readily  determine  the  minimum  number  of  wagons 
required  to  carry  three  days'  supply  of  oats  and  rations  for  a 
division.  The  requirement  of  a  division  for  three  days  amounts 
to  3  X  133, 599  equals  400,797  pounds;  and  the  requirements  of 
each  wagon  carrying  these  supplies  to  3  X  39  equals  1 17  pounds; 
the  capacity  of  a  wagon  is  2,500  pounds,  which,  less  117  pounds, 
equals  2,383  pounds  available  for  the  division.  Dividing 
400,797  by  2,383  gives  168  wragons,  to  which  10  per  cent  should 
be  added,  making  184.8.  As  it  is  desirable  to  have  the  supply 
train  divisible  by  3,  so  that  each  section  may  carry  a  day's 
supply,  it  is  submitted  that  186  wagons  should  be  the  pre- 
scribed minimum  allowance.  Allowing  20  yards  to  a  wagon, 
the  supply  train  of  a  division,  carrying  only  three  days'  rations 


78  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

and  forage,  will,  if  marching  in  a  single  column,  extend  over  a 
distance  of  2  miles  and  200  yards.  Of  the  186  wagons,  96  are 
for  forage  and  90  for  rations. 

Referring  again  to  Chart  VI.,  it  will  be  recalled  that  654 
wagons  were  required,  which  is  468  more  than  the  number  con- 
stituting the  supply  train  proper  of  the  division.  In  practice 
it  is  improbable  that  this  number  of  extra  standard  four-rnule 
wagons  would  be  available — in  fact,  the  transport  of  an  army 
in  excess  of  the  prescribed  allowance  will  ordinarily  and  of 
necessity  consist  largely  of  a  heterogeneous  lot  of  vehicles 
requisitioned  from  the  country.  In  such  case,  the  wagons 
should  be  divided  into  classes  of  approximately  the  same  carry- 
ing power,  and  calculations  as  to  the  requirements  should  be 
made  accordingly.  By  assigning  the  same  class  of  wagons  to 
the  same  stages  of  the  journey,  the  calculations  will  not  be  un- 
duly complicated.  By  beginning  the  computation  with  the 
last  stage  of  the  journey  each  day,  when  none  but  the  four-mule 
wagons  are  used,  we  can  readily  work  back  to  the  advance 
depot.  Eventually  we  will  have  122  of  the  186  wagons  consti- 
tuting the  division  supply  train  proper  working  back  and  forth 
over  the  last  stage  of  the  route  and  the  rest  between  Stations 
IV.  and  V. — in  other  words,  none  of  the  regular  wagons  will  be 
required  to  move  more  than  two  stations  away  from  the  troops. 

Let  us  consider  now  what  use  should  be  made  of  the  10  per 
cent  spare  wagons  provided.  If  a  wagon  breaks  down  we  must 
have  a  spare  one  in  which  to  load  its  supplies ;  so  that,  although 
it  is  desirable  to  carry  extra  supplies,  all  the  wagons  must  not 
be  loaded.  By  placing  the  computed  loads  at  the  advance 
depot  on  the  wagons  provided  and  then  loading  half  the  re- 
maining wagons  we  can  carry  forward  5  per  cent  additional 
supplies.  Of  what  they  should  consist  will  depend  entirely 
upon  the  conditions.  The  most  important  extras  to  furnish 
troops  are  fresh  beef  or  canned  meats,  fresh  bread,  some  form 
of  anti-scorbutics,  preferably  fresh  vegetables,  and  tobacco.  It 
may,  however,  be  considered  necessary  to  load  the  spare  wagons 
with  extra  haversack  rations  and  oats  only.  Unless  the  weather 
is  suitable,  it  will  be  difficult  to  supply  fresh  beef  or  fresh  vege- 
tables from  the  advance  depot,  even  if  they  can  be  gotten  that 
far  to  the  front;  and  to  attempt  to  supply  fresh  bread  by 
wagons  to  troops  seventy-five  miles  away  is,  of  course,  out  of 
the  question.  To  the  American  soldier  tobacco  is  more  of  a 
necessity  than  a  luxury,  and  every  effort  should  be  made  to  • 
provide  it  for  sale  or  as  an  extra  issue.  It  would  be  well,  then, 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  79 

if  practicable,  to  send  forward  a  supply  of  tobacco  at  intervals. 
But  as  to  other  extras,  everything  will  depend  upon  conditions, 
principally  upon  the  resources  of  the  country,  the  ease  of  supply 
of  the  advance  depot,  and  the  climate. 

So  far  we  have  considered  only  the  question  of  supply  of 
an  army  from  the  advance  depot  when  the  army  has  moved  a 
given  distance  from  there  and  halted,  and  we  have  demon- 
strated a  method  by  which  the  number  of  wagons  needed  to 
supply  such  an  army  can  be  calculated.  Suppose  now  it  is  at- 
tempted to  supply  wholly  from  the  rear  an  army  that  starts  out 
with  no  intention  of  halting.  Evidently  it  can  subsist  only  for 
the  number  of  days  that  the  supplies  carried  with  it  will  last, 
for  there  are  no  means  of  renewal.  Starting  out  with  say  ten 
days'  supplies,  at  the  end  of  that  time  the  army  will  be  without 
food,  ten  days  away  from  its  point  of  supply.  Then,  if  provis- 
ion has  not  been  made  to  supply  it  at  that  distance  from  the 
depot,  the  army  can  remain  halted,  or  march  on,  or  struggle 
back ;  but,  whatever  else  happens,  it  will  most  likely  starve,  and 
it  will  certainly  not  be  in  condition  to  win  any  battle.  The 
conclusion,  then,  is  obvious,  that  an  army  dependent  upon  its 
base  for  supplies  cannot  start  out  on  any  expedition  of  indefinite 
length.  Provision  must  be  made  in  advance  for  keeping  it 
supplied,  and  in  order  to  make  such  provision  the  maximum 
distance  it  can  go  with  the  transportation  available  must  be 
determined,  and  the  whole  transportation  problem  solved  by 
the  method  that  has  been  explained.  Then  if  the  army  must 
proceed  still  further  forward,  the  advance  depot  must  first  be 
pushed  along  to  its  vicinity,  when  it  will  be  able  to  make 
another  advance  movement  of  fixed  duration.  Thus,  slowly, 
the  enemy's  country  can  be  penetrated  and  contact  with  him 
be  eventually  secured. 


DISADVANTAGES  IN  THE   USE   OF   CATTLE 

ON  THE  HOOF  AS  BEEF  SUPPLY  OF 

AN  ARMY  IN  THE  FIELD. 


As  SHOWN  BY  FRENCH,  GERMAN,  AND  Swiss  OFFICIAL 

REPORTS,  AND  BY  CELEBRATED  MILITARY 

WRITERS  IN  EUROPE. 

Colonel  FEISS  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  GOOD,  of  the  Swiss 
Army,  were  attached  to  the  German  Army  of  occupation  in 
France  in  1871,  and  submitted  a  report  to  their  Government 
on  "The  Organization  and  Operation  of  the  Subsistence  Service 
in  the  German  Army  during  the  War  of  1870-1871,"  in  which 
report  it  is  stated : 

"In  France,  the  German  armies,  during  their  forward  movements, 
always  found  fresh  meat  sufficient  for  several  days.  This  fact  and  that 
of  the  cattle  plague,  which  had  broken  out  in  the  herds  brought  from 
Russia,  have  impressed  the  most  capable  German  iritendants  with  the 
conviction  that  to  drive  cattle  with  the  army  is  a  great  mistake.  The 
cattle  soon  become  mere  skeletons;  they  catch  and  spread  all  contagious 
diseases;  and  finally  it  becomes  necessary  to  kill  them  without  their  being 
available  for  the  alimentation  of  the  troops.  It  is  for  these  reasons, 
gained  from  experience,  that  the  German  Intendence  has,  in  the  War  of 
1870-1871,  founded  establishments  to  make  meat  preserves  by  different 
processes." — Pierron,  "Strategic  et  Grande  Tactique,"  Vol.  III.,  p.  15. 

Captain  SCHAEFFER,  in  his  "History  of  the  Franco-German 
War  of  1870-1871,"  edited  by  the  historical  section  of  the 
Prussian  Great  General  Staff,  says : 

"But,  at  that  time,  the  cattle  plague  broke  out,  which  occasioned 
great  difficulties  for  the  subsistence  service.  The  Chief  Intendant  of  the 
Army  was  forced  to  adopt  stringent  methods  in  order  to  prevent  this 
plague  from  spreading  in  the  herds  on  the  march.  Orders  were  issued  to 
slaughter  all  the  cattle  engaged  in  the  direction  of  Landau-Nancy,  to  salt 
the  meat  known  to  be  healthy,  and  to  bury  that  which  was  contaminated. 
The  introduction  of  cattle  from  Russia  and  from  Austria-Hungary  was 
prohibited;  only  the  cattle  from  France,  Belgium,  and  Holland  could  be 
drawn  upon.  Later,  it  was  necessary  to  prohibit  all  importation. 

"Notwithstanding  all  these  precautions,  cases  of  the  cattle  plague 
occurred  constantly,  which  rendered  the  supply  of  meat  and  the  variety 

80 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  81 

in  the  food-supply  extremely  difficult.  Recourse  was  then  made  to  salt 
meat  and  to  canned  meats,  for  which  they  had  had  the  forethought  to 
establish  a  factory  at  Mayence,  as  well  as  to  mutton;  and  it  was  possible 
to  partly  remedy  the  difficulties." — Pierron,  "Strategic  et  Grande  Tactique" 
Vol.  III.,  p.  40. 

L'Intendant-Ge'neral  FRIANT,  1874: 

"The  Prussians  are  now  providing  supplies  of  canned  meats,  having 
recognized  from  experience  in  the  War  of  1870-1871  the  inconveniences  oc- 
casioned by  the  herds  of  cattle,  which  are  soon  decimated  by  the  cattle 
plague.  There  was  presented  to  the  Superior  Commission  of  Subsistence 
at  Paris,  of  which  1  am  the  President,  some  canned  beef,  of  excellent  qual- 
ity, good  keeping  properties,  and  very  reasonable  price.  It  can  be  eat- 
en cold  or  made  into  soup.  What  economy  would  be  effected  if  finally 
it  was  decided  to  adopt  it  and  to  comply  with  the  general  desire  for  a  war 
food !  A  steer  of  600  kilograms  gross  weight  yields  300  kilograms  of  un- 
cooked meat,  and  300  kilograms  of  uncooked  meat  produce  only  150  kilo- 
grams of  edible  meat.  There  would  be  no  more  loss  from  the  frightful 
mortality  among  the  herds  of  animals,  and  tainted  meat  would  no  longer 
be  issued,  which  caused,  in  my  opinion,  sickness  among  the  men.  Wrhat 
kind  of  food  can  be  obtained  from  cattle  constantly  on  the  move  and 
which  are  not  sufficiently  nourished  and  soon  become  mere  skin  and  bones, 
as  in  the  Crimea  in  1854-55?  At  Besacon,  when  Bourbaki's  army  re- 
treated, in  1871,  we  lost  1,200  head  of  cattle  from  the  cattle  plague.  In 
the  Crimea,  how  many  did  we  lose  ?  A  kilogram  of  meat  supplied  from 
cattle  on  the  hoof  becomes  very  expensive.  It  cost,  on  account  of  the  losses, 
more  than  15  francs  in  the  Crimea.  Forage,  a  valuable  article  in  an  army, 
and  still  more  so  in  fortified  places,  is  necessary  for  cattle  on  the  hoof, 
and  frequently  there  is  not  enough  for  such  purpose." — Pierron,  " Strategic 
et  Grande  Tactique,"  Vol.  III.,  p.  62. 

A  Prussian  officer: 

"Assigned  to  the  command  of  the  fortress  artillery  of  Sedan  after 
the  capitulation  of  that  fortress  (September,  1870),  and  returning  from 
Coblentz  to  my  station,  I  met  on  the  road  large  convoys  of  cattle  destined 
for  our  army  and  on  the  way  to  Metz.  They  had  only  a  single  ration  of 
forage,  and  moreover  they  were  on  the  road  for  four  or  five  days  because 
of  the  obstruction  of  the  railways. 

"Arriving  at  Sedan,  I  ascertained  from  the  commandant  of  the 
fortress  that  five  thousand  head  of  cattle,  being  forwarded  from  Bel- 
gium to  the  German  Army  around  Paris,  were  to  remain  for  some  time 
in  my  care.  In  addition  to  the  difficulty  of  corralling  them,  the  difficulty 
of  feeding  them  seemed  insurmountable;  this  herd  would  have  consumed 
in  three  days  all  the  forage  for  the  horses  of  the  fortress.  On  my  advice, 
they  were  placed  on  an  island  in  the  Meuse,  which  the  animals  could 
scarcely  reach  by  means  of  a  ford.  In  three  days  they  had  exhausted  all 
the  grass  in  the  country,  which  became  a  slough.  The  water,  because  of  a 
freshet  in  the  river,  threatened  to  submerge  the  island,  and  the  situation 
seemed  inextricable,  when  fortunately  an  order  was  received  to  slaughter 
the  cattle,  because  of  the  cattle  plague  which  had  broken  out  in  the  herds 
of  cattle  of  the  army  around  Paris,  and  to  forward  to  that  army  such  of 
the  dressed  meat  as  was  known  to  be  healthy. 

"These  instances  show  what  insurmountable  difficulties  are  oc- 
6— 


82  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

casioned  by  the  transport  of  such  a  large  number  of  cattle  on  the  hoof, 
difficulties  which  will  only  augment  as  the  effective  strength  of  modern 
armies  is  increased. 

"To  provide  for  the  subsistence  of  armies  in  the  field  there  is  no 
longer  any  other  practical  method  than  the  following:  To  have  only  such 
cattle  on  the  hoof  as  can  be  provided  from  the  local  resources,  and  to 
exclude  from  the  roads  the  live  cattle. 

"This  method  of  transporting  cattle  on  the  hoof  is  an  evident  an- 
achronism. It  dates  from  the  time  when,  lacking  means  for  keeping  dressed 
meat,  one  was  compelled  to  transport  live  cattle.  Now,  to  transport 
alive  a  steer  of  500  kilograms,  results  in  transporting  at  least  250  kilograms 
of  bone,  horns,  hoofs,  hide,  and  entrails.  These  parts  undoubtedly  have 
some  value,  but  in  the  field  they  will  have,  notwithstanding  the  measures 
taken  by  the  administration,  little  or  no  value.  To  these  objections 
others  are  to  be  added,  such  as  the  transportation  of  the  forage,  the  sub- 
sistence of  the  herders,  and  the  difficulty  of  loading  and  unloading  these 
heavy  animals. 

"From  all  these  considerations  it  follows  at  least  that  the  cattle  cannot 
be  transported  on  the  hoof;  they  should  be  slaughtered,  cut  up,  and 
loaded  on  cars,  boats,  or  wagons.  The  problem  is  not  difficult  to  solve, 
since  at  the  present  time  dressed  meat  is  forwarded  from  South  America 
to  London  and  in  a  perfect  state  of  preservation,  notwithstanding  a  voyage 
of  forty-five  days. 

"As  concerns  the  supply  for  fortresses,  it  should  be  composed  chiefly 
of  preserved  meats.  When  one  has  seen  the  difficulties  that  a  commandant 
of  a  fortress  experiences  to  hold,  feed,  and  keep  in  good  condition  a  large 
herd,  the  ravages  caused  by  the  cattle  plague,  the  shells  from  the  enemy's 
artillery  which  set  fire  to  the  stables,  one  gains  convincing  proof  that, 
even  in  a  large  fortress,  protected  by  detached  works,  it  is  possible  to  keep 
alive  cattle  only  during  the  beginning  of  the  investment,  and  that  preserves 
of  meat  should,  in  the  future,  always  be  used  in  constituting  the  supplies 
for  a  siege."  —  Pierron,  "Strategic  et  Grande  Tactique,"  Vol.  III.,  p.  67. 

"Advantages   of   Transporting    Dressed    Meats/'    by   M. 


"Animals  transported  on  foot  or  in  cars  suffer  from  lack  of  food 
and  water,  from  the  disturbance  caused  in  their  manner  of  life,  from  the 
uneasiness  caused  by  fright  and  crowding  in  the  cars.  Thus  they  arrive, 
if  not  sick,  at  least  in  an  unhealthy  condition. 

"When  slaughtered  at  the  places  of  production,  the  animal  is  killed, 
on  the  other  hand,  in  the  best  condition.  The  meat  is  healthy,  nourishing, 
and  the  following  advantages  are  obtained  :  the  offal  of  the  animal  serves 
for  manure;  the  hides  supply  the  local  industry;  the  transports  are  loaded 
only  with  edible  meat. 

"To  assure  good  keeping  qualities  to  dressed  meat,  it  is  not  necessary 
to  resort  to  chemical  ingredients;  cold  itself  gives  a  satisfactory  result,  or, 
rather,  the  temperature  of  32°  F.,  without  variation  and  in  perfectly  dry  air. 
If  the  temperature  is  above  32°  F.,  the  meat  does  not  keep;  if  it  is  below,  it 
loses  its  flavor.  With  a  temperature  of  32°  F.,  the  result  of  the  conserva- 
tion is  such  that  at  the  end  of  a  week  the  meat  is  entirely  improved,  and 
that  it  is  possible  to  keep  it  in  that  way  for  two  months  and  longer."- 
Pierron,  "Strategic  et  Grande  Tactique,"  Vol.  III.,  p.  304. 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  83 

Prussian  General  VON  DER  Goi/rz,  Inspector  of  the  Line  of 
Communications  of  the  III.  German  Army  in  1870-1871 : 

"In  the  month  of  September,  1870,  the  German  Army  received  a 
decided  check  by  the  appearance  of  the  cattle  plague,  which  compelled  it 
to  discontinue  all  consignments  of  cattle  from  the  mother  country  and  to 
be  satisfied  with  what  was  found  in  the  country,  outside  the  roads  tra- 
versed by  the  troops  or  their  trains,  and  to  resort  to  mutton.  The  greatest 
efforts  were  made  to  localize  the  epidemic,  but  without  success;  for  the 
root  of  the  evil  was  the  bad  or  insufficient  nourishment,  the  lack  of  care,  and 
the  filth  of  the  animals  held  in  enormous  herds;  and  very  often  the  epidemic 
appeared  rather  as  the  typhus  of  hunger  than  as  the  cattle  plague.  On  the 
road  followed  by  the  army  it  was  not  possible  to  find  any  longer  sufficient 
resources  to  keep  in  good  condition  such  large  herds,  because  both  friend 
and  foe  had  exhausted  them ;  on  this  account  herds  of  about  two  thousand 
head  of  cattle  perished  in  a  few  days.  All  that  could  be  done  was  to 
separate  the  healthy  cattle  from  those  which  were  contaminated,  to  kill 
the  first  in  order  to  use  them  as  salt  meat,  and  to  bury  the  others. 

"The  administration  of  the  occupied  territories  exerted  every  effort 
to  check  the  propagation  of  the  epidemic,  in  order  to  protect  the  resources 
of  the  country,  and  it  was  successful  to  a  considerable  degree. 

"Later,  it  was  decided  to  transport  the  cattle  by  rail  instead  of  for- 
warding them  by  the  roads,  so  as  to  avoid  the  localities  infected  with  the 
cattle  plague.  But  very  soon  the  impossibility  of  feeding  such  large  num- 
bers of  cattle  was  made  manifest,  and  the  typhus  of  hunger  again  made  its 
appearance.  Finally,  it  was  determined  to  send  from  the  mother  coun- 
try only  bacon,  salted  or  smoked  meat,  canned  foods,  and  pea  sausages, 
of  which  the  manufacture  of  large  numbers  was  undertaken." — Pierron, 
"Strategieet  Grande  Tactique,"  Vol.  III.,  p.  329. 

"Necessity  for  Canned  Provisions"  (Captain  HEUTSCH, 
German  Army,  1881) : 

"The  effectiveness  and  mobility  of  an  army  depend  particularly  on 
the  manner  in  which  the  soldier  is  nourished;  but  this  last  point  presents 
the  greatest  difficulties,  because  the  armies  of  the  present  time  are  of  im- 
mense size  and  move  in  a  more  concentrated  order  than  formerly.  To  sup- 
ply such  masses  from  the  resources  of  a  country  is  most  frequently  an  im- 
possibility; and  it  is  not  possible  to  drive  cattle  herds  after  them  without 
exposure  to  the  danger  of  the  cattle  plague. 

"Effort  has  been  made  to  remedy  these  inconveniences  in  two  ways: 
by  the  introduction  of  preserves  as  one  way,  and  for  another  by  adopting 
various  methods  of  freezing  in  order  to  transport  the  dressed  meat  without 
its  spoiling." — Pierron,  "Strategie  et  Grande  Tactique,"  Vol.  III.,  p.  61. 

Sous-Intendant  DUSSUTOUR,  1888: 

"The  enormous  herds  of  the  River  Plate,  of  Australia  and  of  New 
Zealand,  were  generally  used,  until  recent  years,  only  for  the  hides  and 
fat  of  the  animals.  The  meat,  in  reality,  was  too  abundant  to  be  con- 
sumed there,  and  the  methods  of  preservation  too  defective  to  practically 
permit  exportation.  But  on  account  of  the  invention  of  English  machines 
which  produce  cold,  without  employing  any  chemical  substance,  simply 


84  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

by  the  compression  and  quick  expansion  of  air,  it  is  possible  to  transport 
now  to  Europe  the  meat  coming  from  the  large  cattle-raising  countries. 

********* 

"The  problem  of  keeping  and  transportation  of  large  quantities  of 
meat  and  supplies  appears  then  successfully  solved.  The  duration  of  the 
conservation,  moreover,  does  not  appear  to  be  limited ;  all  the  experiments 
made  in  that  respect  are  entirely  conclusive. 

*  *  *  *       "  #  ;je  *  *  * 

"In  wars  of  the  future,  the  resources  of  the  country  occupied  will  be 
quickly  exhausted  by  the  immense  modern  armies;  and,  after  a  certain 
length  of  time,  all  or  nearly  all  the  supplies  will  be  drawn  from  the  ad- 
joining districts  or  from  the  interior.  Under  such  conditions  frozen  meats 
offer  the  greatest  advantages  for  supplies.  They  will  be  still  more  valuable 
for  fortified  places,  if  these  have  been  provided  with  refrigerating  ma- 
chines in  time  of  peace,  for  the  cattle  could  be  slaughtered  as  soon  as  the 
investment  is  completed,  and  thus  the  difficulty  of  feeding  them  during 
the  siege  would  be  removed." — Pierron,  "Strattgie  et  Grande  Tactique," 
Vol.  III.,  p.  79. 

"fitudes  de  Guerre,  Tactique  de  Ravitaillements,"  par  le 
General  LEWAL,  1889,  Tome  Second,  Chapitre  X.,  p.  47: 

"In  order  to  supply  the  possible  insufficiency  of  the  fresh  meat  to  be 
found  in  a  country,  resort  was  formerly  made  to  cattle  on  the  hoof,  to 
herds  marching  in  rear  of  the  columns.  When  there  was  no  other  means 
of  living,  it  was  necessary  to  submit  to  all  their  inconveniences.  Canned 
meat  makes  it  possible  to  do  away  with  them  and  will  constitute  a  great 
advance  in  provisioning  of  armies. 

********* 

"Marshal  DAVOUST  wrote  to  the  Chief  of  Staff  on  April  3,  1807: 
'The  cattle  plague  prevails  in  our  cantonments  and  has  carried  off  a  large 
number  of  horned  cattle  and  swine.  From  a  report  made  to  General 
Friant,  of  the  fifty-six  animals  which  were  in  his  herd,  forty-nine  died  in 
twenty-four  hours.'  Marshal  DAVOUST  again  wrote  to  the  Emperor  from 
Skierniewice,  on  September  21,  1807:  'The  Intendant  -  general  has  re- 
ported a  quantity  of  beef  on  the  hoof,  which  should  be  sufficient  for  six 
months'  consumption;  but  the  loss  of  a  large  number  of  animals  on  the 
road  and  the  great  loss  in  weight  of  those  which  arrive  reduced  the  supply 
reported  more  than  one-half;  and  this  is  under  the  supposition  that  the 
cattle  plague  does  not  attack  our  herds,  but  for  the  past  month  it  has 
made  the  greatest  ravages,  and  we  are  about  to  experience  the  greatest 
embarrassment.' 

"Frequent  mention  has  been  made  of  the  typhus,  which  so  cruelly 
afflicted  the  garrison  of  Dresden  and  all  of  Germany  in  1813.  The  origin 
of  it  has  been  traced  to  the  diseased  cattle  drawn  from  Hungary  by  the 
Austrian  Army. 

"The  Germans  in  1870  saw  the  cattle  plague  break  out  in  their  herds 
at  Sarrelouis,  Courcelles,  Ars,  Jouy,  etc.  It  was  necessary  to  slaughter 
at  one  time  a  thousand  head,  to  take  the  most  severe  sanitary  measures, 
and  the  supply  of  fresh  meat  soon  became  nearly  impossible. 

"Such  instances  should  cause  serious  consideration  for  the  future, 
when  the  dangers  will  increase  with  the  numbers.  From  this  may  come 
the  cattle  plague,  carbuncles,  typhus,  cholera,  and  these  plagues  may  as- 
sume a  very  dangerous  form  in  the  enormous  numbers  of  future  armies. 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  85 

********* 

"Thus  the  animals  passing  from  one  corral  to  another,  or  following 
the  columns,  are  continuously  on  the  move,  and  marching  injures  them. 

"The  same  old  stereotyped  phrase  is  reproduced  in  all  the  courses  of 
lectures  on  administration:  'Meat  is  a  food  which  marches.'  It  indeed 
marches  too  much. 

"With  large  armies  the  fresh  meat  must  necessarily  be  brought  from 
a  great  distance  in  rear.  The  railroads  will  relieve  the  animals  of  a  portion 
of  the  distance,  but  not  of  the  fatigues  of  the  journey.  In  the  trains  they 
will  suffer  greatly  from  hunger  and  thirst;  they  are  crowded,  frightened, 
constant  prey  to  disease ;  accidents  are  numerous. 

"Immediately  on  disembarkation,  the  cattle  are  rapidly  forwarded 
to  the  troops.  They  are  driven  at  quick  and  unusual  pace,  and  the  roads 
break  up  their  hoofs,  which  have  become  accustomed  to  the  softer  grounds 
of  the  fields  and  ranges. 

"A  sustained  pace  is  not  natural  for  them.  They  need  frequent  and 
prolonged  halts  in  order  to  graze  and  particularly  to  ruminate.  Instead 
of  this,  the  herders  and  the  dogs  urge  them  forward  and  harass  them. 

"The  cattle  are  driven  all  day  and  halt  for  a  short  time  in  corrals, 
rarely  in  pastures.  Their  nourishment,  always  insufficient,  is  often  not 
supplied  at  all.  The  mortality  in  the  herds  on  the  march  is  frightful,  and 
those  that  survive  the  hardships  of  the  march  are  emaciated  and  scarcely 
more  than  skin  and  bones.  The  proportion  of  this  thin,  tough  meat, 
nearly  always  diseased,  to  bones,  tendons,  and  cartilage,  falls  to  50  or  60 
per  cent  and  sometimes  more.  If  this  is  not  considered,  the  nutritive 
value  of  the  ration  is  thus  considerably  reduced,  and  to  raise  it  the  expense 
would  be  greatly  increased." 

"Marshal  DAVOUST  to  the  Emperor  (Warsaw,  November  12,  1807): 
'  I  have  written  to  the  Intendant  and  have  advised  him,  instead  of  making 
consignments  of  cattle,  to  send  here  the  value  of  these  cattle.  The  loss 
the  cattle  undergo  which  are  forwarded  to  us  by  the  Intendant,  either 
from  lack  of  nourishment,  or  from  epizooty,  increases  the  price  of  those 
that  arrive  to  the  price  of  40  sols  per  pound  (instead  of  7),  and  then  this 
meat  is  thin  and  the  very  worst  quality.' 

"These  serious  objections  to  cattle  on  the  hoof  are  not  the  only  ones. 
The  herd  marches  much  slower  than  the  troops.  If  they  follow  the  troops, 
they  will  not  complete  the  day's  march  until  an  hour  or  two  after  the  rear 
of  the  column;  if  they  are  started  with  the  advance  guard,  they  are  over- 
taken in  time  by  the  column,  they  raise  clouds  of  dust,  are  a  great  hin- 
drance, and  give  rise  to  disorder  and  confusion.  Actuated  by  the  necessity 
for  water,  food,  and  rest,  and  liable  to  be  stampeded,  the  animals  become 
separated,  and  then  the  tiresome  work  of  rounding  them  up  falls  upon 
the  men. 

"All  these  disadvantages,  apparent  in  small  columns,  assume  an  in- 
finite strength  in  large  ones ;  they  become  so  potent  that  cattle  on  the  hoof 
is  a  delusion  in  war  of  large  masses. 

"The  experience  of  the  Germans,  in  their  war  relatively  easy  in  so 
rich  a  country  as  France,  has  demonstrated  to  them  the  manifest  evils 
of  cattle  on  the  hoof  and  has  induced  them  to  include  in  their  supplies 
canned  meats." 

Extract  from  work  entitled  "The  Army  Ration,"  by  E.  N. 


86  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

HORSFORD,  late   Rumford   Professor  in   Harvard   University, 
Cambridge,  Mass.,  published  in  1864,  pages  19,  20,  and  21 : 

"Fresh  beef  as  a  source  of  the  marching  ration  has  some  advantages : 
it  carries  itself;  the  cattle  can  be  driven,  but  this  advantage  is  limited. 
Of  what  use  are  live  cattle  on  such  an  expedition  as  Averill's,  to  cut  the 
Virginia  &  Tennessee  Railroad;  or  Kilpatrick's,  in  the  rear  of  Lee's  army, 
threatening  Richmond?  In  a  forced  march  the  herd  of  cattle  must  be 
some  distance  in  the  rear,  and  the  supply  of  fresh  beef  irregular.  The 
best  of  cattle  in  Ohio,  Indiana,  or  Illinois,  after  transportation  in  cars, 
with  little  water,  food,  or  sleep,  during  several  days  and  nights  of  con- 
tinuous travel,  and  after  being  driven  about  for  two  or  three  weeks,  with 
scanty  forage  or  none  at  all,  furnish  as  a  whole  meager  and  inferior  beef. 
To  preserve  the  beef,  the  cattle  are  slaughtered — in  summer,  early  in  the 
morning — and  the  meat  immediately  boiled,  if  conveniences  will  permit, 
to  prevent  its  becoming  fly-blown.  The  juices  extracted  in  the  boiling 
are  uniformly  and  necessarily  lost.  The  edible  meat  is  much  of  it  lost  in 
the  difficulty  and  haste  of  detaching  it  from  the  bones;  it  has  no  provision 
against  spontaneous  decay;  it  is  not  always  at  command  when  most 
needed;  it  is  bulky,  and  yet  the  actual  edible  meat  which  the  soldier  de- 
rives from  an  ox  slaughtered  on  the  march  is  much  less  than  is  ordinarily 
supposed.  The  advantage  of  providing  it  on  the  hoof  is  correspondingly 
small. 

"In  slaughtering,  the  weight  is  diminished  by  loss  of  blood,  the  re- 
moval of  the  tongue,  heart,  and  liver,  the  viscera  and  offal,  and  legs  to  the 
knee.  This  reduction,  called  'shrinkage,'  in  good  cattle  fresh  from  the 
pasture  amounts  to  at  least  one-third.  An  ox  in  fair  condition,  weighing 
i,  1500  pounds  on  the  hoof,  would  lose  by  shrinkage  500  pounds. 

********* 

"A  medical  officer,  whose  duties  called  him  to  Chattanooga  during  the 
months  preceding  the  battle  of  Lookout  Mountain,  has  informed  me  that 
the  cattle  furnished  to  that  post  were  so  sick  and  exhausted  from  the  effects 
of  the  transportation  from  Louisville,  and  so  reduced  and  emaciated  from 
having  had  absolutely  nothing  to  eat  on  the  railroad  and  after  their  ar- 
rival, for  -weeks  in  succession,  that  some  of  them  reeled  in  walking,  and, 
falling  or  lying  down,  were  unable  to  rise.  It  is  true  that  the  bullocks 
that  thus  fell  were  not  eaten,  but  they  indicate  the  condition  of  those 
which  had  been  subjected  to  the  same  suffering  and  deprivations  and  were 
actually  used  as  food.  What  these  cattle  on  the  hoof  cost  the  Government 
I  know  not,  but  probably  not  less  than  the  cattle  supplied  to  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  while  their  value  for  food  must  have  been  less  and  the 
cost  of  the  ration  of  fresh  beef  correspondingly  greater." 

CANNED  MEAT. — "The  impossibility  of  driving  cattle,  the  necessity 
for  a  food  always  ready,  even  without  fire,  in  battle,  on  the  march,  in 
bivouac,  and  at  the  outposts,  has  compelled  the  adoption  of  canned  meat 
and  vegetables  of  commerce  for  the  supply  of  troops  in  the  field." — Lewal, 
"Etudes  de  Guerre,"  Tome  II.,  p.  52. 

"Cours  Professes  a  1'Ecole  d' Administration  Militaire  de 
Vincennes,  pendant  1'Annee  1891,"  Volume  II.,  page  343: 

"Such  a  reserve — i.  e.,  of  cattle  herds — imposed  upon  the  contractor 
entails  a  heavy  charge  against  the  Treasury,  which  pays  the  interest  on 
the  capital  invested;  it  also  deprives  the  cavalry  of  all  the  forage  con- 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  87 

sumed  on  the  spot  by  the  cattle.  These  inconveniences  have  suggested 
the  idea  of  utilizing  for  the  supply  of  fresh  meat  for  armies  a  very  recent 
discovery  which  permits  the  transportation  to  great  distances  of  dressed 
meats  after  having  frozen  them.  In  the  field,  if  too  serious  obstacles  are 
not  encountered,  this  system  is  destined  to  render  important  services  and  to 
effect  great  economies.  It  is  being  investigated  at  present  with  the  view 
of  its  application  to  the  supply  of  fortresses;  undoubtedly  the  same  in- 
vestigation will  be  extended  to  the  question  of  the  supply  of  fresh  meat 
in  the  field." 

General  PIKRRON,  in  his  work  entitled  "Stategie  et  Grande 
Tactique  d'apres  T Experience  des  Dernieres  Guerres,"  Volume 
III.,  page  4,  states: 

"As  a  campaign  would  not  be  entered  into  without  a  plan  of  opera- 
tions, it  is  likewise  necessary  to  previously  form  the  plan  of  supply  to 
provide  the  subsistence  for  the  soldier  and  for  the  horse  in  the  zone  of 
concentration : 

"The  questions  to  be  solved  are  the  following: 

********* 

"8.  Where  should  the  large  slaughter-houses  be  established?"  and 
answers  as  follows: 

"8.  The  large  slaughter-houses  will  forward  to  the  army  the  meat 
cut  up  and  preserved,  either  by  the  use  of  ice  or  by  means  of  air  or  in- 
dustrial process.  They  will  be  located  near  the  railway,  in  a  locality 
abounding  in  forage  and  water,  where  the  large  enclosures  will  make  'it 
possible  to  keep  the  cattle  in  healthy  condition.'  " — Id.,  p.  6. 

"Although  the  supply  of  fresh  meats  for  armies  is  a  relatively  easy 
matter  on  account  of  the  great  abundance  of  cattle  in  all  portions  of  the 
country  and  of  means  of  transportation,  the  danger  from  distempers 
subject  the  administration  to  the  greatest  inconveniences. 

"When  toward  the  end  of  the  month  of  August,  1870,  the  ist  Ger- 
man Army  had  united  with  the  2d  in  the  investment  of  Metz,  the  cattle 
plague  broke  out  in  the  herds  assembled  at  Sarrelouis,  Courcelles,  Ars, 
and  Jouy,  and  caused  great  ravages  in  a  few  days.  The  army  could  count 
neither  on  the  local  resources,  since  it  was  to  remain  in  the  same  place  for 
an  indefinite  period,  nor  upon  those  of  the  zones  in  the  rear,  for  the  cattle 
forwarded  would  have  been  rapidly  contaminated  and  would  have  served 
only  to  increase  the  extent  of  the  contagion.  It  was  necessary  to  estab- 
lish at  Mayence  a  field  abattoir,  from  which  the  quarters  of  dressed  meat 
previously  washed,  dried,  and  salted  in  order  to  assure  the  keeping  quali- 
ties, then  surrounded  with  straw,  were  forwarded  directly  to  the  troops 
by  the  railway. 

"Since  that  time  an  industry  has  been  developed,  which,  under 
similar  conditions,  would  be  of  great  assistance  to  armies  in  the  field.  We 
now  refer  to  the  preservation  of  meats  by  cold  and  dry  air. 

"You  know  that  this  is  the  method  adopted  by  breeders  of  La  Plata, 
of  Australia,  etc.,  who  until  recently  could  only  utilize  the  fat  and  hides 
of  their  herds  to  import  to  Europe  immense  quantities  of  meat.  In 
France  also  a  cold-storage  depot  has  been  installed  at  Havre,  and  sends 
each  week  to  Paris  2,000  carcasses  of  mutton  and  the  same  number  of 
quarters  of  beef.  The  meat,  after  having  been  dried,  is  placed  in  a  re- 
frigerating chamber  with  double  walls,  where  a  current  of  cold  air,  pro- 
duced by  a  refrigerating  machine,  maintains  the  necessary  temperature. 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

The  frozen  meat  is  transported  by  rail,  in  cars  specially  constructed,  where, 
efore  starting,  the  cold  air  necessary  to  keep  the  meat  in  good  condition 
during  the  journey,  is  introduced. 

"The  frozen  meat  needs  no  preparation  before  being  used;  it  is  suf- 
ficient to  hang  it  in  dry  air  for  some  time  to  bring  it  to  the  temperature 
of  the  surrounding  air  and  permit  it  to  regain  all  its  natural  qualities.  In 
summer  twelve'hours  are  sufficient  to  obtain  this  result;  in  winter  some 
hours  longer  are  necessary." — Crttin,  "Conferences  sur  I' Administration 
Militaire,"  p.  420. 

"The  Organization  and  Administration  of  the  Lines  of 
Communication  in  War,"  by  Colonel  GEORGE  ARMAND  FURSE, 
C.  B.,  London,  1894,  page  279: 

********* 
"Cattle  can  be  driven  in  every  direction  the  troops  have  to  take; 
this  is  supposed  to  render  the  service  of  the  meat  ration  more  easy  and 
manageable  than  any  other.  We  must,  nevertheless,  take  into  account 
that  the  animals  often  follow  the  columns  with  difficulty,  and  that  long 
marches  of  numerous  herds  of  cattle,  with  the  grazing  often  limited  and  of 
inferior  quality,  have  the  effect  of  lowering  the  condition  of  the  animals 
and  of  abstracting  from  their  flesh  some  of  its  nutritive  qualities.  As  a 
rule,  cattle  should  always  be  rested  for  some  hours  before  being  slaughtered. 
"Proper  steps  must  be  taken  in  time  to  provide  against  any  failure 
in  the  supply  of  cattle  for  slaughter,  for  this,  unfortunately,  is  one  of  the 
supplies  which  fails  first.  If  the  occupied  territory  cannot  supply  cattle 
in  sufficient  number,  they  must  be  obtained  from  foreign  markets.  The 
purchase  of  cattle,  however,  requires  judgment,  for  we  read  in  ancient 
history  (A.  D.  810)  how  the  cattle  plague  destroyed  all  the  cattle  the  Em- 
peror Charlemagne  had  collected  for  his  army.  Coming  down  to  more 
recent  times,  Sir  W.  Power  remarks:  'Epidemics  almost  invariably  occur 
in  countries  where  there  is  such  unusual  movement  of  cattle  as  is  caused 
in  war.  In  Roumania,  Bulgaria,  and  Asia  Minor,  during  the  Crimean 
War,  murrain  amongst  the  sheep  and  cattle  became  almost  universal,  and 
it  spread  into  the  principalities  before  the  war  was  ended.  It  is  a  well- 
established  fact  that  the  cattle  purchased  in  Russia  and  Poland  for  the 
German  Army  in  the  War  of  1870-1871  brought  the  cattle  plague  into  the 
Prussian  Provinces. 

********* 
"PRESERVED  PROVISIONS. — When  the  supply  of  animals  for  slaughter 
is  very  uncertain,  or  when  bad  or  insufficient  forage  or  water  prevent  the 
cattle  from  following  the  troops,  these  will  have  to  be  fed  on  canned  or 
salted  meats.  The  soldier  always  prefers  the  more  familiar  forms  of  food, 
and  the  patent  compounds  and  preserved  provisions  that  replace  them 
are  not  unnaturally  unpopular  with  him. — Idem,  p.  282. 

********* 
"Canned  meat,  salted  beef  or  pork,  demand  a  large  increase  in  the 
transport,  as  only  fresh  meat  carries  itself.  The  long  droves  of  live  cattle 
are,  however,  a  source  of  constant  delay;  in  certain  instances  the  enfeeble- 
ment  of  the  animals  performing  long  marches  with  insufficient  time  for 
grazing,  and  the  conditions  under  which  they  are  slaughtered  and  cut  up, 
are  greatly  against  their  being  used.  In  such  cases,  but  for  the  precaution 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  89 

of  keeping  a  large  supply  of  preserved  provisions  handy,  the  soldier  would 
have  to  go  without  meat. 

"The  great  progress  made  in  late  years  in  the  preservation  of  food, 
has  been  of  signal  advantage  in  the  alimentation  of  troops  in  the  field. 
Canned  meats  and  biscuit  pack  well,  keep  for  a  long  period,  and  are  not 
subject  to  the  same  deterioration  as  fresh  provisions;  preserved  provisions 
can  be  eaten  at  once,  and,  their  weight  being  uniform,  the  distributions 
can  be  made  with  greater  speed  and  less  labor.  The  meat  has  no  bone; 
all  is  useful  food.  With  respect  to  packing,  every  care  should  be  taken 
to  reduce  the  bulk  on  account  of  the  saving  it  will  effect  in  the  transport. 

"Notwithstanding  the  many  advantages  claimed  for  preserved  pro- 
visions, they  should  only  be  considered  in  the  light  of  a  reserve,  to  be  used 
when  necessity  compels  us  to  resort  to  these  substitutes,  for  fresh  bread 
and  fresh  meat  are  necessary  to  secure  the  health  and  strength  of  the 
soldier.  Reasonable  as  it  is  to  take  into  account  the  many  difficulties 
which  encompass  the  procuring  of  fresh  eatables  for  the  troops,  to  imagine 
that  an  unlimited  use  of  preserved  provisions  can  be  made  during  a  cam- 
paign is  a  fallacy  to  be  judiciously  guarded  against.  As  nothing  is  con- 
sidered more  conducive  to  the  maintenance  of  health  than  a  change  of 
diet,  every  effort  must  be  made  to  obtain  at  all  times  as  large  a  supply  of 
fresh  provisions  as  possible.  The  stomach  demands  a  change  of  diet; 
after  many  days  of  feeding  on  boiled  meat,  everyone  knows  what  a  relief 
it  is  to  be  able  to  partake  of  a  bit  of  roast  flesh. 

"With  regard  to  a  too  prolonged  use  of  preserved  provisions,  it 
should  be  observed  that  when  the  soldier  is  in  comfortable  quarters  and 
has  comparatively  light  work  to  perform,  he  is  fed  on  bread,  fresh  meat, 
vegetables,  and  groceries;  when,  on  the  other  hand,  in  the  field,  he  has  to 
undergo  fatiguing  marches — carrying  a  heavy  weight — and  is  subject  to 
every  kind  of  exposure,  necessity  often  compels  us  to  feed  him  on  hard 
biscuit  and  preserved  meat.  Thus,  when  his  nourishment  requires  to  be 
of  the  best  is  the  very  time  when  he  ceases  to  partake  of  the  most  strength- 
ening food. 

"It  is  more  economical  to  supply  canned  meat  in  small  tins;  when 
issued  in  six-pound  tins,  a  great  part  of  it  is  thrown  away  and  wasted. 
It  has  been  found  that  the  meat  in  tins  which  have  been  exposed  to  a  very 
hot  sun  has  gone  bad. 

"Canned  meat  is  very  devoid  of  fat;  consequently  after  a  short  time 
it  becomes  distasteful.  Some  kinds  being  more  salted  than  others,  pref- 
erence should  be  given  to  the  less  salted  sorts  in  operations  conducted  in 
countries  where  the  water  supply  is  known  to  be  limited.  Smoked  meat 
retains  all  its  nutritive  constituents,  and  is  therefore  preferable  to  salt 
meat.  The  brine  in  the  preparation  of  the  latter  abstracts  many  of  the 
substances  which  are  essential  to  the  constitution  of  the  flesh ;  thus  salted 
meat  in  process  of  salting  becomes  deficient  of  nutritive  materials,  and  is 
injurious  when  it  forms  a  principal  and  continuous  article  of  diet." 

"Alimentation  et  Ravitaillement  des  Armees  en  Campagne, 
Cours  d' Administration  en  temps  de  guerre  et  de  manoeuvres 
professe  a  1'Ecole  Superieure  de  Guerre  en  1896-1897,"  par  M. 
PEYROLLE,  Sous-Intendant  Militaire  de  ire  classe,  page  88: 

"At  the  end  of  August  (1870)  an  epidemic  broke  out  in  the  herds 
at  Sarrelouis,  Courcelles,  Ars-sur-Moselle,  Puy-aux-Arches.  It  became 


90  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

necessary  to  slaughter  the  cattle  and  supply  the  army  investing  Metz  only 
with  smoked  or  salted  meat.  The  troops  becoming  tired  of  it,  there  was 
an  abattoir  established  at  Mayence,  from  which  was  forwarded  meat 
packed  in  straw,  which  had  previously  been  cooked  and  rubbed  with 
pepper  and  salt;  but  this  bred  dysentery." 

"Provisioning  Armies  in  the  Field,"  by  Colonel  GEORGE 
ARMAND  FURSE,  C.  B.,  London,  1899,  page  292 : 

********* 

"Nothing  will  so  conduce  to  the  health  and  strength  of  the  fighting 
man  as  fresh  bread  and  fresh  meat;  this  is  incontestable;  nevertheless, 
fresh  provisions  occupy  a  good  deal  of  room  and  are  easily  spoilt.  Say 
that  the  soldier  has  been  furnished  with  a  supply  for  three  days,  the  whole 
of  his  haversack  will  be  nearly  filled,  causing  him  inconvenience.  The 
meat  portion  carried  in  a  haversack  with  a  number  of  other  articles  soon 
gets  tainted  and  loathsome;  it  turns  equally  bad  if  carried  in  a  mess-tin. 
At  the  commencement  of  a  march,  the  soldier  will  possibly  strive  to  keep 
the  rations  in  good  condition,  but  little  by  little  he  will  become  careless. 
7f  it  becomes  very  hot,  if  dust  gets  at  the  haversack,  the  meat  is  spoilt; 
a  great  portion  of  it  becomes  unpalatable  and  is  cast  away. 

"Meat  is  often  said  to  be  the  only  part  of  the  soldier's  food  which 
carries  itself;  in  other  words,  herds  of  cattle  follow  the  march  of  the 
troops.  How  badly  fitted  the  animals  must  be  for  food  after  a  march  of 
from  twelve  to  fifteen  miles  a  day,  smothered  by  dust,  without  proper 
pasture  and  water,  can  be  left  to  imagination.  Under  these  disadvant- 
ages the  cattle  cannot  but  lose  condition,  and  cattle  much  out  of  condi- 
tion are  liable  to  take  and  spread  all  manner  of  contagious  diseases.  Ani- 
mals obtained  locally  on  requisition  or  by  purchase  will  be  in  better 
condition  for  slaughter. 

"The  rule  with  regard  to  live  stock  is  that  the  vital  energy  of  the 
animals  which  may  have  been  to  any  extent  impaired  by  excessive  fatigue 
or  from  any  other  cause,  should  have  fully  recovered  before  they  are 
slaughtered;  then  only  the  flesh  can  be  considered  of  good  quality.  This 
condition  is  not  fulfilled  with  cattle  which  have  to  conform  to  the  move- 
ments of  the  troops.  Their  habits  of  life  are  totally  changed :  accustomed 
to  wander  leisurely  on  soft  fields,  on  the  march  they  tread  on  hard  roads^ 
urged  at  a  pace  to  them  extraordinary;  they  are  pressed  for  many  con- 
secutive hours;  are  harassed  and  kept  in  a  feverish  condition.  The  ani- 
mals will  be  saved  much  fatigue  when  transported  part  of  the  way  by  rail ; 
nevertheless  this  will  not  spare  them  the  hardships  of  the  journey.  They 
will  be  overcrowded,  seriously  frightened,  and  will  suffer  from  exposure, 
hunger,  and  thirst. 

"To  drive  cattle  on  the  hoof  in  rear  of  the  combatants  is,  by  many 
practical  men,  regarded  as  an  error.  As  cattle  march  slower  than  the 
troops,  they  cause  intervals  in  the  length  of  the  column;  they  are  difficult 
to  keep  together  on  such  roads  as  are  not  bound  by  fences,  and  come  into 
camp  long  after  the  troops;  there  they  are  penned  up,  and  seldom  get  an 
opportunity  for  picking  up  food  in  pasture-fields.  Under  these  conditions 
the  animals  soon  get  reduced  to  skin  and  bone,  and  the  nutritive  value  of 
the  ration  is  very  considerably  lowered.  Should  the  animals  show  signs 
of  having  contracted  any  contagious  disease,  they  will  have  to  be  destroyed, 
without  having  rendered  any  service  to  the  commissariat. 

*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  91 

"The  need  for  driving  cattle  no  longer  exists,  now  that  preserved  meat 
of  good  quality  and  at  a  resonable  price  has  become  an  article  of  commerce. 

"Preserved  provisions  of  many  kinds  have  now  come  to  be  of  the 
greatest  help  to  an  army  in  the  field.  Both  with  regard  to  their  transpor- 
tation and  employment,  they  are  very  well  adapted  for  use  in  a  campaign. 
Preserved  provisions  rank  as  reserves;  the  principal  conditions  which  these 
eatables  should  fulfil  are :  good  nutritive  qualities,  small  volume,  lightness, 
good  keeping  qualities,  and  speediness  in  the  preparation  of  the  meals. 

"Provisions  of  this  kind  occupy  less  space  and  weigh  less  than  fresh 
victuals;  they  enable  the  soldier  to  live  for  a  certain  number  of  days  on 
what  he  carries  in  his  valise,  if  the  country  he  is  in  affords  no  other  re- 
sources, or  the  army  has  outstripped  its  provision  columns.  When  the 
local  resources  are  insufficient  to  provide  all  that  is  needed,  by  adding 
preserved  provisions  to  the  little  that  is  found  the  soldier  can  be  ade- 
quately fed.  The  advantages  of  preserved  meat  and  preserved  vegetables 
have  been  so  fully  recognized  that  in  most  European  States,  with  a  view 
to  their  employment  in  war,  establishments  have  been  provided  for  their 
manufacture. 

' '  What  is  much  to  be  desired  in  many  of  the  circumstances  of  a  cam- 
paign is  a  description  of  eatables  which  can  be  easily  transported  and  have 
beyond  doubt  good  keeping  qualities.  A  reserve  ration,  small  in  bulk, 
very  nourishing,  and  easy  to  transport,  which,  when  substituted  for  the 
ordinary  provisions,  should  give  an  invigorating  meal.  Certain  rapid  and 
continuous  movements  cannot  be  executed  without  something  of  this  sort. 

"When  employing  railways  as  lines  of  supplies,  a  very  ordinary  re- 
flection will  show  how  a  certain  number  of  trucks  will  be  able  to  carry  far 
more  rations  of  preserved  meat  than  their  equivalent  in  live  cattle.  In- 
deed, all  the  many  experiences  which  have  been  made  with  substitutes 
for  fresh  meat  have  had,  amongst  other  principal  objects,  a  tangible  re- 
duction in  the  matter  of  transport.  In  the  field,  however,  it  is  held  that 
their  use  should  not  be  pushed  too  far,  for  a  lengthy  consumption  of  any 
single  description  of  food  tires  and  disgusts  the  stomach.  Man,  not  sat- 
isfied with  procuring  food  for  his  support,  has  endeavored  to  add  to  it 
some  seasoning  which  will  gratify  his  palate.  In  the  Franco-German  War 
the  German  soldiers  very  frequently  complained  that  they  were  tired  of 
the  same  nourishment;  that  there  was  no  variety,  no  account  taken  of 
their  taste. 

"Canned  meat  has  several  advantages.  It  can  be  carried  by  the 
soldier  for  any  time  without  undergoing  deterioration;  it  nourishes  him 
well,  for  a  pound  of  it  really  represents  a  pound  of  food ;  it  is  more  tender 
than  freshly  killed  meat ;  it  can  be  made  into  excellent  soup  or  can  be 
eaten  cold.  This  last  is  a  very  valuable  advantage  when  the  soldier  has 
not  time  to  cook  his  meals  on  service,  has  no  fuel,  or  is  worn  down  by 
fatigue.  He  can  then  eat  a  piece  of  it  cold  with  some  bread  or  biscuit, 
and  soon  lie  down  to  take  his  rest.  Compare  this  with  the  use  of  fresh 
provisions  when,  to  prepare  a  meal,  water  and  fuel  have  to  be  fetched, 
the  fires  lighted,  and  some  hours  must  naturally  be  allowed  to  elapse  before 
the  food  is  cooked  and  fit  to  eat. 

"But,  invaluable  an  article  as  canned  meat  is  for  troops  in  the  field, 
it  is  devoid  of  fat,  and  soldiers  quickly  tire  of  it.  The  point  which  should 
engage  our  attention  is  to  study  how  it  can  be  made  the  basis  of  a  really 
palatable  meal.  The  chief  point  in  this  direction  is  to  assimilate  the  nour- 
ishment to  what  the  soldier  has  been  accustomed  to  in  his  home.  With  a 


92  The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army. 

little  ingenuity,  several  ways  will  be  found  of  cooking  canned  meat,  and 
when  mixed  with  certain  ordinary  essences  and  condiments — extracts  of 
onions,  celery,  carrots,  parsley,  etc. — some  way  may  be  discovered  that 
will  deprive  it  of  its  somewhat  insipid  taste.  Onions  are  invaluable;  they 
impart  an  agreeable  flavor  to  the  soup.  Rice,  lentils,  pearl  barley,  or  oat- 
meal, added  to  it,  would  have  that  effect.  These  articles  keep  well." — 
Idem,  pp.  294,  295. 

The  Supply  Service  in  the  Field.  From  the  Point  of  View 
of  the  Staff  of  the  Higher  Commands  by  COLONEL  v.  FRANCOIS, 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  IVth  (German)  Army  Corps. 
Part  I.,  1904,  Page  27. 

The  "Dienstanweisung  fur  den  Schlachtereibetrieb  und  den  Viehtrans- 
port"  ("Regulations  for  the  Slaughtering  and  Transport  of  Animals") 
states  that  pigs,  calves,  and  cattle  ready  for  killing  cannot  undertake  long 
marches,  and  that  they  can  only  be  moved  long  distances  overland  by 
means  of  box  wagons.  The  regulations  lay  down  the  distance  that  oxen 
can  march  in  a  day  as  20  kilometers  on  the  average,  provided  that  there 
are  two  rest  days  in  each  week  and  that  the  animals  are  well  fed  and 
looked  after.  Oxen  and  pigs  will  therefore  have  to  be  left  behind  when 
troops  are  continually  advancing,  and  cannot,  as  a  rule,  be  used  in  such 
circumstances  for  supply  purposes.  Any  attempts  to  make  the  animals 
march  further  might  easily  lead  to  the  outbreak  of  all  sorts  of  diseases. 
These  animals  have  but  little  stamina;  when  they  have  to  endure  much 
physical  exertion  and  are  badly  looked  after  and  insufficiently  fed,  they 
die  and  their  carcases  poison  the  air.  The  conditions  under  which  sheep 
can  be  forwarded  are  much  more  favorable.  "The  Regulations  for  the 
Slaughtering  and  Transport  of  Animals"  gauges  their  average  marching 
powers  at  30  kilometers  per  diem.  According  to  this,  their  rate  of  move- 
ment is  approximately  the  same  as  that  of  the  troops;  flocks  of  sheep 
could  therefore  be  driven  along  and  made  use  of  for  feeding  purposes. 

"Les  Principes  du  Ramtaillement  des  Armees  Modernes, 
Appliques  a  la  Guerre  Russo-Japonaise,"  par  1'  Intendant  Mili- 
taire  Jean  Schrabok,  du  Comite"  Militaire  Technique  Austro- 
Hongrois. 

"In  the  particular  part  of  Manchuria  then  occupied,  no  beef  cattle 
are  raised.  The  Chinaman  eats  no  beef  and  makes  no  us  e  of  dairy 
products.  Cattle  are  used  only  as  draft  animals  and  they  are  not  found 
in  great  numbers.  In  Mongolia,  on  the  contrary,  the  raising  of  beef 
cattle  is  one  of  the  principal  industries;  but  Chinese  neutrality  interposed 
an  obstacle  to  purchase  of  supplies  in  that  province,  and  it  became  neces- 
sary to  employ,  for  this  purpose,  persons  who  were  on  friendly  terms 
with  the  Mongol  princes. 

"There  were,  however,  drawbacks  to  the  plan  of  buying  beeves  at  so 
great  a  distance.  It  required  a  large  escort  to  drive  and  care  for  the  ani- 
mals, and  it  was  besides  necessary  to  vaccinate  the  droves  against  splenic 
fever,  in  order  that  the  men  themselves  might  not  contract  the  disease. 
This  required  the  procuring  and  keeping  on  hand  of  sufficient  quantity  of 
the  specific  serum.  Finally,  the  watering  of  any  considerable  number  of 


The  Provisioning  of  the  Modern  Army.  93 

animals  presented  great  difficulties,  particularly  in  winter.  To  all  these 
complications  was  added  the  rapid  increase  of  troops,  which  suddenly 
aggravated  the  conditions. 

"The  approach  of  the  cold  season  had  likewise  given  rise  to  orders 
for  frozen  beef  to  be  shipped  from  the  rear,  though  this  measure  produced 
but  a  tardy  effect.  There  were,  besides,  serious  losses  resulting  from  acci- 
dents on  the  railway." 

From  the  "Revue  du  Service  de  T  Intendance  Militaire,"  Tome  XX., 
p.  881. 


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